11. That it is of his own power that he dies, and that mortality is not a property of human nature which is pure
그가 죽는 것이 그의 고유한 능력이라는 것, 그리고 필멸성은 순수한 인간 본성의 속성이 아니라는 것
A. It now remains to investigate whether he is capable of dying as a consequence of his human nature; for, in consequence of his divine nature, he will always be incorruptible.
이제 남아있는 탐구할 것은 그가 그의 인간 본성의 귀결로서 죽을 능력이 있는지 하는 것이다; 왜냐하면, 그의 신성의 귀결로, 그는 불후할 것이기 때문이다.
B. Why need we have doubt about this, seeing that he is to be a true man and all mankind is by nature mortal?
우리가 이것에 대해 왜 의심해야 하는가, 그는 진정한 인간일 것이고 모든 인류는 본성상 필멸인데?
A. I do not think that mortality is a property of pure human nature, rather of human nature which is corrupt. Certainly, if man had never sinned and his immortality had been confirmed in such a way that it could not be changed, he would none the less have been truly human. Moreover, when mortals rise again into incorruptibility, they will be no less true human beings. Now, if mortality were a property essential for the genuineness of human nature, it would not be possible for someone immortal to be human. For corruptibility or incorruptibility is not a determinant of the genuineness of human nature, since neither makes or destroys a human being: rather, one has the power to cause him misery, the other happiness. But, on the reasoning that there is no human being who does not die, ‘mortal’ is specified in the definition of a man given by philosophers who did not believe that the whole man had ever been, or could be, immortal. Because of this, the fact that he is truly human is insufficient to prove that the man we have in mind need be mortal.
나는 필멸이 순수한 인간 본성의 속성이라고 생각하지 않고, 오히려 오염된 인간 본성에 속한다고 생각한다. 확실히, 만일 인간이 결코 죄를 짓지 않았고 그의 불멸성이 변할 수 없을 그런 방식으로 확정되었더라면, 그는 조금도 덜 참된 인간이지 않았을 것이다. 더욱이, 필멸자들이 불후성으로 부활할 때, 그들은 전혀 덜 인간존재들인 게 아닐 것이다. 이제, 만일 필멸이 이간 본성의 진성에 본질적 속성이었다면, 불멸하는 누군가가 인간이 되기는 불가능했을 것이다. 왜냐하면 가후성이나 불후성은 인간 본성의 진성을 결정하는 요소가 아니기 때문이다, 그것이 인간 존재를 만들지도 파괴하지도 않으므로: 오히려, 그 한 쪽은 그를 불행하게 만들 능력을 가지고, 다른 쪽은 행복하게 만들 능력을 가진다. 그러나, 죽지 않는 인간 존재는 아무도 없다는 추론에서, '필멸'은 전체로서의 인간이 결코 불멸이었거나 그럴 수 있었다 믿지 않는 철학자들에 의해 가정된 인간의 정의 속에서 규정된다. 이로 인하여, 그가 참된 인간이라는 사실은 우리가 고려하는 인간이 필멸이어야 함을 증명하기에 부족하다.
B. So, look for another line of reasoning. For I do not know of a way of proving that he is capable of dying, if you do not know one.
그래, 추론의 다른 노선을 보자. 왜냐하면 나는 그가 죽을 능력이 있다고 증명할 방법을 모르니까, 만일 니가 모른다면.
A. There is no doubt that he will be omnipotent, seeing that he is like God.
그가 전능할 것임은 의심의 여지가 없다, 그는 신과 같으므로.
B. This is true.
그거 맞다.
A. If it is his will, then, he will be able to lay aside his soul and take it up again.
만일 그게 그의 의지라면, 그래서, 그는 그의 영혼을 내려놓고 다시 되찾을 능력이 있을 것이다.
B. If he cannot do this, I do not see that he is omnipotent.
만일 그가 이리 할 수 없다면, 나는 그가 전능하다고 보지 않는다.
A. It will be in his power, therefore, never to die, if he wishes; it will also be in his power to die and rise again. Furthermore, it makes no difference, so far as his power is concerned, whether he lays his soul aside without involvement of any other person in the action, or whether it is another person who will bring it about that he lays it aside, having given his own consent.
그러므로 절대로 죽지 않음이 그의 능력 안에 있을 것이다, 만일 그가 바란다면; 또한 죽고 부활할 것도 그의 능력 안에 있을 것이다. 더욱이, 그의 능력과 관련하여, 그가 그의 영혼을 다른 어떤 인격의 개입 없이 그 행위 안에서 그의 영혼을 내려 놓는지 그렇지 않은지, 혹은 그가 그 영혼을 내려놓는 일을 불러일으킬 것이 또 다른 인격인지 아닌지, 그 자신의 허락을 고려하였을 경우 아무런 차이도 없다.
B. This is undoubtedly the case.
의심할 바 없는 사실이다.
A. If, therefore, it is his will to give his permission, it will be possible for him to be killed, and, if it is not, this will not be possible.
그러므로, 만일 그의 허락을 내놓는 것이 그의 의지라면, 그가 죽임을 당하는 일이 가능할 것이고, 만일 그렇지 않다면, 이건 불가능할 것이다.
B. This is the conclusion to which logic unswervingly leads us.
변함없이 우리를 인도하는 논리에 따르는 결론이다.
A. Logic has also taught us that he ought to possess something greater than everything which is below God, which he may give to God voluntarily and not in repayment of a debt.
논리는 또한 우리에게, 신으로부터 빌린 모든 것보다 더 대단한 어떤 것을 그가 지녀야 한다고 가르친다. 그것은 그가 자발적으로 그리고 빚의 보상이 아닌 것으로 신에게 줄 것이다.
B. That is right.
맞다.
A. But this cannot be found either below God or outside him.
하지만 이건 신으로부터 빌리든 그의 외부에서든 발견될 수 없다.
B. True.
맞다.
A. It is within the man himself, therefore, that it has to be found.
그러므로, 발견되어야 하는 것은 그 인간 자신 속에 있다.
B. This follows.
그리 귀결된다.
A. What he will give, therefore, will either be himself or something from himself.
그가 줄 것은 그러므로 그 자신이거나 그 자신으로부터의 어떤 것일 것이다.
B. I cannot conceive it to be otherwise.
달리 생각할 수 없다.
A. The question which now has to be asked is of what kind this giving ought to be. Now, he will not be able to give to God either himself or something from himself, as if he were making himself belong to one who does not own him—for every created being belongs to God.
지금 던져야 하는 질문은 주어야 하는 이것이 어떤 종류의 것인지 하는 것이다. 이제, 그는 신에게 그 자신이든 그 자신으로부터의 어떤 것이든 줄 능력이 없을 것이다, 마치 그가 그 자신을 그를 소유하지 않는 자에게 속하도록 만들고 있는 것처럼- 왜냐하면 모든 피조물은 신에게 속하니까.
B. This is so.
그렇다.
A. The way in which this giving has to be understood, therefore, is this: that in some way he will be laying aside himself, or something from himself, to the honour of God, since he will not be a debtor.
그러므로 이 제공은 이런 식으로 이해되어야 한다: 즉 어떤 식으로 그는 그 자신을 내려놓을 것이거나, 혹은 그 자신으로부터의 어떤 것을, 신의 영광에 대해 내려놓을 것이다, 그는 채무자가 될 수 없을 것이므로.
B. This follows from what has been said earlier.
앞서 이야기된 것에서 귀결한다.
A. If we say that he will make a present of himself as an act of obedience to God, in that he will be submitting himself to God’s will by upholding righteousness with perseverance, this will not constitute giving something which God does not demand from him in repayment of a debt. For every rational creature owes this obedience to God.
만일 우리가 그는 복종의 행위로서 그 자신을 신에게 선사할 것이라 말한다면, 그가 그가 그 자신을 인내와 더불어 정의를 지킴으로써 신의 의지에 복종하고 있으리란 점에서, 이 일은 신이 그에게 빚의 상환에 있어서 요구하지 않은 어떤 것을 주는 일을 구성하지 않을 것이다. 왜냐하면 모든 이성적 피조물은 이 복종을 신에게 빚지고 있으니.
B. It is impossible to deny this.
이걸 부정할 수 없다.
A. It ought to be in some other way, therefore, that he should give either himself or something from himself.
그러므로 그가 그 자신이나 그 자신으로부터의 뭔가를 주어야 함은 다른 어떤 방식으로 이루어져야 한다.
B. Reason impels us to this conclusion.
추론이 우리를 이 결론으로 강제한다.
A. Let us see whether perhaps this may not be for him to give his life, or to lay aside his soul, or to hand himself over to death, for the honour of God. For this is not something which God will demand from him in repayment of a debt, given that, since there will be no sin in him, he will be under no obligation to die, as we have said.
혹시 그가 그의 생명을 내놓거나, 그의 영혼을 내려놓거나, 그 자신을 죽음에 내맡기거나, 이 일이 신의 영광을 위한 게 아닐 수도 있는지 보자. 왜냐하면 이 일은 신이 빚의 상환에 있어서 그에게 요구할 어떤 것이 아니니까, 그의 내부에 아무런 죄도 없을 것이므로, 그는 죽을 아무런 의무 하에도 있지 않으리란 것, 우리 말대로 그러리란 것을 가정하면.
B. I cannot interpret the matter differently.
그 문제를 달리 볼 수 없다.
A. Let us consider further whether it is logically appropriate for it to be so.
그 일이 그리되는 게 논리적으로 적절한지 더 살펴보자.
B. Speak, and I will be happy to listen.
말해라, 나는 기꺼이 들으마.
A. If man sinned through pleasure, is it not fitting that he should give recompense through pain? And if it was in the easiest possible way that man was defeated by the devil, so as to dishonour God by his sinning, is it not justice that man, in giving recompense for sin, should, for the honour of God, defeat the devil with the greatest possible difficulty? Is it not fitting that man, who, by sinning, removed himself as far as he possibly could away from God, should, as recompense to God, make a gift of himself in an act of the greatest possible self-giving?
만일 인간이 쾌락을 통해 죄 지었다면, 고통을 통해 보상을 바쳐야 하리란 것이 어울리지 않나? 그리고 만일 인간이 악마에 의해 굴복당하는 것이 가능한 가장 쉬운 방식으로 이루어졌었다면, 그의 죄로 인한 신에 대한 불명예에 관한 한, 죄에 대한 보상을 줌에 있어서, 인간이 신의 영광을 위해 가능한 가장 어려운 일로 악마를 굴복시킴이 정의롭지 않나? 죄로써 그 자신을 그가 신으로부터 떨어질 수 있는 가능한 한 가장 멀리까지 떨어뜨린 인간이 신에 대한 보상으로서 가능한 가장 큰 자기-헌신의 행위에서 그 자신을 선사하는 게 적절하지 않나?
B. This is unsurpassable logic.
더할 나위 없는 논리다.
A. There can, moreover, be nothing that a man may suffer—voluntarily and without owing repayment of a debt—more painful or more difficult than death. And there is no act of self-giving whereby a man may give himself to God greater than when he hands himself over to death for God’s glory.
더욱이 인간이 겪을 죽음보다 더한 고통도 더한 어려움도 전혀 있을 수 없다 - 자발적으로 그리고 빚에 대한 상환의무 없이-. 그리고 그로써 인간이 그 자신을 신에게 줄 헌신의 행위로 그 자신을 신의 영광을 위해 죽음에 내맡기는 때보다 더 대단한 행위는 아무것도 없다.
B. All these things are true.
이거 다 맞다.
A. The one whose will it is to be to pay recompense for the sin of mankind ought therefore to have the characteristic of being able to die if he wishes.
인류의 죄에 대해 보상을 지불하게 되기를 의지하는 그는 그러므로 그가 바란다면 죽을 능력이 있는 자의 특성을 지녀야 한다
B. I see clearly that the man whom we are seeking ought to have the following characteristics: it will not be as a matter of necessity that he will die, because he will be omnipotent; he will not be dying obligatorily, because he will never be a sinner, and it will be within his capacity to die of his own free will, because this will be necessary.
나는 우리가 찾고 있는 그 인간이 다음과 같은 특성들을 지녀야 한다는 걸 분명히 안다: 그가 죽을 것이 필연의 문제가 아닐 것인데, 왜냐하면 그는 전능할 것이기 때문이다; 그는 의무적으로 죽게 되지 않을 것인데, 왜냐하면 그는 결코 죄인이 아닐 것이기 때문이고, 그것은 그의 고유한 자유의지로 죽을 그의 능력 안에 있을 것인데, 왜냐하면 이 이것이 필연적일 것이기 때문이다.
A. There are many other reasons too why it will be extremely appropriate for him to bear a resemblance to mankind and have the behaviour belonging to mankind—while being without sin. These reasons are more readily and clearly discernible in Christ’s life and works than can be demonstrated by reason alone, hypothetically, as if before experience of the events. For who may explain how necessary and wise a thing it was for it to come about that he who was to redeem the human race and bring it back from the way of death and destruction to the way of life and eternal happiness, should live in the company of human beings and, while he was teaching them verbally how they ought to live, should, through his very behaviour, present himself as an example? Furthermore, how was he to present himself to weak and mortal humans as an example of the fact that they should not depart from righteousness on account of injustices, insults, pain or death, if they were not aware that he himself had experience of all these things?
그가 인류와 유사함이 그리고 인류에 속하는 행동을 가짐이 왜 극도로 적절할 것인지에 대해 다른 많은 이유들이 있다-죄가 없음에도. 이런 이유들은 마치 그 사건들의 경험 이전인듯이 가정적으로 오직 추론만을 통해 증명될 수 있는 것보다 더욱 기껍고 분명하게 그리스도의 삶과 업적들 속에서 인식될 수 있다. 왜냐하면 인종을 구원하고 죽음과 파괴의 길로부터 삶과 영원한 복락의 길로 돌이킬 그가 인간 존재들의 세속에서 살아야 하고, 그가 그들에게 어떻게 살아야 하는지 구두로 가르치던 동안에, 그의 바로 그 행위를 통하여, 그 자신을 예시로서 보여주었던 일이 일어났다는 것이 얼마나 필연적이고 지혜로운 일이었는지 누가 설명하겠는가? 더욱이, 어떻게 그가 나약하고 필멸인 인간들에게 그들이 의로움으로부터 부정의, 모욕들, 고통이나 죽음으로 인하여 떠나서는 안 되다는 사실의 실례로서 자기 자신을 보여주었겠는가, 만일 그들이 그 스스로 이 모든 일들에 대한 경험을 지녔음을 알지 못한다면?
12. That, although he is a sharer in our discomforts, he is nevertheless not unhappy
설령 그가 우리의 불편을 공유할지라도, 그는 그럼에도 불구하고 불행하지 않다는 것
B. All these considerations make it patently obvious that it is right for him to be mortal and a sharer in our discomforts. But these are all circumstances which belong to our unhappiness. Will he not, therefore, be unhappy?
이 모든 고찰들은 그가 가사자가 되고 우리의 불편들을 공유하는 자가 됨이 옳다는 것을 명백히 분명하게 해준다. 그러나 이런 것들은 우리의 불행에 속하는 조건들이다. 그러므로 그는 불행하지 않겠나?
A. Not at all. For, just as a comfort which someone possesses against his will is not conducive to happiness, similarly it is not unhappiness to take upon oneself a discomfort willingly, out of wisdom, not out of any necessity.
전혀. 왜냐하면, 누군가 그의 의지에 반하여 지니는 안락이 행복에 기여하는 바가 없는 것과 마찬가지로, 유사하게 자의적으로, 어떤 필연이 아니라 숙려를 통해 자처한 불편은 불행이 아니다.
B. This must be admitted.
받아들여야만 하네.
13. That he does not have ignorance along with our other weaknesses
우리의 다른 나약함들에 더하여 그가 무지를 지니지는 않는다는 것
However, as regards the likeness which he needs to bear to members of the human race, say whether he is going to have ignorance in the same way as he is to have our other weaknesses.
그렇지만, 그가 인간 종의 구성원들에 속하기 위해 필요한 유사성을 고려해서, 그가 우리의 다른 나약함들을 지니는 것과 같은 방식으로 무지를 지니게 될지 말해줘.
A. Why do you have doubts with regard to God, as to whether he is omniscient?
왜 그가 전지한지에 관하여 신에 대해 의심하냐?
B. Because, although he is to be immortal as a consequence of his divine nature, he will nevertheless be mortal as a consequence of his humanity. Why, in view of this, will it not be possible for the man we have in mind to be truly ignorant, just as he will be truly mortal?
왜냐하면, 설령 그가 그의 신성의 결과로 불멸이라 할지라도, 그는 그럼에도 불구하고 그의 인성의 귀결로 가사자가 될 테니까. 이 관점에서, 왜 우리가 고려하는 그 인간이 참으로 무지함이, 마치 그가 참으로 가사자가 될 것과 마찬가지로, 가능할 수 없을까?
A. The accepting of man into the unity of the person of God will not be brought about otherwise than wisely, by the highest wisdom, and therefore there will be no acceptance1 of something which is in no way useful, but detrimental rather, for the work which the man is going to undertake. Now, there would be no purpose for which ignorance would be useful to him: rather it would be for many purposes detrimental. For how is he going to perform all the many great works which he is to perform, without immeasurable wisdom? Again, how are people going to believe in him, if they know he is ignorant? Moreover, supposing this is something they do not know: for what purpose will that ignorance be useful to him? And again, if it is the case that nothing is loved except that which is known: by the same token as it will be no good thing for him not to love, it will be no good thing for him to be ignorant. Furthermore, no one has a perfect knowledge of what is good who does not know how to distinguish it from what is bad. It is also the case that no one who is ignorant of the bad knows how to draw this distinction. The man we have in mind will therefore have all knowledge, even though he may not make this evident in public in his dealings with mankind.
신의 인격의 통합 속으로 이간을 수용함은 다른 식으로가 아니라 지혜롭게 이루어질 것이고, 최상의 지혜에 의해 이루어질 거라서, 그러므로 아무 쓸모 없는, 오히려 그 인간이 떠맡을 일에 대해 해로운 어떤 것의 수용은 전혀 없을 것이다. 이제, 무지가 그에게 유용할 어떤 용도도 없을 것이다: 오히려 해로운 많은 용도들이 있을 것이다. 왜냐하면 어떻게 그가 행한 많은 위대한 업적들 모두를 가늠할 수 없는 지혜 없이 수행하게 되었겠나? 다시, 만일 그가 무지하다는 걸 사람들이 알았더라면, 그들이 어떻게 그를 믿게 되었겠나? 더욱이, 그게 그들이 몰랐던 것이라 가정하면: 무지가 그에게 유용할 무슨 용도가 있겠는가? 또 다시, 만일 알려진 것 외에 어떤 것도 사랑받지 않음이 사실이라면: 같은 이유로 그가 사랑하지 않음이 좋은 것이 전혀 아닐 것이듯, 그가 무지함이 좋은 일이 전혀 아닐 것이다. 더 나아가, 나쁜 것으로부터 좋은 것을 어떻게 구분하는지 알지 못하는 자는 그 누구도 좋은 것이 무엇인지에 대한 완벽한 앎을 지니지 못한다. 나쁜 것에 대해 무지한 그 누구도 이 구분을 어떻게 이끌어낼지 알지 못한다는 것도 사실이다. 우리가 고려하는 인간은 그러므로 모든 지식을 지닐 것이다, 설령 그가 인류를 대함에 있어서 공적으로 명백하게 이점을 드러내진 않았을지라도.
B. What you are saying seems to hold good for his adulthood; but in his infancy it will not be the appropriate time for wisdom to appear in him, and similarly there will be no need, and consequently it will be incongruous, too, for him to have it.
그의 성년기에 대해서는 좋아 보이는 말이다; 하지만 그의 어릴 적에는 그에게서 지혜가 드러나기에 적절한 시기가 아닐 것이고, 마찬가지로 그럴 필요도 없을 것이며, 따라서 그가 그 지혜를 지님이 어울리지 않을 것이다.
A. Have I not said that the incarnation which we have in mind will be brought about in a way characterized by wisdom? Now, it will be in wisdom that God will take mortality upon himself, and it will be in wisdom that he will put it to use, because he will be using it to great advantage. But he will not be able to take ignorance upon himself in wisdom, because ignorance is never useful, always detrimental rather, except perhaps when an evil desire—something which will never be found in the God-Man—is prevented from being fulfilled. For even if sometimes ignorance is not detrimental in any other regard, it is nevertheless detrimental in the mere fact that it does away with the good which consists in knowledge. Moreover, to complete my brief reply to your enquiry: from the time when he becomes human, he will always be full of God, God’s identity being his own. Hence he will never be without God’s power and fortitude and wisdom.
우리가 고려하는 육화가 지혜에 의해 규정되는 방식에서 발생되리란 것을 말하지 않았냐? 이제, 신이 가사성을 자처할 것임이 지혜에 속할 것이고, 그 가사성을 이용할 것임이 지혜에 속할 것인데, 왜냐하면 그걸 아주 유용하게 써먹을 것이기 때문이다. 하지만 그는 지혜 안에서 무지를 자처할 능력은 없을 것인데, 왜냐하면 무지는 결코 유용하지 않고, 언제나 차라리 해롭기 때문이다, 아마도 악한 욕망이 - 신-인가 안에서는 결코 찾을 수 없을 그런 것으로서- 성취되는 일로부터 제지될 때를 제외하면. 왜냐하면 무지가 다른 경우 해롭지 않을 때가 종종 있더라도, 그럼에도 불구하고 지혜로 이루어지는 선이 없어진다는 단순한 사실에서 해롭다. 더욱이, 네 탐구에 대한 내 간략한 답변을 마무리하면: 그가 인간이 된 순간으로부터, 그는 언제나 완전한 신일 것이고, 신의 정체성은 그에게 고유한 것일 것이다. 따라서 그는 결코 신의 능력과 용기 그리고 지혜가 없지 않을 것이다.
B. I did not doubt that this was always the case with Christ but, even so, I none the less made this enquiry with the aim that I should hear a rational explanation for this fact also. For often we are certain that something is the case, but do not know how to prove it logically.
나는 이게 그리스도와 함께 언제나 사실임을 의심하지 않았지만, 그럴지라도, 이 사실에 대해 또한 이성적 설명을 들으리란 목적을 가진 이 탐구를 조금도 덜 이루지 않았다. 왜냐하면 종종 우리는 어떤 것이 사실임을, 하지만 그걸 어떻게 논리적으로 증명할지 모른다는 걸 확신하고 있으니.
14. That his death outweighs the number and magnitude of all sins
그의 죽음이 모든 죄들의 수와 크기를 압도한다는 것
Now my request is that you should teach me how it is that his death outweighs the number and magnitude of all sins, seeing that you make it clear that one sin which we consider the most lightweight is of such infinite magnitude that one ought not to take a glance contrary to the will of God, even supposing that an infinite number of universes, each full of creatures just as this one is, were to be laid out before one, and could not be kept from being reduced to nothing, except if someone were to take this glance.
이제 내 요청은 니가 어떻게 그의 죽음이 모든 죄의 수와 크기를 압도하는지 나에게 가르쳐주어야 한다는 거다, 너는 우리가 고려한 가장 가벼운 하나의 죄가 설령 이 세상처럼 피조물들로 각각이 가득 찬 무한한 수의 세계들을 가정할지라도 신의 의지에 반하여 눈길을 돌리는 일을 해서는 안 되는 것으로 드러날 것이고 전혀 경감될 수 없을 것으로, 누군가 이 눈길을 취하게 될 경우를 제외하면 그러리라고 하는 그렇게 무한히 큰 것에 속한다는 점을 밝혔으니까.
A. If the man we have in mind were to be present, and you knew who he was, and someone were to say to you, ‘If you do not kill this man, the whole of the universe will perish, and whatever is not God’, would you do it in order to preserve the whole of the rest of creation?
우리가 고려하는 인간이 현존한다면, 그가 당신이 알고 있는 그라면, 그리고 누군가 너에게 '만일 니가 이 사람을 죽이지 않으면, 세계 전체가 파멸할 것이고, 신 외에 뭐든 파멸할 것이다'라고 말한다면, 너 나머지 모든 창조 전체를 지키기 위해 죽일 거냐?
B. I would not do it, even if an infinite number of universes were offered to me.
안 죽일 거다, 설령 내게 무한한 세계들이 제공되더라도.
A. What if someone were to follow this up by saying, ‘Either you will kill him or all the sins of the world will come upon you’?
그를 죽이든지 세계의 죄들 모두가 너에게 부과되든지, 이리 말하면?
B. I would answer that I would rather take upon myself all other sins, not just all the sins of this universe—both those committed in the past and those to be committed in the future—but whatever sins can be conceived of as existing in addition to these. And I think I ought to make this answer not only with regard to the act of killing him, but with respect to any small injury whatsoever which would harm him.
차라리 다른 모든 죄 짊어진다고 답할 거다, 과거에 저질러지고 미래에 저질러질 죄들, 이 세계의 모든 죄들 전부가 아니고, 이것들에 더하여 현존하는 것으로 인정될 수 있는 죄들 무엇이든. 나는 내가 그를 죽이는 행위과 관련해서만이 아니라 그를 해할 그 어떤 종류의 작은 상해라도 관련해서 이리 대답해야 한다고 생각한다.
A. You are right in thinking so. But tell me why your heart makes such a judgement, being more horrified at one sin involving injury to this man than at all else that can be conceived of, given that all the sins ever committed are against him.
그리 생각하는 게 맞다. 하지만 왜 네 마음이 그런 판단을 내렸는지 말해라, 그에 대하여 저질러졌던 모든 죄들을 고려하여 인정될 수 있는 다른 모든 죄들보다도 이 사람에 대해 상해를 포함하는 하나의 죄에 더 두려워하면서.
B. It is because a sin which is directed at this man’s person is incomparably greater than all conceivable sins which are directed elsewhere than at his person.
그건 곧장 이 사람의 인격을 향하는 죄가 그의 인격 외에 다른 어떤 곳을 향하게 되는 가능한 모든 죄들보다 비할 수 없이 크기 때문이다.
A. What will you say to the objection that often someone willingly endures discomfiture to his own person so as not to endure greater discomfiture in his business dealings.
니가 말할 반대는 뭐냐, 종종 누군가 자의적으로 그의 일에 있어서 더 큰 실패를 감당하지 않기 위해 그 자신의 인격에 실패를 감당한다는 것에 대해서.
B. I will say that God has no need of this endurance, for all things are subject to his power, just as you said earlier in reply to some question of mine.
나는 신이 이런 감내를 전혀 필요로 하지 않는다고, 왜냐하면 모든 것은 그의 능력에 지배받기 때문이라고, 니가 내 어떤 질문에 답하면서 앞서 말했듯 그렇다고 말할 거다.
A. Your answer is a good one. We see, therefore, that no sins, no matter how immeasurably great or numerous, which are directed elsewhere than against the person of God, can be regarded as equal to the violation of the bodily life of the man whom we have in mind.
니 대답 좋다. 그러므로 우리는 안다 어떤 죄도 그게 얼마나 가늠할 수 없이 크거나 많더라도 상관 없이, 신의 인격에 반하는 것 외에 다른 곳을 향하는 죄는, 우리가 고려하는 인간의 육체적 삶에 대한 폭력과 동일한 것으로 간주될 수 있다는 걸.
B. This is perfectly clear.
완전히 명백하다.
A. How great a good does he2 seem to you to constitute, given that killing him is such a bad thing?
그가 이루는 것으로 네게 여겨지는 선이 얼마나 위대한가, 그를 죽임이 그렇게 나쁜 일임을 고려하면?
B. If every good is as good as its destruction is bad, he3 is an incomparably greater good than the sins immeasurably outweighed by his killing are bad.
모든 좋은 것들이 좋을 만큼이나 그 파괴가 나쁘다면, 그는 그를 죽이는 일이 나쁜 것이기에 모든 죄들이 가늠할 수 없이 압도되는 것보다 훨씬 더 비할 수 없이 대단한 선이다.
A. What you are saying is true. Consider also that sins are as hateful as they are bad and that the life which you have in mind is as loveable as it is good. Hence it follows that this life is more loveable than sins are hateful.
니가 말하는 거 맞다. 또한 죄들이 나쁠 뿐만 아니라 증오스럽기도 하고 니가 고려하는 삶이 좋을 뿐만 아니라 사랑할 만하다는 것을 고려해라. 따라서 이 삶이 죄들이 증오스러운 것보다 더욱 사랑스럽다는 것이 귀결한다.
B. This is something which I cannot fail to appreciate.
인정하지 않을 수 없는 것이다.
A. Do you think that something which is so great a good and so loveable can suffice to pay the debt which is owed for the sins of the whole world?
너는 그렇게나 좋고 그렇게나 사랑스러운 어떤 것이 세계 전체의 죄들에 대해 갚아야 하는 빚을 지불하는 데에 충분할 수 있다고 생각하냐?
B. Indeed, it is capable of paying infinitely more.
게다가, 무한히 넘치게 지불할 능력이 있다고 본다.
A. You see, therefore, how, if this life is given for all sins, it outweighs them all.
그러니까 너는 만일 이 삶이 모든 죄들을 위해 제공되면, 그 죄들 전부를 어떻게 압도하는지 안다.
B. Plainly.
충분히.
A. If, then, to accept death is to give one’s life, just as his life outweighs all the sins of mankind, so does his acceptance of death.
그래서 만일 죽음을 받아들임이 그의 삶을 제공하는 것이라면, 그의 삶이 인류의 모든 죄들을 압도하는 것처럼, 그렇게 그의 죽음 수용도 그렇다.
B. It is established that this is the case with all sins which do not touch the person of God.
신의 인격을 건드리지 않는 모든 죄들과 더불어 이게 참임이 확정적이다.
15. That this same death destroys the sins even of those who put him to death
이 동일한 죽음이 그를 죽음으로 몰아넣은 자들의 죄들까지도 소멸시킨다는 것
But now I see that another question has to be asked. For if to kill him is as bad as his life is good, how can his death overcome and destroy the sins of those who killed him? Or, if it destroys the sin of any one of them, how can it destroy in addition any sin committed by other people? For we believe that many of the human race have been saved, and that countless others are being saved.
하지만 이제 나는 또 다른 질문이 던져져야 한다는 걸 안다. 왜냐하면 만일 그를 죽임이 그의 삶이 좋은 만큼 나쁘다면, 어떻게 그의 죽음이 그를 죽였던 자들의 죄들을 압도하고 소멸시킬 수 있는가? 혹은 만일 그 죽음이 그들 중 누구 하나의 죄를 소멸시킨다면, 어떻게 다른 사람들에 의해 저질러진 어떤 죄든 추가로 소멸시킬 수 있는가?
A. The Apostle who said, ‘If they had known it, they would not have crucified the Lord of glory’ [1 Cor. 2: 8], provided the answer to this question. For so great is the difference between a sin committed knowingly and one which is committed through ignorance, that an evil which, if it were recognized for what it was, they would never be able to commit because of its enormity, is capable of being pardoned because it was committed through ignorance. For no member of the human race would ever wish to kill God, at least no one would knowingly wish it, and therefore those who killed him unknowingly did not fall headlong into that infinite sin with which no other sins can be compared. Bear in mind that in order to see how good his life was, we considered the magnitude of that sin not in relation to the fact that it was committed in ignorance, but as if it were committed knowingly—something which no one has ever done or would have been capable of doing.
'만일 그들이 알았더라면 그들은 영광의 주를 십자가에 매달지 않았을 것이다'라고 말했던 사도는, 이 물음에 답을 준다. 왜냐하면 그렇게나 대단하게 알고서 저질러진 죄와 무지로 저질러진 죄가 다르기 때문이다, 만일 그게 뭔지 알았다면 그들이 결코 그 심각함 때문에 저지를 수 없었을 그 일은 무지를 통해서였기 때문에 양해될 수 있는 것에 속하기 때문이다. 왜냐하면 인간 종의 그 어떤 구성원도 신을 죽이길 바라지 않을 것이고, 최소한 알고서 그러길 바라진 않을 것이며, 그러므로 그를 모르고 죽였던 자들은 다른 죄들과 비할 수 없는 무한한 죄로 곤두박질치지 않는다. 그의 삶이 얼마나 선한지 알기 위해서, 우리가 무지에서 그 죄가 저질러졌다는 사실과 관련하여 그 죄의 크기를 고찰하지 않았지만, 마치 알고서 저지른 것처럼 했음을 염두에 둬라 - 그 누구도 하지 않았을 혹은 할 수 없었을.
B. You have demonstrated logically that it was possible for those who killed Christ to attain to forgiveness of their sin.
그리스도 죽인 자들이 그들의 죄를 용서받을 수 있음을 논리적으로 증명했다.
A. What more are you asking now? Look! You recognize how logical necessity makes it clear that the city above has to have its complement made up by members of the human race, and that this cannot come about except through the remission of sins, which no man can have except through a man who is identical with God and who by his death reconciles sinners to God. We have clearly found Christ, whom we acknowledge to be God and man and to have died for our sakes. Be sure of this too, without any doubt: all that he says is true, since God is incapable of lying, and the deeds he did were done wisely, even though the reasoning behind them may not be understood by us.
이제 니가 물을 게 또 뭐냐? 봐라! 너는 논리적 필연이 어떻게 천상의 나라가 그 충족을 이루어야 하는지, 인간 종의 숫자를 통해 그래야 하는지, 그리고 이것이 죄의 사함을 통해서가 아니라면 일어날 수 없다는 걸, 신과 동일하고 그의 죽음으로 신에 대한 죄인들에 상응시키는 인간을 통해서가 아니라면 가질 수 없다는 걸 분명하게 하는지 알게 되었다. 우리는 그리스도, 우리가 신이며 인간이자 우리 때문에 죽었던 자로 인정하는 그를 분명히 찾았다. 어떤 의심의 여지도 없다: 그가 말하는 모든 게 참인데, 신은 거짓말할 능력이 없기 때문이고, 그가 행한 행위들은 지혜롭게 이루어졌는데, 설령 그 이면의 추론이 우리에 의해 이해될 수 없더라도 그렇다.
B. What you are saying is true, and I do not doubt that what he said is true or that what he did was done in accordance with reason. I nevertheless ask you to explain to me by what logic this truth, which to those who do not believe in the Christian faith seems as if it were not right and not possible, is in fact right and possible. I ask this not in order that you should confirm me in the faith, rather so that you should give one already confirmed in the faith the joy which comes from an understanding of the absolute truth.
니가 말 맞다, 그리고 나는 그가 말했던 것이 참임을 의심하지 않고 혹은 그가 했더 일이 이성에 따라 행해졌음을 의심하지 않는다. 그럼에도 불구하고 나는 니가 나에게 어떤 논리로 이 진리가, 그리스도교 신앙에서 믿음을 가지지 않는 자들에게 마치 옳지 않고 불가능해 보이는 이 진리가 사실 옳고 가능한지 설명해주길 바란다. 나는 이걸 니가 나를 신앙에 있어서 확신시켜주길 바라고 요구하는 게 아니라, 오히려 니가 이미 신앙 안에서 확신하는 자에게 절대적 진리를 이해하는 일로부터 오는 기쁨을 주길 바라고 요구한다.
16. How God produced a man without sin out of sinful matter; also about the salvation of Adam and Eve
어떻게 신은 죄로 물든 물질로부터 죄 없는 인간을 만들었는지; 또한 아담과 이브의 구원에 대하여
In view of this, it is my request that you should explain the reasoning behind the matters about which I have yet to ask you in the same way as you have elucidated the reasoning behind the matters which we have spoken of up to now. My first question is: how did God produce a man without sin out of the human race, which is totally permeated with sin? This was like producing unleavened bread out of leavened dough. For, granted that the actual conception of this man was untainted and devoid of the sin of carnal pleasure, the Virgin from whom he was taken was conceived ‘amid iniquities’ and her mother ‘conceived’ her ‘in sin’ [cf. Ps. 50: 7 Vulg. 51: 5], and she was born with original sin since she sinned in Adam, ‘in whom all have sinned’ [Rom. 15: 12].
이런 관점에서, 내 요청은 니가 우리가 지금까지 이야기했던 문제들의 이면의 추론을 설명했을 때와 동일한 방식으로 내가 아직 너에게 묻고 있는 그 문제들의 이면의 추론을 설명해 달라는 거다. 내 첫 물음은 : 어떻게 신이 인종, 완전히 죄로 물든 종으로부터 죄 없는 인간을 만들었는지? 이건 효모 없는 빵을 효모 들어간 반죽에서 만드는 것 같다. 왜냐하면, 이 인간의 구체적 개념이 때묻지 않고 육욕의 쾌락의 죄가 없었던 것이었음을 받아들이면, 부당성들 가운데 그가 그로부터 취해질 수 있었던 처녀를 인정하면 그리고 그녀의 어머니가 죄 안에서 그녀를 품었고, 그녀는 원죄와 함께 태어났는데 아담의 경우에서 그녀가 죄를 지었으므로, 그 안에 모든 죄가 있는.
A. Once it is agreed that the man whom we have in mind is God and the reconciler of sinners, there is no doubt that he is completely without sin. Moreover, this cannot be so if he has not been produced without sin out of sinful matter. Now, if we cannot understand the reasoning whereby the Wisdom of God did this, we ought not to express astonishment, but reverently bear with the fact that in the hidden recesses of so surpassingly great an actuality there is something which we do not know. Indeed, God’s restoration of human nature was more miraculous than his creation of it. For the two acts—restoration and creation—are both equally easy for God. However, in the time before he was created, man did not sin, and hence there was no need for restoration to take place. But after he was created he sinned and, because of his sin, deserved to lose both the fact of being created and the destiny for which he was created. In fact, though, he did not entirely lose the fact of being created. This was so that he could be the object of God’s punishment or of his mercy. For neither of these options could come about if he had been annihilated. It follows, then, that God’s restoration of human nature was more miraculous than his action in bringing it into existence, to the extent that the restoration was concerned with man as sinner and was contrary to what he deserved, whereas the creation was concerned with man in a state of sinlessness, and was not contrary to what he deserved. What a great thing it is, too, for God and man to combine in One, in such a way that a man is identical with God, while the integrity of both natures is preserved! Who may presume even to think that a human intellect might be capable of fathoming how it is that such an act has been performed, so wisely and so wonderfully?
일단 우리가 고려하는 인간이 신이며 죄의 조정자임을 동의하면, 그가 완전히 죄 없는 건 의심할 수 없다. 더욱이, 만일 그가 죄의 물질에서 죄 없이 탄생하지 않았다면 그럴 수 없다. 이제, 만일 우리가 신의 지혜로 이 일을 행한 그 추로을 이해할 수 없다면, 우리는 경악을 표할 게 아니라, 경건하게 깊숙하게 숨겨진 그렇게나 놀랍도록 대단한 실재성, 우리가 모르는 어떤 것이 있다는 그 현실성을 감내해야 한다. 더구나, 인간 본성에 대한 신의 복원은 그에 대한 창조보다 더 기적이었다. 왜냐하면 두 행위들 - 복원과 창조 - 모두 마찬가지로 신에게 쉽기 때문이다. 그렇지만, 그가 창조했던 때 이전에, 인간은 죄를 짓지 않았고, 따라서 복원이 일어날 필요가 없다. 하지만 그가 창조한 다음 그가 죄를 지었고, 그의 죄 때문에, 창조되었다는 사실과 그가 그를 위해 창조된 운명 모두 잃을 만하다. 사실, 그렇지만, 그는 창조된 사실을 완전히 잃지 않는다. 그래서 그가 신의 처벌 대상이 될 수 있었거나 그의 자비의 대상이 될 수 있었게 하도록. 왜냐하면 이 선택지들 중 어느 쪽도 만일 그가 무화되었더라면 일어날 수 없었을 것이기 때문이다. 따라서 신의 인간 본성 복원은 그걸 존재하게 만든 것보다 더 기적이다, 복원이 죄인으로서의 인간과 관련된 만큼 그리고 그가 받아야 할 것에 반대되는 만큼, 반면에 창조는 죄 없는 상태의 인간과 관련되고, 그가 받을 것에 반대되지 않는다. 이 무슨 대단한 일인가, 신과 인간이 하나로 결합하여 그런 식으로 인간이 신과 동일화되는 방식으로, 두 본성 모두의 완전성이 보존되는 한에서! 인간 지성이 그런 행위가 어떻게 이루어졌는지 이해할 능력을 가질 만큼 그렇게나 현명하고 경이롭다고 그 누가 짐작하겠는가?
B. I agree that no human being can in this life disclose the innermost depths of such a great mystery, and I am not asking you to do what no human can do, only as much as you can do. For you will be making a more persuasive case for there being deeper reasons for this action if you show that you discern some reason for it, than if, by saying nothing, you make it self-evident that you understand no reason at all.
그 어떤 인간도 이 삶 속에서 그런 대단한 신비의 가장 내밀한 깊이를 드러낼 수 없음을 동의한다, 그리고 나는 누구도 할 수 없는 걸 너한테 요구하지 않는다, 오직 니가 할 수 있는 한에서 요구한다. 왜냐하면 너는 만일 니가 아무것도 말하지 않음으로써 니가 어떤 추로도 전혀 이해하지 못함을 자명하게 하는 것보다 그 일에 대해 어떤 이유를 분간한다는 걸 보여준다면 이 행위에 대해 더 깊은 이유들이 있음에 대해 더 설득력 있는 경우를 만들 거다.
A. I see that I am unable to set myself free from your importunity. But let us give thanks to God if I can to any extent make clear the subject which you are demanding I should clarify. If, on the other hand, I cannot, let the proofs arrived at earlier suffice. For if it is established that God ought to become man, there is no doubt that he does not lack the wisdom and the power whereby this may be effected without sin.
나는 내가 내 스스로 네 끈질김에서 나를 자유롭게 할 능력이 없음을 안다. 하지만 만일 내가 어느 정도 분명하게 니가 내게 밝히길 요구하는 주제를 밝힌다면 신에게 감사하도록 하자. 만일 다른 한편으로 내가 할 수 없다면, 앞선 증명들이 충분하다고 하자. 왜냐하면 만일 신이 인간이 되어야 함이 확정된다면, 이 일이 죄 없이 완수될 지혜와 능력의 결여가 없으리란 것은 의심할 수 없으니까.
B. I am happy to accept terms of this sort.
그런 말은 기꺼이 받아들인다.
A. It was right, certainly, that the redemption which Christ brought about should benefit not only the people in being at that time, but others too. Let us imagine that there is a king and that the entire populace of one of his cities has sinned against him, with the exception of one man, who is none the less of the same race. None of them, moreover, is capable of doing anything to escape from the death penalty. Now, the man who is the only innocent party enjoys such favour with the king that he has it in his power to bring about the reconciliation of all those who believe in his advice, and he has such love towards the guilty that he wishes to do this. This reconciliation will be brought about by means of some service which will be very pleasing to the king, and which he will perform on a stated day in accordance with the king’s desire. And, since not all who are in need of reconciliation are able to assemble on that day, the king makes the concession, in view of the magnitude of the service, that any people who acknowledge before or after that day that they wish to receive pardon through the act which is to be performed on that day, and that they accede to the agreement concluded on that occasion, will be absolved from all their past guilt. Furthermore, supposing it should come about after this pardon that they should sin again, and provided that they should then be willing to give satisfaction in a suitable way and receive correction, they would receive pardon again through the effective power of this same agreement. There would be this proviso: that no one should enter his palace until the deed had been done whereby their wrongdoings were forgiven.
확실히 그리스도가 일으켰던 보상이 그 당시에 있던 인간들에게만 유익한 게 아니라 다른 이들에게도 유익해야 한다는 건 맞다. 왕이 있고 그의 도시들 중 하나의 대중이 그에게 반대하여 죄를 지었다고 가정해 보자, 같은 종족인 한 사람만 제외하고. 그들 중 누구도 사형으로부터 피할 수 없다고 하자. 이제, 유일하게 결백한 자가 그의 능력 내에서 그의 조언을 믿는 모든 자들의 화해를 일으키는 것으로 왕과 더불어 그런 기쁨을 누린다. 이 화해는 신을 기쁘게 할 어떤 봉사의 수단으로 일어날 거다. 그리고 신이 바라는 때에 맞추어 이루어질 거다. 그리고, 화해를 결여한 모든 이가 그 날 참여할 능력이 없기에, 왕은 양보할 것이다, 그 봉사의 크기의 관점에서, 전후에 그들이 그 날 수행될 그 행위를 통해 용서받기를 바라는 날 인정하는 누구든, 그 때 결론난 동의에 응한다, 무죄방면된다 적절하게 보상하길 바라고 교정 받는 자들, 그들이 이 동의의 효력을 통해 다시 용서받을 것이다. 단서가 있다. 누구도 그의 왕실에 그들의 죄가 용서받기 전까지 들어가지 않는다.
The thrust of this parable is that, when Christ brought about the redemption which we have in mind, not all those human beings who were to receive salvation were able to be present, and consequently there was such power in his death that its effect extends to those who were absent either geographically or temporally. That it would not be right for his death only to benefit those present is readily comprehensible from the fact that it was not possible for as many people to be present at his death as are needed for the building up of the heavenly city, even if all the people anywhere in existence at the time of his death were to be accepted for the redemption to which we have referred. For there are more evil angels than there would have been humans alive on that day, and it is from the human race that the full number of replacements for them has to be found. Nor is it to be believed that, since mankind’s first creation, there has been any time in which this world, filled as it is with creatures which were created for the use of mankind, has been so barren that there was no one in it from the human race bearing any relation to the purpose for which mankind was created. For it seems an incongruity that God should for one moment have permitted the human race, and all that he made for the use of the beings from whose ranks the heavenly city was to be completed, to exist, as it were, to no purpose. For they would seem to have their being in vain for as long as they did not seem to exist with a view to the purpose for which they were principally created.
이 우화의 요지는, 그리스도가 우리가 생각하는 그 보상을 일으킬 때, 구원 받을 인간 존재들 전부가 참석할 능력이 있지는 않고, 따라서 지리적으로든 시기적으로든 부재하는 자들의 범위까지 영향을 미치는 능력이 그의 죽음 안에 있어야 한다. 그의 죽음이 오직 현재하는 이들에게만 유익함은 옳지 않을 것임은 그의 죽음 당시에 있던 만큼의 사람들만 천국 구성에 필요하다는 건 불가능하다는 사실로부터 쉽게 이해할 수 있다, 설령 그의 죽음 당시 있던 어느 곳의 사람들이든 모두 우리가 말한 보상에 허용될 것이라 하더라도. 왜냐하면 그 날 살아있는 인간들보다 악한 천사들이 더 많기 때문이다. 그리고 인간 종으로부터 그들의 보충수가 찾아져야 하니까.
B. You are demonstrating with consistent and apparently incontrovertible reasoning that, since mankind was first created, there has never been any time devoid of some person connected with that reconciliation without which all mankind was created in vain. And we can conclude that this is not only fitting, but a necessity. For, assume that this state of affairs is more fitting and logical than that there should have been at some time no one with regard to whom the intention of God in creating mankind was to be fulfilled; assume too that there is no obstacle to this logical state of affairs: in that case it is a necessary fact that there has always been someone connected with the reconciliation we have in mind. Hence it is not to be doubted that Adam and Eve had a connection with that act of redemption, even though divine authority does not state this explicitly.
A. It also seems incredible that God excluded those two from his plan, in view of the fact that he created them and made it his plan, never deviating from it, to create from them all the human beings whom he was to take up into the heavenly city.
B. Indeed, what one ought to believe, rather, is that he created Adam and Eve particularly with the purpose in view that they should number among those for the sake of whom they were themselves created.
A. Your observation is a good one. But no soul could enter the heavenly Paradise before the death of Christ, in accordance with what I said earlier with reference to the ‘king’s palace’.
B. Such is the teaching which we hold to.
A. But that Virgin from whom the man about whom we are speaking was received was one of those who, before his birth, were cleansed of sins through him, and he was received from her in the state of cleanness which was hers.
B. What you are saying would please me greatly were it not for this: whereas he ought to have cleanness from sin in his own person and on his own account, he would appear to have it from his mother, and not to be clean on his own account, but through her.
A. It is not so. Rather, his mother’s cleanness, whereby he is clean, would not have existed, if it had not come from him, and so he was clean on his own account and by his own agency.
B. Good—so far as that issue is concerned. But there seems to me another question to be asked. We have said earlier that he is not going to die as a matter of necessity, and now we see that his mother was clean because of his death which was to happen in the future. How, then, is it that this man, who could not have existed if it were not for the fact that he was going to die, did not die of necessity? For, if he had not been going to die, the Virgin from whom he was received would not have been clean, since this could in no way be so, except in the light of a belief in the reality of his death, and there was no other way in which he could have been received from her. Hence, if he did not die obligatorily, after he was received from the Virgin, the consequence is that he could not be received from the Virgin after he was, in fact, received—and this is an impossibility.
A. If you had considered well our previous discussions, you would have understood that in the course of them this question had been resolved.
B. I do not see how.
A. When we raised the question whether the God-Man could tell lies, did we not demonstrate that where telling lies was concerned there were two potentialities, one being a desire to tell lies, the other, actual lie-telling? Did we not also show that, while he had the capacity for telling lies, he had the characteristic inherent in himself of not being able to wish to lie, and that, for this reason, he was worthy of praise for the righteousness whereby he kept to the truth?
B. Yes.
A. Similarly, in the case of saving one’s life, there is the capacity for wishing to save one’s life and the capacity for saving it. When, therefore, the question is asked whether the same God-Man could have saved his life, so as never to die, it is not a matter for doubt that he always had the capacity for saving it, even though he was not capable of wishing to save it, so as never to die. And since this was something he had inherent in him—I mean, this inability to have this wish—he laid down his soul not obligatorily but by the free exercise of his power.
B. These potentialities in him to which you refer—that for telling lies and that for saving his life—were not in the least comparable. For in the one case, it is a logical consequence that he would be capable of telling a lie if he were to wish it, but in the other, it appears that, if he were to wish not to die, he would no more be capable of this than he could not be what he was. For the purpose of his being a man was this: for him to die; and it was because of the assuredness of his future death that it was possible for him to be received from a Virgin.
A. You think that he was incapable of not dying, or that it was a matter of necessity that he died, because he was incapable of not being what he was: you may just as well assert that he was incapable of wishing not to die or that he wished of necessity to die. For it was no more for the purpose that he should die that he was made a man than for the purpose that he should wish to die. Therefore, just as you ought not to say that he could not wish not to die, or that he wished to die obligatorily, similarly it ought not to be said that he could not not die, or that it was of necessity that he died.
B. No indeed. Since both these things—that is, dying and wishing to die—are subject to the same line of reasoning, and both of them seem to have been inherent in him of necessity.
A. Who was it who wished of his own volition to make himself a man, so that, by the same unchangeable will, he would die and the Virgin from whom he—that man—was to be received would be made clean through faith in the certitude in his death?
B. God, the Son of God.
A. Has it not been demonstrated earlier that when the will of God is said to do something of necessity, it is not actually coerced by necessity, but is maintaining itself by its own spontaneous unchangeability?
B. This has indeed been demonstrated. Rather we see, conversely, that something which is God’s unchangeable will cannot not be and that it is necessary for it to be. Therefore, if it was God’s will that the man we have in mind should die, he could not not die.
A. As an inference from the fact that the Son of God took manhood upon himself with the intention that he should die, you are asserting that the man in question could not not die?
B. That is how I understand the matter.
A. Has it not emerged likewise from our earlier discussions that the Son of God is one person with the manhood which he took upon himself, so that the Son of God and the son of the Virgin are identical?
B. Yes, it has.
A. The same man, therefore, of his own volition, could not not die and did, in fact, die.
B. I cannot deny it.
A. Since, therefore, it is not out of any necessity that the will of God performs any action, but on the strength of his own power, and since the will of that man was the will of God, it was not out of any necessity that he died but on the strength of his power alone.
B. I am incapable of rebutting your lines of argument. For I can in no way invalidate either the propositions which you are adducing as premisses or the consequences which you are inferring. However, something which I have said keeps on coming back to me: that, if it were his will not to die, he would be no more capable of doing so than of not being what he was. For he was truly going to die since, if he had not been truly going to die, the faith in his future death would not be true, and it was through this faith that both the Virgin from whom he was born, and many others, have been cleansed from sin. Now, if it had not been true, it could not have been of any benefit. Consequently, if he was capable of not dying, he was capable of rendering untrue something which was the truth.
A. Why was it the truth, before he died, that he was going to die?
B. Because he wished for this spontaneously and with an unchangeable will.
A. If, therefore, as you say, he could not not die for the reason that he was truly going to die, and he was truly going to die owing to the fact that this was his spontaneous and unchangeable will, it follows that he could not not die for any other reason than because, by his unchangeable volition, it was his will to die.
B. That is right. But, whatever the reason may have been, it is nevertheless true that he could not not die and that it was necessary for him to die.
A. You are too persistent in grasping at nothingness and, as the saying goes, looking for a knot in a bulrush.
B. Have you forgotten what I said in the face of your excuses at the beginning of this disputation of ours, namely that it would not be for the learned that you would be doing what I asked, but for me and for those who were making the request along with me? Allow me therefore to ask questions corresponding to the slowness and dullness of our intelligence, so that in this way you may give me and those other people satisfaction even in the case of childish questioning, as you did at the outset.
17. That in God no necessity or impossibility exists; and that there is a necessity which compels and a necessity which does not compel
A. We have already said that it is incorrect to say of God that he ‘cannot do something’ or that he ‘does it of necessity’. For all necessity, and all impossibility, is subject to his will. Moreover his will is not subject to any necessity or impossibility. For nothing is necessary or impossible for any reason other than that he himself so wills it. Indeed, for God himself to will something, or not will it, on account of necessity or impossibility, is a notion foreign to the truth. Hence, from the fact that he does all things which are his will and does nothing other than the things which are his will, two consequences follow: no necessity or impossibility precedes his volition or nonvolition and, similarly, neither precedes his action or inaction, no matter how many things he may unchangeably wish or do. Moreover, when God does something, the deed cannot be undone after it has been done, but it is for ever the truth that it has been done; yet, despite this, it cannot be correctly stated that it is impossible for God to make a past event not a past event: neither the necessity for action or the impossibility of inaction is operative in this case, only the will of God who, being himself the Truth, always wishes the truth to be unchangeable, as he is. Correspondingly, in the event that God plans that he is unalterably going to do something, even though, in the time preceding his action, what he has in mind is not not going to happen, there is in him no necessity for action or impossibility of inaction, since in him it is the will alone which is operative. Now, on all occasions when it is stated that God is ‘incapable’ of something, this is not a negation of any capacity in him: rather, it is his insuperable power and might which is being signified. For the meaning is none other than that nothing can bring it about that he should do the thing which he is being said to be ‘incapable’ of doing. Now, much use is made of the type of expression whereby something is said to ‘be possible’, not because possibility is inherent in that thing, but because it is inherent in something else, and ‘not to be possible’, not because impossibility is inherent in that thing but because it is inherent in something else. For we say: ‘This man is capable of being defeated’, instead of ‘Someone is capable of defeating him’, and ‘He cannot be defeated’, instead of ‘No one can defeat him’. For to be ‘capable of being defeated’ does not constitute a capability, but an incapability, and to be ‘incapable of being defeated’ does not constitute powerlessness, but power. Nor is it because there is any necessity inherent in him that we say that God does something ‘of necessity’, but rather because the necessity exists in something else; this is comparable to what I have said with reference to ‘incapability’ in statements to the effect that someone ‘is incapable’. As for necessity, every case of it constitutes either compulsion or prohibition, and these two necessities are opposites, the converse of one another, as are ‘necessity’ and ‘impossibility’. However, when we say with reference to God that something is, or is not, a necessity, the meaning is not that there exists in him either coercive or prohibitive necessity: the significance is that there is necessity inherent in all things other than himself which prevents him from acting—and compels him not to act—against what is predicated of God. For, when we say that it is a necessary fact that God always speaks the truth, and that it is a necessary fact that he never lies, all that is being said is that inherent in him there is such a high degree of constancy with regard to upholding the truth that nothing can make him not speak the truth, or tell lies. Consequently, when with reference to the man we have in mind— who, in view of the unity of his person, as has been said earlier, is identical with the Son of God, God—we say that he could not not die, or could not wish not to die, after he was born of the Virgin, what is being signified is not any inability to preserve his own life, or to wish to preserve it, immortal. What is being signified, rather, is the unchangeability of his will, in response to which he had of his own volition made himself a man with the specific intent that he would die in the steadfast pursuance of that same will, and the fact that nothing could change that will. For it would be incapability more than capability, if he were to be capable of wishing to lie or to deceive or to change his will, having previously willed that it should be unalterable. Moreover, as I said earlier, when someone voluntarily plans to do some good thing, and afterwards, in accordance with the same will, completes what he planned, it is not right to say of him that he is doing what he is doing out of necessity, even though, supposing that he were unwilling to fulfil his promise, it would be possible for him to be compelled to do so. For one ought not to say that anything is being done, or not being done, out of necessity or incapability, when it is neither necessity nor incapability that is operative, but will. If, I say, this is so in the case of a human being, it is very much more the case that the terms ‘necessity’ and ‘incapability’ are not to be used at all with reference to God, who does nothing which is not his will, and whose will no force has the power to compel or prohibit. For, in the case of Christ, the difference between his natures and the unity of his person had the effect of making it possible for his divine nature to bring about what had to happen for the restoration of mankind, should his human nature not be capable of this, and for his human nature to show forth whatever was not at all appropriate for his divine nature. Moreover, it would not be a case of ‘this man . . .’ and ‘the other . . .’, but both would be himself, one and the same, and, being completely both human and divine, he would pay through his human nature the debt which human nature owed, and would be capable, through his divine nature, of what was expedient. Finally, the Virgin who was made clean through faith, so that he might be received from her, by no means believed that he was going to die for any reason other than that it was his will to do so, this being in accordance with the teaching of the prophet who said of him, ‘He was made a sacrifice, because he willed it’ [Isa. 53: 7 Vulg.]. Consequently, since her belief was true, it was a necessity that it would come about just as she believed. Now, if it troubles you once more that I am saying, ‘It was a necessity’, remember that the truth of the Virgin’s belief was not the cause of his dying voluntarily: rather the belief was true because his dying voluntarily was in the future to be an actuality. Hence, supposing it is said, ‘It was necessary that he should die only through his will, because prior belief or prophecy concerning it was true’: this is no different from saying that it was necessary for it to come about thus in the future, since it was going to come about thus. Moreover, this sort of ‘necessity’ does not compel something to be: rather, the existence of an actuality makes it a necessary fact. For there is a necessity which precedes, being the cause for an actuality’s existence, and there is a necessity which is consequent, being caused by an actuality. It is a case of a necessity which precedes and effects when the statement is made that ‘the sky revolves because it is a necessity that it should revolve’. It is a case of a necessity which is consequent and effects nothing but is itself caused when I say, ‘You are, of necessity, speaking’. This is because when I say this, what I mean is that nothing can bring it about that, while you are speaking, you are not speaking; I do not mean that something is compelling you to speak. For the violence of a natural state of affairs compels the sky to revolve, but there is no necessity which is causing you to speak. Now, wherever there exists antecedent necessity, consequent necessity also exists. But it is not the case that where there is consequent necessity, there immediately exists antecedent necessity. For we can say, ‘It is a necessity that the sky should turn, because it does turn’, but it is not similarly true to say, ‘You are speaking for the reason that it is a necessity for you to speak’. This consequent necessity occurs throughout the tenses, in this way. It is a necessity that whatever has been, has been. It is a necessity that whatever is, is. It is a necessity that whatever is, has been going to be. It is a necessity that everything that is going to be, is going to be. This is the necessity which, in Aristotle’s treatment of singular and future propositions,37 appears to deny the existence of alternatives and affirms that all things exist of necessity. Since the conviction and the prophecy about Christ—that he was going to die voluntarily and not out of necessity—were true, it was on the strength of this consequent, non-effectual necessity that it was necessary that it should be so. This was the necessity whereby he was made man; whereby he did and had done to him38 whatever he did and had done to him; whereby he willed whatever he willed. These things of necessity were, for the reason that they were going to be, and they were going to be because they were, and they were because they were. And if you want to know what the true necessity was behind all the things which he did and had done to him, know this: all these things of necessity were, because he himself so willed it. Indeed, no necessity is antecedent to his will. Hence, given that it was for no reason that these things were, other than that he willed it: if he had not so willed, they would not have been. In this way, therefore, no one took his life from him, but he himself laid it down and took it up again, because he had the ‘power to lay down his life and take it up again’, as he himself says [John 10: 18].
B. You have satisfied me that Christ cannot be proved to have undergone death out of any necessity, and I am not sorry that I was a nuisance to you, in order that you should do this.
A. We have made clear, I think, a definite logical explanation of how God raised up a man without sin out of sinful matter. I also think that one certainly must not deny there to be—apart from the consideration that God can do what human reasoning cannot comprehend—a logical explanation other than the one of which we have been speaking. But the explanation which I have given you seems sufficient to me, and also, if I were to wish to investigate another now, it would be necessary to look into what original sin is, and how it percolates through to the whole human race from our first ancestors, and it would be necessary to confront certain other questions which demand their own separate treatment. Let us be content, therefore, with the explanation of which we have been speaking, and
37 Cf. Aristotle, De Interpretatione, cited by Boethius, In De Interpretatione Aristotelis Vol. 1: 9.31–10.1 Meiser, PL 64, 333, meaning, approximately, ‘It is not the case, therefore, that anything exists or comes into being by chance, nor will it in future alternatively be or not be, but all things exist of necessity, and not as a matter of alternatives.’
38 Lat. passus est; alternative translation, ‘suffered’.
proceed to the remaining parts of the work which we have undertaken.
B. As you wish—but on condition that, with God’s help, you will some time, as if in repayment of a debt, explore that other reason which you are avoiding looking into now.
A. I do not refuse your request, since I am aware that I have a desire to undertake this. But because I am uncertain about future events, I do not dare to make a promise, but place the matter at God’s disposal.
18. How the life of Christ is recompense paid to God for the sins of mankind; and how Christ was obliged, and was not obliged, to suffer
In consequence of the question which you put forward at the beginning, many other questions have presented themselves. But say now what aspect of it seems to you in want of a complete solution.
B. The substance of the question was: why God became man, so that he might save mankind through his death, when it appears that he could have done this in another way. You have responded to this question with many cogent lines of reasoning, and have thereby shown that it was not right that the restoration of human nature should be left undone, and that it could not have been brought about unless man repaid what he owed to God. This debt was so large that, although no one but man owed it, only God was capable of repaying it, assuming that there should be a man identical with God. Hence it was a necessity that God should take man into the unity of his person, so that one who ought, by virtue of his nature, to make the repayment and was not capable of doing so, should be one who, by virtue of his person, was capable of it. Next, in view of the fact that the man who was God had to be taken from a Virgin and from the person of the Son of God, you have also shown how he could have been taken sinless from out of sinful matter. You have furthermore proved that the life of this man is so sublime and so precious that it can suffice to repay the debt owed for the sins of the whole world, and infinitely more besides. It now remains, therefore, to show how his life is recompense for the sins of mankind.
A. If he allowed himself to be killed on account of his righteousness, did he not give his life for God’s honour?
B. If I can understand what I do not doubt, I will admit— although I do not see how he was acting rationally in doing this, seeing that he could have upheld righteousness unswervingly and could have preserved his life eternally—that he voluntarily gave to God, for his honour, some gift of the sort with which all that is not God cannot be compared, but which can be given as recompense for the debts of all mankind.
A. When Christ endured with kindly patience the sufferings— injuries and insults and death on the cross along with robbers— which were inflicted on him because of the righteousness which, as we have said earlier, he was obediently maintaining, he set an example to mankind, the purpose of which was that people should not turn aside, without the provocation of any perceptible discomforts, from the righteousness which they owe to God. He would certainly not have been setting this example if he had taken advantage of his power and turned aside from the death which, for such a reason, was being inflicted on him. Do you not understand this?
B. It does not seem that it was a matter of any necessity that he should personally have set this example, seeing that many people before his coming, and John the Baptist after his coming but before his death, are recognized to have done this adequately by enduring death bravely for the sake of the truth.
A. No member of the human race except Christ ever gave to God, by dying, anything which that person was not at some time going to lose as a matter of necessity. Nor did anyone ever pay a debt to God which he did not owe. But Christ of his own accord gave to his Father what he was never going to lose as a matter of necessity, and he paid, on behalf of sinners, a debt which he did not owe. In view of this, he was all the more setting an example, the purpose of this being that people would not, when there was a compelling reason, have doubts about giving to God something which each of them was some time before long to lose. He was in no way needy on his own account, or subject to compulsion from others, to whom he owed nothing, unless it was punishment that he owed them. Nevertheless, he gave his life, so precious; no, his very self; he gave his person—think of it—in all its greatness, in an act of his own, supremely great, volition.
B. You are approaching very close to my heart’s desire. But be so patient as to allow me to ask a question which you may perhaps think me foolish to ask but to which it is not immediately obvious how I would reply, if I were to be asked it. You say that, when Christ died, he gave something which he did not owe. But no one will deny that, when he set this example in the way he did, he acted in a better way, and one more pleasing to God, than if he had not done this. And no one will say that he ought not to do something which he understood to be the better option and more pleasing to God. How, therefore, are we to assert that he did not owe to God what he did—namely, what he knew to be better and more pleasing to God—especially since a creature owes to God all that it is, and all that it knows and is capable of ?
A. Although a creature possesses nothing of itself, none the less, when God gives it leave to do or not to do something with his permission, he is granting it the gift of having two options, under such terms that, although one option may be better, neither is definitely demanded. Instead, whether the creature does what is better, or the alternative, it is said that what it is doing is what it ought to do. Moreover, if it does what is better, it has a reward, because it is giving of its own accord what is its own. For instance, although virginity is better than marriage, neither is definitely demanded from a human being. Rather, it is said of a person who prefers to marry, and of one who prefers to preserve virginity, that this is what he ought to do. For no one says that a person ought not to choose virginity, or marriage. Rather, we say that what a person prefers, before choosing one of these options, he ought to do. And if he preserves his virginity, he looks forward to a reward for the voluntary gift which he is offering to God. When, therefore, you say that a creature owes to God what it knows is better and what it is capable of, this is not invariably true—not if you interpret the action as a matter of indebtedness, and do not read into your statement the unstated implication, ‘If God commands it’. For indeed, as I have said, a person does not owe virginity as a debt. Rather, he ought to marry, if this is his preference. But if the word ‘ought’ perturbs you and you cannot conceive of a meaning for it without any sense of ‘owing’, take note of the fact that, just as the words ‘can’ and ‘cannot’ and ‘necessity’ are sometimes uttered not because they apply to the subjects of the utterance in which they occur, but because they apply to something else, so it is with ‘ought’. For instance, when we say that the poor ‘ought’ to receive alms from the rich, this is no different from saying that the rich ‘ought’ to give alms to the poor. For the debt owed here is not something to be exacted from a poor person, but from a rich one. It is said of God too that he ‘ought’ to be pre-eminent over all things, not because he is in this respect in any sense a debtor, but because all things ‘ought’ to be subordinate to him. It is said of him that he ‘ought’ to do what is his will, since that which is his will ought to be. Thus, when some creature wishes to do something which it is its own prerogative to do or not to do, the reason why the expression ‘ought to do’ is used is that what it wishes ought to be. When, therefore, it was the will of the Lord Jesus, as we have said, to endure death, in view of the fact that it was his prerogative to suffer or not to suffer, the reason why he ‘ought’ then to do what he did was that what he wished ought to be. His action was not something that he owed, because it was not a matter of indebtedness. Indeed he is both God and man, so consequently, where his human nature was concerned, from the time when he became human, he received from his divine nature—which is different from human nature—the circumstance that whatever he had was his own. As a result, there was nothing which he ‘ought’ to give, except what he wished. But, where his person was concerned, he had what he had from himself, and thus was perfectly self-sufficient, and, as a result, neither owed recompense to anyone, nor needed to give recompense to himself.
B. I see plainly now that, contrary to what my reasoning seemed to indicate, there was no logical reason why it was as a result of an obligation owed that Christ gave himself up to death for the sake of God’s honour—and that, nevertheless, what he did was something which he ‘ought’ to do.
A. That honour, to be sure, belongs to the whole of the Trinity. It follows that because Christ himself is God, the Son of God, the offering he made of himself was to his own honour as well as to the Father and the Holy Spirit; that is, he offered up his humanity to his divinity, the one selfsame divinity which belongs to the three persons. However, so that we may express our meaning more clearly, while remaining steadfast in the same truth, let us say, as customary usage has it, that the Son voluntarily offered himself to the Father. For it is most appropriate to speak in this way, because, in referring to the one person, one understands the whole God to whom Christ offered himself as a human being. Moreover, through the naming of Father and Son, a feeling of immense pious devotion is aroused in the hearts of listeners, since the Son is said in this way to be making supplication to the Father on our behalf.
B. I accept this most gladly.
19. With what very great logicality the salvation of mankind follows from his death
A. Let us contemplate now, as far as we are able, with what very great logicality human salvation follows from his death.
B. This is the direction towards which my heart inclines. For, although it seems to me that I understand this, I none the less want the structure of the logic to be worked out by you.
A. There is no need, however, to expound what a great gift it is that the Son voluntarily gave.
B. That is sufficiently clear.
A. Moreover, it will not be your judgement that someone who gives such a great gift to God ought to go without recompense.
B. No. I see that it is necessary that the Father should compensate the Son. Otherwise, he would seem unjust if he lacked the will, and powerless if he lacked the ability, to do so; both of which qualities are foreign to God.
A. Someone who gives recompense to another either gives what that person does not have or excuses what cannot be exacted from him. But before the Son performed his supremely great action, all things which belonged to the Father belonged to him, and he had no debt which he could be excused. What compensation is to be given, therefore, to someone who lacks nothing and to whom nothing can be given or excused?
B. On the one hand, I see the necessity for compensation and, on the other, its impossibility. For it is both necessary for God to give what he owes, and there is nothing for him to give as recompense.
A. If a reward, supremely great and supremely well-merited, is not given to him or to anyone else, the Son will seem to have done his supremely great act to no purpose.
B. It is an abomination to countenance this idea.
A. It is inevitable, therefore, that, because it cannot be given to him, it must be given to someone else.
B. This follows inevitably.
A. Supposing the Son wished that what was owed to him should be given to someone else, could the Father have justly prevented him, or denied the gift to the intended recipient?
B. No. I appreciate that it is both just and necessary that it should be handed over as recompense by the Father to the recipient to whom the Son wished to give it. This is for two reasons: it is permissible for the Son to give what is his own, and it is only to someone else that the Father can give what he owes.
A. On whom is it more appropriate for him to bestow the reward and recompense for his death than on those for whose salvation, as the logic of truth teaches us, he made himself a man, and for whom, as we have said, he set an example, by his death, of dying for the sake of righteousness? For they will be imitators of him in vain, if they are not to be sharers in his reward. Again, whom is he with greater justice to make heirs of the recompense due to him, and of the overflowing of his bounty, than those who are parents and brothers to him, whom he sees, bound by so many and such enormous debts, wasting away with deprivation in the depths of misery? The debt that they owe for their sins would, as a result, be excused and they would be given what, because of their sins, they are deprived of.
B. There can be nothing more logical, nothing sweeter, nothing more desirable that the world can hear. I indeed derive such confidence from this that I cannot now express in words with what joy my heart is rejoicing. For it seems to me that God rejects no member of the human race who approaches him on this authority.
A. So it is, if he makes the approach in the way that he should. Moreover, how one should approach the state of sharing in this grace, and how one should live once subject to that state, is something which Holy Scripture teaches, based as it is on the solid truth into which, with God’s help, we have to some extent gained an insight, truth which is, as it were, a firm foundation.
B. Truly, whatever is built upon this foundation is founded on firm rock.
A. I think I have now gone some little way towards a satisfactory reply to your question, although someone better than I could do it more fully, and there are more, and greater, reasons for this thing than my intellect, or any mortal intellect, can comprehend. It is clear also that God in no way had a need which required him to perform the action of which we have been speaking: rather, it was unchangeable truth that demanded that this be so. For, granted that this was the action of the man of whom we have spoken and that it may be said that God did it, in view of the unity of his person, it is nevertheless not the case that God needed to come down from heaven to conquer the devil, or to take action against him in order to set mankind free. Rather, God demanded it of man that he should defeat the devil and should pay recompense by means of righteousness, having previously offended God through sin. Certainly God did not owe the devil anything but punishment, nor did man owe him anything but retribution—to defeat in return him by whom he had been defeated. But, whatever was demanded from man, his debt was to God, not to the devil.
20. How great and just the mercy of God is
Now, the mercy of God which, when we were considering the justice of God and the sin of mankind, seemed to you to be dead,39 we have found to be so great, and so consonant with justice, that a greater and juster mercy cannot be imagined. What, indeed, can be conceived of more merciful than that God the Father should say to a sinner condemned to eternal torments and lacking any means of redeeming himself, ‘Take my only-begotten Son and give him on your behalf ’, and that the Son himself should say, ‘Take me and redeem yourself ’. For it is something of this sort that they say when they call us and draw us towards the Christian faith. What also could be juster than that the one to whom is given a reward greater than any debt should absolve all debt, if it is presented with the feeling that is due?
21. That it is impossible for the devil to receive reconciliation
As for the reconciling of the devil about which you asked,40 you will understand this to be impossible if you carefully consider the reconciling of mankind. For just as man could not be reconciled except by a man-God who was capable of dying, through whose righteousness what God lost through the sin of mankind might be restored, likewise the condemned angels cannot be saved except by an angel-
39 Cf. 1.25 above.
40 Cf. 1.17.
God who would be capable of dying and who would restore by his righteousness what the sins of the others have stolen. Moreover, just as it was not right that man should be restored by another man who was not of the same race, even if he were of the same nature, similarly it is not right that an angel should be saved by another angel, even if he were of the same nature, since angels are not of one race as human beings are. For angels are not all descended from one angel in the same way that human beings are descended from one man. Another thing which rules out their restoration is that, just as they fell without having as the cause of their fall injury from anyone else, similarly they ought to rise once more without the assistance of anyone else—and this is impossible for them. For there is no other way in which they can be restored to the dignity which they were to have possessed, since, supposing they had not sinned, they would have been remaining steadfast in the truth without anyone else’s assistance, through power which they had received as their own. Consequently, if anyone advances the opinion that our Saviour’s redemption ought at some time to be extended to them, it is proved by logic that he is being deceived contrary to logic. I do not say this on the supposition that the value of the death of Christ does not outweigh in its magnitude all the sins of mankind and of the angels, but because unalterable logic opposes the granting of relief to the fallen angels.
22. That by the things which have been said, the truth of the Old Testament and the New has been proved
B. All the things which you say seem to me logical and incontrovertible. And my understanding is that, through the solution given to the single problem which we set ourselves, all that is contained in the New Testament and the Old has been proved. For you prove that it is a matter of necessity for God to become man, and you do so in such a way that, even if one were to remove the few things posited by you that come from books of ours, such as the material you have touched upon with regard to the three persons of God and with regard to Adam—you would be providing something which would satisfy not only Jews, but even pagans. The God-Man himself it is who establishes the New Testament and confirms the Old. Therefore, in the same way that it is a necessity to acknowledge that the God-Man is truthful, likewise no one can fail to acknowledge that all that is contained in those Testaments is true.
A. If we have said anything that ought to be corrected, I do not refuse correction. But if it is corroborated by the Testimony of Truth, as we think we have by means of logic discovered, we ought to attribute this not to ourselves but to God, who is blessed throughout all ages. Amen.
-작성중-
- 34 For non assumet here (Schmitt, 112:23) perhaps we should read non assumetur. [본문으로]
- 35 The text here raises suspicions: one would expect to read ‘his life’ rather than ‘he’, and it may be we should indeed read conjecturally: Quantum bonum tibi videtur
cuius interemptio tam mala est. [본문으로] -
36 Or ‘it’, if we have read
, ‘his life’. [본문으로]