oistros

11. That it is of his own power that he dies, and that mortality is not a property of human nature which is pure
그가 죽는 것이 그의 고유한 능력이라는 것, 그리고 필멸성은 순수한 인간 본성의 속성이 아니라는 것

A. It now remains to investigate whether he is capable of dying as a consequence of his human nature; for, in consequence of his divine nature, he will always be incorruptible.
이제 남아있는 탐구할 것은 그가 그의 인간 본성의 귀결로서 죽을 능력이 있는지 하는 것이다; 왜냐하면, 그의 신성의 귀결로, 그는 불후할 것이기 때문이다.
B. Why need we have doubt about this, seeing that he is to be a true man and all mankind is by nature mortal?
우리가 이것에 대해 왜 의심해야 하는가, 그는 진정한 인간일 것이고 모든 인류는 본성상 필멸인데?
A. I do not think that mortality is a property of pure human nature, rather of human nature which is corrupt. Certainly, if man had never sinned and his immortality had been confirmed in such a way that it could not be changed, he would none the less have been truly human. Moreover, when mortals rise again into incorruptibility, they will be no less true human beings. Now, if mortality were a property essential for the genuineness of human nature, it would not be possible for someone immortal to be human. For corruptibility or incorruptibility is not a determinant of the genuineness of human nature, since neither makes or destroys a human being: rather, one has the power to cause him misery, the other happiness. But, on the reasoning that there is no human being who does not die, ‘mortal’ is specified in the definition of a man given by philosophers who did not believe that the whole man had ever been, or could be, immortal. Because of this, the fact that he is truly human is insufficient to prove that the man we have in mind need be mortal.
나는 필멸이 순수한 인간 본성의 속성이라고 생각하지 않고, 오히려 오염된 인간 본성에 속한다고 생각한다. 확실히, 만일 인간이 결코 죄를 짓지 않았고 그의 불멸성이 변할 수 없을 그런 방식으로 확정되었더라면, 그는 조금도 덜 참된 인간이지 않았을 것이다. 더욱이, 필멸자들이 불후성으로 부활할 때, 그들은 전혀 덜 인간존재들인 게 아닐 것이다. 이제, 만일 필멸이 이간 본성의 진성에 본질적 속성이었다면, 불멸하는 누군가가 인간이 되기는 불가능했을 것이다. 왜냐하면 가후성이나 불후성은 인간 본성의 진성을 결정하는 요소가 아니기 때문이다, 그것이 인간 존재를 만들지도 파괴하지도 않으므로: 오히려, 그 한 쪽은 그를 불행하게 만들 능력을 가지고, 다른 쪽은 행복하게 만들 능력을 가진다. 그러나, 죽지 않는 인간 존재는 아무도 없다는 추론에서, '필멸'은 전체로서의 인간이 결코 불멸이었거나 그럴 수 있었다 믿지 않는 철학자들에 의해 가정된 인간의 정의 속에서 규정된다. 이로 인하여, 그가 참된 인간이라는 사실은 우리가 고려하는 인간이 필멸이어야 함을 증명하기에 부족하다.
B. So, look for another line of reasoning. For I do not know of a way of proving that he is capable of dying, if you do not know one.
그래, 추론의 다른 노선을 보자. 왜냐하면 나는 그가 죽을 능력이 있다고 증명할 방법을 모르니까, 만일 니가 모른다면.
A. There is no doubt that he will be omnipotent, seeing that he is like God.
그가 전능할 것임은 의심의 여지가 없다, 그는 신과 같으므로.
B. This is true.
그거 맞다.
A. If it is his will, then, he will be able to lay aside his soul and take it up again.
만일 그게 그의 의지라면, 그래서, 그는 그의 영혼을 내려놓고 다시 되찾을 능력이 있을 것이다.
B. If he cannot do this, I do not see that he is omnipotent.
만일 그가 이리 할 수 없다면, 나는 그가 전능하다고 보지 않는다.
A. It will be in his power, therefore, never to die, if he wishes; it will also be in his power to die and rise again. Furthermore, it makes no difference, so far as his power is concerned, whether he lays his soul aside without involvement of any other person in the action, or whether it is another person who will bring it about that he lays it aside, having given his own consent.
그러므로 절대로 죽지 않음이 그의 능력 안에 있을 것이다, 만일 그가 바란다면; 또한 죽고 부활할 것도 그의 능력 안에 있을 것이다. 더욱이, 그의 능력과 관련하여, 그가 그의 영혼을 다른 어떤 인격의 개입 없이 그 행위 안에서 그의 영혼을 내려 놓는지 그렇지 않은지, 혹은 그가 그 영혼을 내려놓는 일을 불러일으킬 것이 또 다른 인격인지 아닌지, 그 자신의 허락을 고려하였을 경우 아무런 차이도 없다.
B. This is undoubtedly the case.
의심할 바 없는 사실이다.
A. If, therefore, it is his will to give his permission, it will be possible for him to be killed, and, if it is not, this will not be possible.
그러므로, 만일 그의 허락을 내놓는 것이 그의 의지라면, 그가 죽임을 당하는 일이 가능할 것이고, 만일 그렇지 않다면, 이건 불가능할 것이다.
B. This is the conclusion to which logic unswervingly leads us.
변함없이 우리를 인도하는 논리에 따르는 결론이다.
A. Logic has also taught us that he ought to possess something greater than everything which is below God, which he may give to God voluntarily and not in repayment of a debt.
논리는 또한 우리에게, 신으로부터 빌린 모든 것보다 더 대단한 어떤 것을 그가 지녀야 한다고 가르친다. 그것은 그가 자발적으로 그리고 빚의 보상이 아닌 것으로 신에게 줄 것이다.
B. That is right.
맞다.
A. But this cannot be found either below God or outside him.
하지만 이건 신으로부터 빌리든 그의 외부에서든 발견될 수 없다.
B. True.
맞다.
A. It is within the man himself, therefore, that it has to be found.
그러므로, 발견되어야 하는 것은 그 인간 자신 속에 있다.
B. This follows.
그리 귀결된다.
A. What he will give, therefore, will either be himself or something from himself.
그가 줄 것은 그러므로 그 자신이거나 그 자신으로부터의 어떤 것일 것이다.
B. I cannot conceive it to be otherwise.
달리 생각할 수 없다.
A. The question which now has to be asked is of what kind this giving ought to be. Now, he will not be able to give to God either himself or something from himself, as if he were making himself belong to one who does not own him—for every created being belongs to God.
지금 던져야 하는 질문은 주어야 하는 이것이 어떤 종류의 것인지 하는 것이다. 이제, 그는 신에게 그 자신이든 그 자신으로부터의 어떤 것이든 줄 능력이 없을 것이다, 마치 그가 그 자신을 그를 소유하지 않는 자에게 속하도록 만들고 있는 것처럼- 왜냐하면 모든 피조물은 신에게 속하니까.
B. This is so.
그렇다.
A. The way in which this giving has to be understood, therefore, is this: that in some way he will be laying aside himself, or something from himself, to the honour of God, since he will not be a debtor.
그러므로 이 제공은 이런 식으로 이해되어야 한다: 즉 어떤 식으로 그는 그 자신을 내려놓을 것이거나, 혹은 그 자신으로부터의 어떤 것을, 신의 영광에 대해 내려놓을 것이다, 그는 채무자가 될 수 없을 것이므로.
B. This follows from what has been said earlier.
앞서 이야기된 것에서 귀결한다.
A. If we say that he will make a present of himself as an act of obedience to God, in that he will be submitting himself to God’s will by upholding righteousness with perseverance, this will not constitute giving something which God does not demand from him in repayment of a debt. For every rational creature owes this obedience to God.
만일 우리가 그는 복종의 행위로서 그 자신을 신에게 선사할 것이라 말한다면, 그가 그가 그 자신을 인내와 더불어 정의를 지킴으로써 신의 의지에 복종하고 있으리란 점에서, 이 일은 신이 그에게 빚의 상환에 있어서 요구하지 않은 어떤 것을 주는 일을 구성하지 않을 것이다. 왜냐하면 모든 이성적 피조물은 이 복종을 신에게 빚지고 있으니.
B. It is impossible to deny this.
이걸 부정할 수 없다.
A. It ought to be in some other way, therefore, that he should give either himself or something from himself.
그러므로 그가 그 자신이나 그 자신으로부터의 뭔가를 주어야 함은 다른 어떤 방식으로 이루어져야 한다.
B. Reason impels us to this conclusion.
추론이 우리를 이 결론으로 강제한다.
A. Let us see whether perhaps this may not be for him to give his life, or to lay aside his soul, or to hand himself over to death, for the honour of God. For this is not something which God will demand from him in repayment of a debt, given that, since there will be no sin in him, he will be under no obligation to die, as we have said.
혹시 그가 그의 생명을 내놓거나, 그의 영혼을 내려놓거나, 그 자신을 죽음에 내맡기거나, 이 일이 신의 영광을 위한 게 아닐 수도 있는지 보자. 왜냐하면 이 일은 신이 빚의 상환에 있어서 그에게 요구할 어떤 것이 아니니까, 그의 내부에 아무런 죄도 없을 것이므로, 그는 죽을 아무런 의무 하에도 있지 않으리란 것, 우리 말대로 그러리란 것을 가정하면.
B. I cannot interpret the matter differently.
그 문제를 달리 볼 수 없다.
A. Let us consider further whether it is logically appropriate for it to be so.
그 일이 그리되는 게 논리적으로 적절한지 더 살펴보자.
B. Speak, and I will be happy to listen.
말해라, 나는 기꺼이 들으마.
A. If man sinned through pleasure, is it not fitting that he should give recompense through pain? And if it was in the easiest possible way that man was defeated by the devil, so as to dishonour God by his sinning, is it not justice that man, in giving recompense for sin, should, for the honour of God, defeat the devil with the greatest possible difficulty? Is it not fitting that man, who, by sinning, removed himself as far as he possibly could away from God, should, as recompense to God, make a gift of himself in an act of the greatest possible self-giving?
만일 인간이 쾌락을 통해 죄 지었다면, 고통을 통해 보상을 바쳐야 하리란 것이 어울리지 않나? 그리고 만일 인간이 악마에 의해 굴복당하는 것이 가능한 가장 쉬운 방식으로 이루어졌었다면, 그의 죄로 인한 신에 대한 불명예에 관한 한, 죄에 대한 보상을 줌에 있어서, 인간이 신의 영광을 위해 가능한 가장 어려운 일로 악마를 굴복시킴이 정의롭지 않나? 죄로써 그 자신을 그가 신으로부터 떨어질 수 있는 가능한 한 가장 멀리까지 떨어뜨린 인간이 신에 대한 보상으로서 가능한 가장 큰 자기-헌신의 행위에서 그 자신을 선사하는 게 적절하지 않나?
B. This is unsurpassable logic.
더할 나위 없는 논리다.
A. There can, moreover, be nothing that a man may suffer—voluntarily and without owing repayment of a debt—more painful or more difficult than death. And there is no act of self-giving whereby a man may give himself to God greater than when he hands himself over to death for God’s glory.
더욱이 인간이 겪을 죽음보다 더한 고통도 더한 어려움도 전혀 있을 수 없다 - 자발적으로 그리고 빚에 대한 상환의무 없이-. 그리고 그로써 인간이 그 자신을 신에게 줄 헌신의 행위로 그 자신을 신의 영광을 위해 죽음에 내맡기는 때보다 더 대단한 행위는 아무것도 없다.
B. All these things are true.
이거 다 맞다.
A. The one whose will it is to be to pay recompense for the sin of mankind ought therefore to have the characteristic of being able to die if he wishes.
인류의 죄에 대해 보상을 지불하게 되기를 의지하는 그는 그러므로 그가 바란다면 죽을 능력이 있는 자의 특성을 지녀야 한다
B. I see clearly that the man whom we are seeking ought to have the following characteristics: it will not be as a matter of necessity that he will die, because he will be omnipotent; he will not be dying obligatorily, because he will never be a sinner, and it will be within his capacity to die of his own free will, because this will be necessary.
나는 우리가 찾고 있는 그 인간이 다음과 같은 특성들을 지녀야 한다는 걸 분명히 안다: 그가 죽을 것이 필연의 문제가 아닐 것인데, 왜냐하면 그는 전능할 것이기 때문이다; 그는 의무적으로 죽게 되지 않을 것인데, 왜냐하면 그는 결코 죄인이 아닐 것이기 때문이고, 그것은 그의 고유한 자유의지로 죽을 그의 능력 안에 있을 것인데, 왜냐하면 이 이것이 필연적일 것이기 때문이다.
A. There are many other reasons too why it will be extremely appropriate for him to bear a resemblance to mankind and have the behaviour belonging to mankind—while being without sin. These reasons are more readily and clearly discernible in Christ’s life and works than can be demonstrated by reason alone, hypothetically, as if before experience of the events. For who may explain how necessary and wise a thing it was for it to come about that he who was to redeem the human race and bring it back from the way of death and destruction to the way of life and eternal happiness, should live in the company of human beings and, while he was teaching them verbally how they ought to live, should, through his very behaviour, present himself as an example? Furthermore, how was he to present himself to weak and mortal humans as an example of the fact that they should not depart from righteousness on account of injustices, insults, pain or death, if they were not aware that he himself had experience of all these things?
그가 인류와 유사함이 그리고 인류에 속하는 행동을 가짐이 왜 극도로 적절할 것인지에 대해 다른 많은 이유들이 있다-죄가 없음에도. 이런 이유들은 마치 그 사건들의 경험 이전인듯이 가정적으로 오직 추론만을 통해 증명될 수 있는 것보다 더욱 기껍고 분명하게 그리스도의 삶과 업적들 속에서 인식될 수 있다. 왜냐하면 인종을 구원하고 죽음과 파괴의 길로부터 삶과 영원한 복락의 길로 돌이킬 그가 인간 존재들의 세속에서 살아야 하고, 그가 그들에게 어떻게 살아야 하는지 구두로 가르치던 동안에, 그의 바로 그 행위를 통하여, 그 자신을 예시로서 보여주었던 일이 일어났다는 것이 얼마나 필연적이고 지혜로운 일이었는지 누가 설명하겠는가? 더욱이, 어떻게 그가 나약하고 필멸인 인간들에게 그들이 의로움으로부터 부정의, 모욕들, 고통이나 죽음으로 인하여 떠나서는 안 되다는 사실의 실례로서 자기 자신을 보여주었겠는가, 만일 그들이 그 스스로 이 모든 일들에 대한 경험을 지녔음을 알지 못한다면?

12. That, although he is a sharer in our discomforts, he is nevertheless not unhappy
설령 그가 우리의 불편을 공유할지라도, 그는 그럼에도 불구하고 불행하지 않다는 것

B. All these considerations make it patently obvious that it is right for him to be mortal and a sharer in our discomforts. But these are all circumstances which belong to our unhappiness. Will he not, therefore, be unhappy?
이 모든 고찰들은 그가 가사자가 되고 우리의 불편들을 공유하는 자가 됨이 옳다는 것을 명백히 분명하게 해준다. 그러나 이런 것들은 우리의 불행에 속하는 조건들이다. 그러므로 그는 불행하지 않겠나?
A. Not at all. For, just as a comfort which someone possesses against his will is not conducive to happiness, similarly it is not unhappiness to take upon oneself a discomfort willingly, out of wisdom, not out of any necessity.
전혀. 왜냐하면, 누군가 그의 의지에 반하여 지니는 안락이 행복에 기여하는 바가 없는 것과 마찬가지로, 유사하게 자의적으로, 어떤 필연이 아니라 숙려를 통해 자처한 불편은 불행이 아니다.
B. This must be admitted.
받아들여야만 하네.

13. That he does not have ignorance along with our other weaknesses
우리의 다른 나약함들에 더하여 그가 무지를 지니지는 않는다는 것

However, as regards the likeness which he needs to bear to members of the human race, say whether he is going to have ignorance in the same way as he is to have our other weaknesses.
그렇지만, 그가 인간 종의 구성원들에 속하기 위해 필요한 유사성을 고려해서, 그가 우리의 다른 나약함들을 지니는 것과 같은 방식으로 무지를 지니게 될지 말해줘.
A. Why do you have doubts with regard to God, as to whether he is omniscient?
왜 그가 전지한지에 관하여 신에 대해 의심하냐?
B. Because, although he is to be immortal as a consequence of his divine nature, he will nevertheless be mortal as a consequence of his humanity. Why, in view of this, will it not be possible for the man we have in mind to be truly ignorant, just as he will be truly mortal?
왜냐하면, 설령 그가 그의 신성의 결과로 불멸이라 할지라도, 그는 그럼에도 불구하고 그의 인성의 귀결로 가사자가 될 테니까. 이 관점에서, 왜 우리가 고려하는 그 인간이 참으로 무지함이, 마치 그가 참으로 가사자가 될 것과 마찬가지로, 가능할 수 없을까?
A. The accepting of man into the unity of the person of God will not be brought about otherwise than wisely, by the highest wisdom, and therefore there will be no acceptance^[각주:1] of something which is in no way useful, but detrimental rather, for the work which the man is going to undertake. Now, there would be no purpose for which ignorance would be useful to him: rather it would be for many purposes detrimental. For how is he going to perform all the many great works which he is to perform, without immeasurable wisdom? Again, how are people going to believe in him, if they know he is ignorant? Moreover, supposing this is something they do not know: for what purpose will that ignorance be useful to him? And again, if it is the case that nothing is loved except that which is known: by the same token as it will be no good thing for him not to love, it will be no good thing for him to be ignorant. Furthermore, no one has a perfect knowledge of what is good who does not know how to distinguish it from what is bad. It is also the case that no one who is ignorant of the bad knows how to draw this distinction. The man we have in mind will therefore have all knowledge, even though he may not make this evident in public in his dealings with mankind.
신의 인격의 통합 속으로 이간을 수용함은 다른 식으로가 아니라 지혜롭게 이루어질 것이고, 최상의 지혜에 의해 이루어질 거라서, 그러므로 아무 쓸모 없는, 오히려 그 인간이 떠맡을 일에 대해 해로운 어떤 것의 수용은 전혀 없을 것이다. 이제, 무지가 그에게 유용할 어떤 용도도 없을 것이다: 오히려 해로운 많은 용도들이 있을 것이다. 왜냐하면 어떻게 그가 행한 많은 위대한 업적들 모두를 가늠할 수 없는 지혜 없이 수행하게 되었겠나? 다시, 만일 그가 무지하다는 걸 사람들이 알았더라면, 그들이 어떻게 그를 믿게 되었겠나? 더욱이, 그게 그들이 몰랐던 것이라 가정하면: 무지가 그에게 유용할 무슨 용도가 있겠는가? 또 다시, 만일 알려진 것 외에 어떤 것도 사랑받지 않음이 사실이라면: 같은 이유로 그가 사랑하지 않음이 좋은 것이 전혀 아닐 것이듯, 그가 무지함이 좋은 일이 전혀 아닐 것이다. 더 나아가, 나쁜 것으로부터 좋은 것을 어떻게 구분하는지 알지 못하는 자는 그 누구도 좋은 것이 무엇인지에 대한 완벽한 앎을 지니지 못한다. 나쁜 것에 대해 무지한 그 누구도 이 구분을 어떻게 이끌어낼지 알지 못한다는 것도 사실이다. 우리가 고려하는 인간은 그러므로 모든 지식을 지닐 것이다, 설령 그가 인류를 대함에 있어서 공적으로 명백하게 이점을 드러내진 않았을지라도.
B. What you are saying seems to hold good for his adulthood; but in his infancy it will not be the appropriate time for wisdom to appear in him, and similarly there will be no need, and consequently it will be incongruous, too, for him to have it.
그의 성년기에 대해서는 좋아 보이는 말이다; 하지만 그의 어릴 적에는 그에게서 지혜가 드러나기에 적절한 시기가 아닐 것이고, 마찬가지로 그럴 필요도 없을 것이며, 따라서 그가 그 지혜를 지님이 어울리지 않을 것이다.
A. Have I not said that the incarnation which we have in mind will be brought about in a way characterized by wisdom? Now, it will be in wisdom that God will take mortality upon himself, and it will be in wisdom that he will put it to use, because he will be using it to great advantage. But he will not be able to take ignorance upon himself in wisdom, because ignorance is never useful, always detrimental rather, except perhaps when an evil desire—something which will never be found in the God-Man—is prevented from being fulfilled. For even if sometimes ignorance is not detrimental in any other regard, it is nevertheless detrimental in the mere fact that it does away with the good which consists in knowledge. Moreover, to complete my brief reply to your enquiry: from the time when he becomes human, he will always be full of God, God’s identity being his own. Hence he will never be without God’s power and fortitude and wisdom.
우리가 고려하는 육화가 지혜에 의해 규정되는 방식에서 발생되리란 것을 말하지 않았냐? 이제, 신이 가사성을 자처할 것임이 지혜에 속할 것이고, 그 가사성을 이용할 것임이 지혜에 속할 것인데, 왜냐하면 그걸 아주 유용하게 써먹을 것이기 때문이다. 하지만 그는 지혜 안에서 무지를 자처할 능력은 없을 것인데, 왜냐하면 무지는 결코 유용하지 않고, 언제나 차라리 해롭기 때문이다, 아마도 악한 욕망이 - 신-인가 안에서는 결코 찾을 수 없을 그런 것으로서- 성취되는 일로부터 제지될 때를 제외하면. 왜냐하면 무지가 다른 경우 해롭지 않을 때가 종종 있더라도, 그럼에도 불구하고 지혜로 이루어지는 선이 없어진다는 단순한 사실에서 해롭다. 더욱이, 네 탐구에 대한 내 간략한 답변을 마무리하면: 그가 인간이 된 순간으로부터, 그는 언제나 완전한 신일 것이고, 신의 정체성은 그에게 고유한 것일 것이다. 따라서 그는 결코 신의 능력과 용기 그리고 지혜가 없지 않을 것이다.
B. I did not doubt that this was always the case with Christ but, even so, I none the less made this enquiry with the aim that I should hear a rational explanation for this fact also. For often we are certain that something is the case, but do not know how to prove it logically.
나는 이게 그리스도와 함께 언제나 사실임을 의심하지 않았지만, 그럴지라도, 이 사실에 대해 또한 이성적 설명을 들으리란 목적을 가진 이 탐구를 조금도 덜 이루지 않았다. 왜냐하면 종종 우리는 어떤 것이 사실임을, 하지만 그걸 어떻게 논리적으로 증명할지 모른다는 걸 확신하고 있으니.

14. That his death outweighs the number and magnitude of all sins
그의 죽음이 모든 죄들의 수와 크기를 압도한다는 것

Now my request is that you should teach me how it is that his death outweighs the number and magnitude of all sins, seeing that you make it clear that one sin which we consider the most lightweight is of such infinite magnitude that one ought not to take a glance contrary to the will of God, even supposing that an infinite number of universes, each full of creatures just as this one is, were to be laid out before one, and could not be kept from being reduced to nothing, except if someone were to take this glance.
이제 내 요청은 니가 어떻게 그의 죽음이 모든 죄의 수와 크기를 압도하는지 나에게 가르쳐주어야 한다는 거다, 너는 우리가 고려한 가장 가벼운 하나의 죄가 설령 이 세상처럼 피조물들로 각각이 가득 찬 무한한 수의 세계들을 가정할지라도 신의 의지에 반하여 눈길을 돌리는 일을 해서는 안 되는 것으로 드러날 것이고 전혀 경감될 수 없을 것으로, 누군가 이 눈길을 취하게 될 경우를 제외하면 그러리라고 하는 그렇게 무한히 큰 것에 속한다는 점을 밝혔으니까.
A. If the man we have in mind were to be present, and you knew who he was, and someone were to say to you, ‘If you do not kill this man, the whole of the universe will perish, and whatever is not God’, would you do it in order to preserve the whole of the rest of creation?
우리가 고려하는 인간이 현존한다면, 그가 당신이 알고 있는 그라면, 그리고 누군가 너에게 '만일 니가 이 사람을 죽이지 않으면, 세계 전체가 파멸할 것이고, 신 외에 뭐든 파멸할 것이다'라고 말한다면, 너 나머지 모든 창조 전체를 지키기 위해 죽일 거냐?
B. I would not do it, even if an infinite number of universes were offered to me.
안 죽일 거다, 설령 내게 무한한 세계들이 제공되더라도.
A. What if someone were to follow this up by saying, ‘Either you will kill him or all the sins of the world will come upon you’?
그를 죽이든지 세계의 죄들 모두가 너에게 부과되든지, 이리 말하면?
B. I would answer that I would rather take upon myself all other sins, not just all the sins of this universe—both those committed in the past and those to be committed in the future—but whatever sins can be conceived of as existing in addition to these. And I think I ought to make this answer not only with regard to the act of killing him, but with respect to any small injury whatsoever which would harm him.
차라리 다른 모든 죄 짊어진다고 답할 거다, 과거에 저질러지고 미래에 저질러질 죄들, 이 세계의 모든 죄들 전부가 아니고, 이것들에 더하여 현존하는 것으로 인정될 수 있는 죄들 무엇이든. 나는 내가 그를 죽이는 행위과 관련해서만이 아니라 그를 해할 그 어떤 종류의 작은 상해라도 관련해서 이리 대답해야 한다고 생각한다.
A. You are right in thinking so. But tell me why your heart makes such a judgement, being more horrified at one sin involving injury to this man than at all else that can be conceived of, given that all the sins ever committed are against him.
그리 생각하는 게 맞다. 하지만 왜 네 마음이 그런 판단을 내렸는지 말해라, 그에 대하여 저질러졌던 모든 죄들을 고려하여 인정될 수 있는 다른 모든 죄들보다도 이 사람에 대해 상해를 포함하는 하나의 죄에 더 두려워하면서.
B. It is because a sin which is directed at this man’s person is incomparably greater than all conceivable sins which are directed elsewhere than at his person.
그건 곧장 이 사람의 인격을 향하는 죄가 그의 인격 외에 다른 어떤 곳을 향하게 되는 가능한 모든 죄들보다 비할 수 없이 크기 때문이다.
A. What will you say to the objection that often someone willingly endures discomfiture to his own person so as not to endure greater discomfiture in his business dealings.
니가 말할 반대는 뭐냐, 종종 누군가 자의적으로 그의 일에 있어서 더 큰 실패를 감당하지 않기 위해 그 자신의 인격에 실패를 감당한다는 것에 대해서.
B. I will say that God has no need of this endurance, for all things are subject to his power, just as you said earlier in reply to some question of mine.
나는 신이 이런 감내를 전혀 필요로 하지 않는다고, 왜냐하면 모든 것은 그의 능력에 지배받기 때문이라고, 니가 내 어떤 질문에 답하면서 앞서 말했듯 그렇다고 말할 거다.
A. Your answer is a good one. We see, therefore, that no sins, no matter how immeasurably great or numerous, which are directed elsewhere than against the person of God, can be regarded as equal to the violation of the bodily life of the man whom we have in mind.
니 대답 좋다. 그러므로 우리는 안다 어떤 죄도 그게 얼마나 가늠할 수 없이 크거나 많더라도 상관 없이, 신의 인격에 반하는 것 외에 다른 곳을 향하는 죄는, 우리가 고려하는 인간의 육체적 삶에 대한 폭력과 동일한 것으로 간주될 수 있다는 걸.
B. This is perfectly clear.
완전히 명백하다.
A. How great a good does he^[각주:2] seem to you to constitute, given that killing him is such a bad thing?
그가 이루는 것으로 네게 여겨지는 선이 얼마나 위대한가, 그를 죽임이 그렇게 나쁜 일임을 고려하면?
B. If every good is as good as its destruction is bad, he^[각주:3] is an incomparably greater good than the sins immeasurably outweighed by his killing are bad.
모든 좋은 것들이 좋을 만큼이나 그 파괴가 나쁘다면, 그는 그를 죽이는 일이 나쁜 것이기에 모든 죄들이 가늠할 수 없이 압도되는 것보다 훨씬 더 비할 수 없이 대단한 선이다.
A. What you are saying is true. Consider also that sins are as hateful as they are bad and that the life which you have in mind is as loveable as it is good. Hence it follows that this life is more loveable than sins are hateful.
니가 말하는 거 맞다. 또한 죄들이 나쁠 뿐만 아니라 증오스럽기도 하고 니가 고려하는 삶이 좋을 뿐만 아니라 사랑할 만하다는 것을 고려해라. 따라서 이 삶이 죄들이 증오스러운 것보다 더욱 사랑스럽다는 것이 귀결한다.
B. This is something which I cannot fail to appreciate.
인정하지 않을 수 없는 것이다.
A. Do you think that something which is so great a good and so loveable can suffice to pay the debt which is owed for the sins of the whole world?
너는 그렇게나 좋고 그렇게나 사랑스러운 어떤 것이 세계 전체의 죄들에 대해 갚아야 하는 빚을 지불하는 데에 충분할 수 있다고 생각하냐?
B. Indeed, it is capable of paying infinitely more.
게다가, 무한히 넘치게 지불할 능력이 있다고 본다.
A. You see, therefore, how, if this life is given for all sins, it outweighs them all.
그러니까 너는 만일 이 삶이 모든 죄들을 위해 제공되면, 그 죄들 전부를 어떻게 압도하는지 안다.
B. Plainly.
충분히.
A. If, then, to accept death is to give one’s life, just as his life outweighs all the sins of mankind, so does his acceptance of death.
그래서 만일 죽음을 받아들임이 그의 삶을 제공하는 것이라면, 그의 삶이 인류의 모든 죄들을 압도하는 것처럼, 그렇게 그의 죽음 수용도 그렇다.
B. It is established that this is the case with all sins which do not touch the person of God.
신의 인격을 건드리지 않는 모든 죄들과 더불어 이게 참임이 확정적이다.


15. That this same death destroys the sins even of those who put him to death
이 동일한 죽음이 그를 죽음으로 몰아넣은 자들의 죄들까지도 소멸시킨다는 것

But now I see that another question has to be asked. For if to kill him is as bad as his life is good, how can his death overcome and destroy the sins of those who killed him? Or, if it destroys the sin of any one of them, how can it destroy in addition any sin committed by other people? For we believe that many of the human race have been saved, and that countless others are being saved.
하지만 이제 나는 또 다른 질문이 던져져야 한다는 걸 안다. 왜냐하면 만일 그를 죽임이 그의 삶이 좋은 만큼 나쁘다면, 어떻게 그의 죽음이 그를 죽였던 자들의 죄들을 압도하고 소멸시킬 수 있는가? 혹은 만일 그 죽음이 그들 중 누구 하나의 죄를 소멸시킨다면, 어떻게 다른 사람들에 의해 저질러진 어떤 죄든 추가로 소멸시킬 수 있는가?
A. The Apostle who said, ‘If they had known it, they would not have crucified the Lord of glory’ [1 Cor. 2: 8], provided the answer to this question. For so great is the difference between a sin committed knowingly and one which is committed through ignorance, that an evil which, if it were recognized for what it was, they would never be able to commit because of its enormity, is capable of being pardoned because it was committed through ignorance. For no member of the human race would ever wish to kill God, at least no one would knowingly wish it, and therefore those who killed him unknowingly did not fall headlong into that infinite sin with which no other sins can be compared. Bear in mind that in order to see how good his life was, we considered the magnitude of that sin not in relation to the fact that it was committed in ignorance, but as if it were committed knowingly—something which no one has ever done or would have been capable of doing.
'만일 그들이 알았더라면 그들은 영광의 주를 십자가에 매달지 않았을 것이다'라고 말했던 사도는, 이 물음에 답을 준다. 왜냐하면 그렇게나 대단하게 알고서 저질러진 죄와 무지로 저질러진 죄가 다르기 때문이다, 만일 그게 뭔지 알았다면 그들이 결코 그 심각함 때문에 저지를 수 없었을 그 일은 무지를 통해서였기 때문에 양해될 수 있는 것에 속하기 때문이다. 왜냐하면 인간 종의 그 어떤 구성원도 신을 죽이길 바라지 않을 것이고, 최소한 알고서 그러길 바라진 않을 것이며, 그러므로 그를 모르고 죽였던 자들은 다른 죄들과 비할 수 없는 무한한 죄로 곤두박질치지 않는다. 그의 삶이 얼마나 선한지 알기 위해서, 우리가 무지에서 그 죄가 저질러졌다는 사실과 관련하여 그 죄의 크기를 고찰하지 않았지만, 마치 알고서 저지른 것처럼 했음을 염두에 둬라 - 그 누구도 하지 않았을 혹은 할 수 없었을.
B. You have demonstrated logically that it was possible for those who killed Christ to attain to forgiveness of their sin.
그리스도 죽인 자들이 그들의 죄를 용서받을 수 있음을 논리적으로 증명했다.
A. What more are you asking now? Look! You recognize how logical necessity makes it clear that the city above has to have its complement made up by members of the human race, and that this cannot come about except through the remission of sins, which no man can have except through a man who is identical with God and who by his death reconciles sinners to God. We have clearly found Christ, whom we acknowledge to be God and man and to have died for our sakes. Be sure of this too, without any doubt: all that he says is true, since God is incapable of lying, and the deeds he did were done wisely, even though the reasoning behind them may not be understood by us.
이제 니가 물을 게 또 뭐냐? 봐라! 너는 논리적 필연이 어떻게 천상의 나라가 그 충족을 이루어야 하는지, 인간 종의 숫자를 통해 그래야 하는지, 그리고 이것이 죄의 사함을 통해서가 아니라면 일어날 수 없다는 걸, 신과 동일하고 그의 죽음으로 신에 대한 죄인들에 상응시키는 인간을 통해서가 아니라면 가질 수 없다는 걸 분명하게 하는지 알게 되었다. 우리는 그리스도, 우리가 신이며 인간이자 우리 때문에 죽었던 자로 인정하는 그를 분명히 찾았다. 어떤 의심의 여지도 없다: 그가 말하는 모든 게 참인데, 신은 거짓말할 능력이 없기 때문이고, 그가 행한 행위들은 지혜롭게 이루어졌는데, 설령 그 이면의 추론이 우리에 의해 이해될 수 없더라도 그렇다.
B. What you are saying is true, and I do not doubt that what he said is true or that what he did was done in accordance with reason. I nevertheless ask you to explain to me by what logic this truth, which to those who do not believe in the Christian faith seems as if it were not right and not possible, is in fact right and possible. I ask this not in order that you should confirm me in the faith, rather so that you should give one already confirmed in the faith the joy which comes from an understanding of the absolute truth.
니가 말 맞다, 그리고 나는 그가 말했던 것이 참임을 의심하지 않고 혹은 그가 했더 일이 이성에 따라 행해졌음을 의심하지 않는다. 그럼에도 불구하고 나는 니가 나에게 어떤 논리로 이 진리가, 그리스도교 신앙에서 믿음을 가지지 않는 자들에게 마치 옳지 않고 불가능해 보이는 이 진리가 사실 옳고 가능한지 설명해주길 바란다. 나는 이걸 니가 나를 신앙에 있어서 확신시켜주길 바라고 요구하는 게 아니라, 오히려 니가 이미 신앙 안에서 확신하는 자에게 절대적 진리를 이해하는 일로부터 오는 기쁨을 주길 바라고 요구한다.


16. How God produced a man without sin out of sinful matter; also about the salvation of Adam and Eve
어떻게 신은 죄로 물든 물질로부터 죄 없는 인간을 만들었는지; 또한 아담과 이브의 구원에 대하여

In view of this, it is my request that you should explain the reasoning behind the matters about which I have yet to ask you in the same way as you have elucidated the reasoning behind the matters which we have spoken of up to now. My first question is: how did God produce a man without sin out of the human race, which is totally permeated with sin? This was like producing unleavened bread out of leavened dough. For, granted that the actual conception of this man was untainted and devoid of the sin of carnal pleasure, the Virgin from whom he was taken was conceived ‘amid iniquities’ and her mother ‘conceived’ her ‘in sin’ [cf. Ps. 50: 7 Vulg. 51: 5], and she was born with original sin since she sinned in Adam, ‘in whom all have sinned’ [Rom. 15: 12].
이런 관점에서, 내 요청은 니가 우리가 지금까지 이야기했던 문제들의 이면의 추론을 설명했을 때와 동일한 방식으로 내가 아직 너에게 묻고 있는 그 문제들의 이면의 추론을 설명해 달라는 거다. 내 첫 물음은 : 어떻게 신이 인종, 완전히 죄로 물든 종으로부터 죄 없는 인간을 만들었는지? 이건 효모 없는 빵을 효모 들어간 반죽에서 만드는 것 같다. 왜냐하면, 이 인간의 구체적 개념이 때묻지 않고 육욕의 쾌락의 죄가 없었던 것이었음을 받아들이면, 부당성들 가운데 그가 그로부터 취해질 수 있었던 처녀를 인정하면 그리고 그녀의 어머니가 죄 안에서 그녀를 품었고, 그녀는 원죄와 함께 태어났는데 아담의 경우에서 그녀가 죄를 지었으므로, 그 안에 모든 죄가 있는.
A. Once it is agreed that the man whom we have in mind is God and the reconciler of sinners, there is no doubt that he is completely without sin. Moreover, this cannot be so if he has not been produced without sin out of sinful matter. Now, if we cannot understand the reasoning whereby the Wisdom of God did this, we ought not to express astonishment, but reverently bear with the fact that in the hidden recesses of so surpassingly great an actuality there is something which we do not know. Indeed, God’s restoration of human nature was more miraculous than his creation of it. For the two acts—restoration and creation—are both equally easy for God. However, in the time before he was created, man did not sin, and hence there was no need for restoration to take place. But after he was created he sinned and, because of his sin, deserved to lose both the fact of being created and the destiny for which he was created. In fact, though, he did not entirely lose the fact of being created. This was so that he could be the object of God’s punishment or of his mercy. For neither of these options could come about if he had been annihilated. It follows, then, that God’s restoration of human nature was more miraculous than his action in bringing it into existence, to the extent that the restoration was concerned with man as sinner and was contrary to what he deserved, whereas the creation was concerned with man in a state of sinlessness, and was not contrary to what he deserved. What a great thing it is, too, for God and man to combine in One, in such a way that a man is identical with God, while the integrity of both natures is preserved! Who may presume even to think that a human intellect might be capable of fathoming how it is that such an act has been performed, so wisely and so wonderfully?
일단 우리가 고려하는 인간이 신이며 죄의 조정자임을 동의하면, 그가 완전히 죄 없는 건 의심할 수 없다. 더욱이, 만일 그가 죄의 물질에서 죄 없이 탄생하지 않았다면 그럴 수 없다. 이제, 만일 우리가 신의 지혜로 이 일을 행한 그 추로을 이해할 수 없다면, 우리는 경악을 표할 게 아니라, 경건하게 깊숙하게 숨겨진 그렇게나 놀랍도록 대단한 실재성, 우리가 모르는 어떤 것이 있다는 그 현실성을 감내해야 한다. 더구나, 인간 본성에 대한 신의 복원은 그에 대한 창조보다 더 기적이었다. 왜냐하면 두 행위들 - 복원과 창조 - 모두 마찬가지로 신에게 쉽기 때문이다. 그렇지만, 그가 창조했던 때 이전에, 인간은 죄를 짓지 않았고, 따라서 복원이 일어날 필요가 없다. 하지만 그가 창조한 다음 그가 죄를 지었고, 그의 죄 때문에, 창조되었다는 사실과 그가 그를 위해 창조된 운명 모두 잃을 만하다. 사실, 그렇지만, 그는 창조된 사실을 완전히 잃지 않는다. 그래서 그가 신의 처벌 대상이 될 수 있었거나 그의 자비의 대상이 될 수 있었게 하도록. 왜냐하면 이 선택지들 중 어느 쪽도 만일 그가 무화되었더라면 일어날 수 없었을 것이기 때문이다. 따라서 신의 인간 본성 복원은 그걸 존재하게 만든 것보다 더 기적이다, 복원이 죄인으로서의 인간과 관련된 만큼 그리고 그가 받아야 할 것에 반대되는 만큼, 반면에 창조는 죄 없는 상태의 인간과 관련되고, 그가 받을 것에 반대되지 않는다. 이 무슨 대단한 일인가, 신과 인간이 하나로 결합하여 그런 식으로 인간이 신과 동일화되는 방식으로, 두 본성 모두의 완전성이 보존되는 한에서! 인간 지성이 그런 행위가 어떻게 이루어졌는지 이해할 능력을 가질 만큼 그렇게나 현명하고 경이롭다고 그 누가 짐작하겠는가?
B. I agree that no human being can in this life disclose the innermost depths of such a great mystery, and I am not asking you to do what no human can do, only as much as you can do. For you will be making a more persuasive case for there being deeper reasons for this action if you show that you discern some reason for it, than if, by saying nothing, you make it self-evident that you understand no reason at all.
그 어떤 인간도 이 삶 속에서 그런 대단한 신비의 가장 내밀한 깊이를 드러낼 수 없음을 동의한다, 그리고 나는 누구도 할 수 없는 걸 너한테 요구하지 않는다, 오직 니가 할 수 있는 한에서 요구한다. 왜냐하면 너는 만일 니가 아무것도 말하지 않음으로써 니가 어떤 추로도 전혀 이해하지 못함을 자명하게 하는 것보다 그 일에 대해 어떤 이유를 분간한다는 걸 보여준다면 이 행위에 대해 더 깊은 이유들이 있음에 대해 더 설득력 있는 경우를 만들 거다.
A. I see that I am unable to set myself free from your importunity. But let us give thanks to God if I can to any extent make clear the subject which you are demanding I should clarify. If, on the other hand, I cannot, let the proofs arrived at earlier suffice. For if it is established that God ought to become man, there is no doubt that he does not lack the wisdom and the power whereby this may be effected without sin.
나는 내가 내 스스로 네 끈질김에서 나를 자유롭게 할 능력이 없음을 안다. 하지만 만일 내가 어느 정도 분명하게 니가 내게 밝히길 요구하는 주제를 밝힌다면 신에게 감사하도록 하자. 만일 다른 한편으로 내가 할 수 없다면, 앞선 증명들이 충분하다고 하자. 왜냐하면 만일 신이 인간이 되어야 함이 확정된다면, 이 일이 죄 없이 완수될 지혜와 능력의 결여가 없으리란 것은 의심할 수 없으니까.
B. I am happy to accept terms of this sort.
그런 말은 기꺼이 받아들인다.
A. It was right, certainly, that the redemption which Christ brought about should benefit not only the people in being at that time, but others too. Let us imagine that there is a king and that the entire populace of one of his cities has sinned against him, with the exception of one man, who is none the less of the same race. None of them, moreover, is capable of doing anything to escape from the death penalty. Now, the man who is the only innocent party enjoys such favour with the king that he has it in his power to bring about the reconciliation of all those who believe in his advice, and he has such love towards the guilty that he wishes to do this. This reconciliation will be brought about by means of some service which will be very pleasing to the king, and which he will perform on a stated day in accordance with the king’s desire. And, since not all who are in need of reconciliation are able to assemble on that day, the king makes the concession, in view of the magnitude of the service, that any people who acknowledge before or after that day that they wish to receive pardon through the act which is to be performed on that day, and that they accede to the agreement concluded on that occasion, will be absolved from all their past guilt. Furthermore, supposing it should come about after this pardon that they should sin again, and provided that they should then be willing to give satisfaction in a suitable way and receive correction, they would receive pardon again through the effective power of this same agreement. There would be this proviso: that no one should enter his palace until the deed had been done whereby their wrongdoings were forgiven.
확실히 그리스도가 일으켰던 보상이 그 당시에 있던 인간들에게만 유익한 게 아니라 다른 이들에게도 유익해야 한다는 건 맞다. 왕이 있고 그의 도시들 중 하나의 대중이 그에게 반대하여 죄를 지었다고 가정해 보자, 같은 종족인 한 사람만 제외하고. 그들 중 누구도 사형으로부터 피할 수 없다고 하자. 이제, 유일하게 결백한 자가 그의 능력 내에서 그의 조언을 믿는 모든 자들의 화해를 일으키는 것으로 왕과 더불어 그런 기쁨을 누린다. 이 화해는 신을 기쁘게 할 어떤 봉사의 수단으로 일어날 거다. 그리고 신이 바라는 때에 맞추어 이루어질 거다. 그리고, 화해를 결여한 모든 이가 그 날 참여할 능력이 없기에, 왕은 양보할 것이다, 그 봉사의 크기의 관점에서, 전후에 그들이 그 날 수행될 그 행위를 통해 용서받기를 바라는 날 인정하는 누구든, 그 때 결론난 동의에 응한다, 무죄방면된다 적절하게 보상하길 바라고 교정 받는 자들, 그들이 이 동의의 효력을 통해 다시 용서받을 것이다. 단서가 있다. 누구도 그의 왕실에 그들의 죄가 용서받기 전까지 들어가지 않는다.
The thrust of this parable is that, when Christ brought about the redemption which we have in mind, not all those human beings who were to receive salvation were able to be present, and consequently there was such power in his death that its effect extends to those who were absent either geographically or temporally. That it would not be right for his death only to benefit those present is readily comprehensible from the fact that it was not possible for as many people to be present at his death as are needed for the building up of the heavenly city, even if all the people anywhere in existence at the time of his death were to be accepted for the redemption to which we have referred. For there are more evil angels than there would have been humans alive on that day, and it is from the human race that the full number of replacements for them has to be found. Nor is it to be believed that, since mankind’s first creation, there has been any time in which this world, filled as it is with creatures which were created for the use of mankind, has been so barren that there was no one in it from the human race bearing any relation to the purpose for which mankind was created. For it seems an incongruity that God should for one moment have permitted the human race, and all that he made for the use of the beings from whose ranks the heavenly city was to be completed, to exist, as it were, to no purpose. For they would seem to have their being in vain for as long as they did not seem to exist with a view to the purpose for which they were principally created.
이 우화의 요지는, 그리스도가 우리가 생각하는 그 보상을 일으킬 때, 구원 받을 인간 존재들 전부가 참석할 능력이 있지는 않고, 따라서 지리적으로든 시기적으로든 부재하는 자들의 범위까지 영향을 미치는 능력이 그의 죽음 안에 있어야 한다. 그의 죽음이 오직 현재하는 이들에게만 유익함은 옳지 않을 것임은 그의 죽음 당시에 있던 만큼의 사람들만 천국 구성에 필요하다는 건 불가능하다는 사실로부터 쉽게 이해할 수 있다, 설령 그의 죽음 당시 있던 어느 곳의 사람들이든 모두 우리가 말한 보상에 허용될 것이라 하더라도. 왜냐하면 그 날 살아있는 인간들보다 악한 천사들이 더 많기 때문이다. 그리고 인간 종으로부터 그들의 보충수가 찾아져야 하니까.
B. You are demonstrating with consistent and apparently incontrovertible reasoning that, since mankind was first created, there has never been any time devoid of some person connected with that reconciliation without which all mankind was created in vain. And we can conclude that this is not only fitting, but a necessity. For, assume that this state of affairs is more fitting and logical than that there should have been at some time no one with regard to whom the intention of God in creating mankind was to be fulfilled; assume too that there is no obstacle to this logical state of affairs: in that case it is a necessary fact that there has always been someone connected with the reconciliation we have in mind. Hence it is not to be doubted that Adam and Eve had a connection with that act of redemption, even though divine authority does not state this explicitly.

A. It also seems incredible that God excluded those two from his plan, in view of the fact that he created them and made it his plan, never deviating from it, to create from them all the human beings whom he was to take up into the heavenly city.

B. Indeed, what one ought to believe, rather, is that he created Adam and Eve particularly with the purpose in view that they should number among those for the sake of whom they were themselves created.

A. Your observation is a good one. But no soul could enter the heavenly Paradise before the death of Christ, in accordance with what I said earlier with reference to the ‘king’s palace’.

B. Such is the teaching which we hold to.

A. But that Virgin from whom the man about whom we are speaking was received was one of those who, before his birth, were cleansed of sins through him, and he was received from her in the state of cleanness which was hers.

B. What you are saying would please me greatly were it not for this: whereas he ought to have cleanness from sin in his own person and on his own account, he would appear to have it from his mother, and not to be clean on his own account, but through her.

A. It is not so. Rather, his mother’s cleanness, whereby he is clean, would not have existed, if it had not come from him, and so he was clean on his own account and by his own agency.

B. Good—so far as that issue is concerned. But there seems to me another question to be asked. We have said earlier that he is not going to die as a matter of necessity, and now we see that his mother was clean because of his death which was to happen in the future. How, then, is it that this man, who could not have existed if it were not for the fact that he was going to die, did not die of necessity? For, if he had not been going to die, the Virgin from whom he was received would not have been clean, since this could in no way be so, except in the light of a belief in the reality of his death, and there was no other way in which he could have been received from her. Hence, if he did not die obligatorily, after he was received from the Virgin, the consequence is that he could not be received from the Virgin after he was, in fact, received—and this is an impossibility.

A. If you had considered well our previous discussions, you would have understood that in the course of them this question had been resolved.

B. I do not see how.

A. When we raised the question whether the God-Man could tell lies, did we not demonstrate that where telling lies was concerned there were two potentialities, one being a desire to tell lies, the other, actual lie-telling? Did we not also show that, while he had the capacity for telling lies, he had the characteristic inherent in himself of not being able to wish to lie, and that, for this reason, he was worthy of praise for the righteousness whereby he kept to the truth?

B. Yes.

A. Similarly, in the case of saving one’s life, there is the capacity for wishing to save one’s life and the capacity for saving it. When, therefore, the question is asked whether the same God-Man could have saved his life, so as never to die, it is not a matter for doubt that he always had the capacity for saving it, even though he was not capable of wishing to save it, so as never to die. And since this was something he had inherent in him—I mean, this inability to have this wish—he laid down his soul not obligatorily but by the free exercise of his power.

B. These potentialities in him to which you refer—that for telling lies and that for saving his life—were not in the least comparable. For in the one case, it is a logical consequence that he would be capable of telling a lie if he were to wish it, but in the other, it appears that, if he were to wish not to die, he would no more be capable of this than he could not be what he was. For the purpose of his being a man was this: for him to die; and it was because of the assuredness of his future death that it was possible for him to be received from a Virgin.

A. You think that he was incapable of not dying, or that it was a matter of necessity that he died, because he was incapable of not being what he was: you may just as well assert that he was incapable of wishing not to die or that he wished of necessity to die. For it was no more for the purpose that he should die that he was made a man than for the purpose that he should wish to die. Therefore, just as you ought not to say that he could not wish not to die, or that he wished to die obligatorily, similarly it ought not to be said that he could not not die, or that it was of necessity that he died.

B. No indeed. Since both these things—that is, dying and wishing to die—are subject to the same line of reasoning, and both of them seem to have been inherent in him of necessity.

A. Who was it who wished of his own volition to make himself a man, so that, by the same unchangeable will, he would die and the Virgin from whom he—that man—was to be received would be made clean through faith in the certitude in his death?

B. God, the Son of God.

A. Has it not been demonstrated earlier that when the will of God is said to do something of necessity, it is not actually coerced by necessity, but is maintaining itself by its own spontaneous unchangeability?

B. This has indeed been demonstrated. Rather we see, conversely, that something which is God’s unchangeable will cannot not be and that it is necessary for it to be. Therefore, if it was God’s will that the man we have in mind should die, he could not not die.

A. As an inference from the fact that the Son of God took manhood upon himself with the intention that he should die, you are asserting that the man in question could not not die?

B. That is how I understand the matter.

A. Has it not emerged likewise from our earlier discussions that the Son of God is one person with the manhood which he took upon himself, so that the Son of God and the son of the Virgin are identical?

B. Yes, it has.

A. The same man, therefore, of his own volition, could not not die and did, in fact, die.

B. I cannot deny it.

A. Since, therefore, it is not out of any necessity that the will of God performs any action, but on the strength of his own power, and since the will of that man was the will of God, it was not out of any necessity that he died but on the strength of his power alone.

B. I am incapable of rebutting your lines of argument. For I can in no way invalidate either the propositions which you are adducing as premisses or the consequences which you are inferring. However, something which I have said keeps on coming back to me: that, if it were his will not to die, he would be no more capable of doing so than of not being what he was. For he was truly going to die since, if he had not been truly going to die, the faith in his future death would not be true, and it was through this faith that both the Virgin from whom he was born, and many others, have been cleansed from sin. Now, if it had not been true, it could not have been of any benefit. Consequently, if he was capable of not dying, he was capable of rendering untrue something which was the truth.

A. Why was it the truth, before he died, that he was going to die?

B. Because he wished for this spontaneously and with an unchangeable will.

A. If, therefore, as you say, he could not not die for the reason that he was truly going to die, and he was truly going to die owing to the fact that this was his spontaneous and unchangeable will, it follows that he could not not die for any other reason than because, by his unchangeable volition, it was his will to die.

B. That is right. But, whatever the reason may have been, it is nevertheless true that he could not not die and that it was necessary for him to die.

A. You are too persistent in grasping at nothingness and, as the saying goes, looking for a knot in a bulrush.

B. Have you forgotten what I said in the face of your excuses at the beginning of this disputation of ours, namely that it would not be for the learned that you would be doing what I asked, but for me and for those who were making the request along with me? Allow me therefore to ask questions corresponding to the slowness and dullness of our intelligence, so that in this way you may give me and those other people satisfaction even in the case of childish questioning, as you did at the outset.


17. That in God no necessity or impossibility exists; and that there is a necessity which compels and a necessity which does not compel

A. We have already said that it is incorrect to say of God that he ‘cannot do something’ or that he ‘does it of necessity’. For all necessity, and all impossibility, is subject to his will. Moreover his will is not subject to any necessity or impossibility. For nothing is necessary or impossible for any reason other than that he himself so wills it. Indeed, for God himself to will something, or not will it, on account of necessity or impossibility, is a notion foreign to the truth. Hence, from the fact that he does all things which are his will and does nothing other than the things which are his will, two consequences follow: no necessity or impossibility precedes his volition or nonvolition and, similarly, neither precedes his action or inaction, no matter how many things he may unchangeably wish or do. Moreover, when God does something, the deed cannot be undone after it has been done, but it is for ever the truth that it has been done; yet, despite this, it cannot be correctly stated that it is impossible for God to make a past event not a past event: neither the necessity for action or the impossibility of inaction is operative in this case, only the will of God who, being himself the Truth, always wishes the truth to be unchangeable, as he is. Correspondingly, in the event that God plans that he is unalterably going to do something, even though, in the time preceding his action, what he has in mind is not not going to happen, there is in him no necessity for action or impossibility of inaction, since in him it is the will alone which is operative. Now, on all occasions when it is stated that God is ‘incapable’ of something, this is not a negation of any capacity in him: rather, it is his insuperable power and might which is being signified. For the meaning is none other than that nothing can bring it about that he should do the thing which he is being said to be ‘incapable’ of doing. Now, much use is made of the type of expression whereby something is said to ‘be possible’, not because possibility is inherent in that thing, but because it is inherent in something else, and ‘not to be possible’, not because impossibility is inherent in that thing but because it is inherent in something else. For we say: ‘This man is capable of being defeated’, instead of ‘Someone is capable of defeating him’, and ‘He cannot be defeated’, instead of ‘No one can defeat him’. For to be ‘capable of being defeated’ does not constitute a capability, but an incapability, and to be ‘incapable of being defeated’ does not constitute powerlessness, but power. Nor is it because there is any necessity inherent in him that we say that God does something ‘of necessity’, but rather because the necessity exists in something else; this is comparable to what I have said with reference to ‘incapability’ in statements to the effect that someone ‘is incapable’. As for necessity, every case of it constitutes either compulsion or prohibition, and these two necessities are opposites, the converse of one another, as are ‘necessity’ and ‘impossibility’. However, when we say with reference to God that something is, or is not, a necessity, the meaning is not that there exists in him either coercive or prohibitive necessity: the significance is that there is necessity inherent in all things other than himself which prevents him from acting—and compels him not to act—against what is predicated of God. For, when we say that it is a necessary fact that God always speaks the truth, and that it is a necessary fact that he never lies, all that is being said is that inherent in him there is such a high degree of constancy with regard to upholding the truth that nothing can make him not speak the truth, or tell lies. Consequently, when with reference to the man we have in mind— who, in view of the unity of his person, as has been said earlier, is identical with the Son of God, God—we say that he could not not die, or could not wish not to die, after he was born of the Virgin, what is being signified is not any inability to preserve his own life, or to wish to preserve it, immortal. What is being signified, rather, is the unchangeability of his will, in response to which he had of his own volition made himself a man with the specific intent that he would die in the steadfast pursuance of that same will, and the fact that nothing could change that will. For it would be incapability more than capability, if he were to be capable of wishing to lie or to deceive or to change his will, having previously willed that it should be unalterable. Moreover, as I said earlier, when someone voluntarily plans to do some good thing, and afterwards, in accordance with the same will, completes what he planned, it is not right to say of him that he is doing what he is doing out of necessity, even though, supposing that he were unwilling to fulfil his promise, it would be possible for him to be compelled to do so. For one ought not to say that anything is being done, or not being done, out of necessity or incapability, when it is neither necessity nor incapability that is operative, but will. If, I say, this is so in the case of a human being, it is very much more the case that the terms ‘necessity’ and ‘incapability’ are not to be used at all with reference to God, who does nothing which is not his will, and whose will no force has the power to compel or prohibit. For, in the case of Christ, the difference between his natures and the unity of his person had the effect of making it possible for his divine nature to bring about what had to happen for the restoration of mankind, should his human nature not be capable of this, and for his human nature to show forth whatever was not at all appropriate for his divine nature. Moreover, it would not be a case of ‘this man . . .’ and ‘the other . . .’, but both would be himself, one and the same, and, being completely both human and divine, he would pay through his human nature the debt which human nature owed, and would be capable, through his divine nature, of what was expedient. Finally, the Virgin who was made clean through faith, so that he might be received from her, by no means believed that he was going to die for any reason other than that it was his will to do so, this being in accordance with the teaching of the prophet who said of him, ‘He was made a sacrifice, because he willed it’ [Isa. 53: 7 Vulg.]. Consequently, since her belief was true, it was a necessity that it would come about just as she believed. Now, if it troubles you once more that I am saying, ‘It was a necessity’, remember that the truth of the Virgin’s belief was not the cause of his dying voluntarily: rather the belief was true because his dying voluntarily was in the future to be an actuality. Hence, supposing it is said, ‘It was necessary that he should die only through his will, because prior belief or prophecy concerning it was true’: this is no different from saying that it was necessary for it to come about thus in the future, since it was going to come about thus. Moreover, this sort of ‘necessity’ does not compel something to be: rather, the existence of an actuality makes it a necessary fact. For there is a necessity which precedes, being the cause for an actuality’s existence, and there is a necessity which is consequent, being caused by an actuality. It is a case of a necessity which precedes and effects when the statement is made that ‘the sky revolves because it is a necessity that it should revolve’. It is a case of a necessity which is consequent and effects nothing but is itself caused when I say, ‘You are, of necessity, speaking’. This is because when I say this, what I mean is that nothing can bring it about that, while you are speaking, you are not speaking; I do not mean that something is compelling you to speak. For the violence of a natural state of affairs compels the sky to revolve, but there is no necessity which is causing you to speak. Now, wherever there exists antecedent necessity, consequent necessity also exists. But it is not the case that where there is consequent necessity, there immediately exists antecedent necessity. For we can say, ‘It is a necessity that the sky should turn, because it does turn’, but it is not similarly true to say, ‘You are speaking for the reason that it is a necessity for you to speak’. This consequent necessity occurs throughout the tenses, in this way. It is a necessity that whatever has been, has been. It is a necessity that whatever is, is. It is a necessity that whatever is, has been going to be. It is a necessity that everything that is going to be, is going to be. This is the necessity which, in Aristotle’s treatment of singular and future propositions,37 appears to deny the existence of alternatives and affirms that all things exist of necessity. Since the conviction and the prophecy about Christ—that he was going to die voluntarily and not out of necessity—were true, it was on the strength of this consequent, non-effectual necessity that it was necessary that it should be so. This was the necessity whereby he was made man; whereby he did and had done to him38 whatever he did and had done to him; whereby he willed whatever he willed. These things of necessity were, for the reason that they were going to be, and they were going to be because they were, and they were because they were. And if you want to know what the true necessity was behind all the things which he did and had done to him, know this: all these things of necessity were, because he himself so willed it. Indeed, no necessity is antecedent to his will. Hence, given that it was for no reason that these things were, other than that he willed it: if he had not so willed, they would not have been. In this way, therefore, no one took his life from him, but he himself laid it down and took it up again, because he had the ‘power to lay down his life and take it up again’, as he himself says [John 10: 18].

B. You have satisfied me that Christ cannot be proved to have undergone death out of any necessity, and I am not sorry that I was a nuisance to you, in order that you should do this.

A. We have made clear, I think, a definite logical explanation of how God raised up a man without sin out of sinful matter. I also think that one certainly must not deny there to be—apart from the consideration that God can do what human reasoning cannot comprehend—a logical explanation other than the one of which we have been speaking. But the explanation which I have given you seems sufficient to me, and also, if I were to wish to investigate another now, it would be necessary to look into what original sin is, and how it percolates through to the whole human race from our first ancestors, and it would be necessary to confront certain other questions which demand their own separate treatment. Let us be content, therefore, with the explanation of which we have been speaking, and

37 Cf. Aristotle, De Interpretatione, cited by Boethius, In De Interpretatione Aristotelis Vol. 1: 9.31–10.1 Meiser, PL 64, 333, meaning, approximately, ‘It is not the case, therefore, that anything exists or comes into being by chance, nor will it in future alternatively be or not be, but all things exist of necessity, and not as a matter of alternatives.’

38 Lat. passus est; alternative translation, ‘suffered’.

proceed to the remaining parts of the work which we have undertaken.

B. As you wish—but on condition that, with God’s help, you will some time, as if in repayment of a debt, explore that other reason which you are avoiding looking into now.

A. I do not refuse your request, since I am aware that I have a desire to undertake this. But because I am uncertain about future events, I do not dare to make a promise, but place the matter at God’s disposal.


18. How the life of Christ is recompense paid to God for the sins of mankind; and how Christ was obliged, and was not obliged, to suffer

In consequence of the question which you put forward at the beginning, many other questions have presented themselves. But say now what aspect of it seems to you in want of a complete solution.

B. The substance of the question was: why God became man, so that he might save mankind through his death, when it appears that he could have done this in another way. You have responded to this question with many cogent lines of reasoning, and have thereby shown that it was not right that the restoration of human nature should be left undone, and that it could not have been brought about unless man repaid what he owed to God. This debt was so large that, although no one but man owed it, only God was capable of repaying it, assuming that there should be a man identical with God. Hence it was a necessity that God should take man into the unity of his person, so that one who ought, by virtue of his nature, to make the repayment and was not capable of doing so, should be one who, by virtue of his person, was capable of it. Next, in view of the fact that the man who was God had to be taken from a Virgin and from the person of the Son of God, you have also shown how he could have been taken sinless from out of sinful matter. You have furthermore proved that the life of this man is so sublime and so precious that it can suffice to repay the debt owed for the sins of the whole world, and infinitely more besides. It now remains, therefore, to show how his life is recompense for the sins of mankind.

A. If he allowed himself to be killed on account of his righteousness, did he not give his life for God’s honour?

B. If I can understand what I do not doubt, I will admit— although I do not see how he was acting rationally in doing this, seeing that he could have upheld righteousness unswervingly and could have preserved his life eternally—that he voluntarily gave to God, for his honour, some gift of the sort with which all that is not God cannot be compared, but which can be given as recompense for the debts of all mankind.

A. When Christ endured with kindly patience the sufferings— injuries and insults and death on the cross along with robbers— which were inflicted on him because of the righteousness which, as we have said earlier, he was obediently maintaining, he set an example to mankind, the purpose of which was that people should not turn aside, without the provocation of any perceptible discomforts, from the righteousness which they owe to God. He would certainly not have been setting this example if he had taken advantage of his power and turned aside from the death which, for such a reason, was being inflicted on him. Do you not understand this?

B. It does not seem that it was a matter of any necessity that he should personally have set this example, seeing that many people before his coming, and John the Baptist after his coming but before his death, are recognized to have done this adequately by enduring death bravely for the sake of the truth.

A. No member of the human race except Christ ever gave to God, by dying, anything which that person was not at some time going to lose as a matter of necessity. Nor did anyone ever pay a debt to God which he did not owe. But Christ of his own accord gave to his Father what he was never going to lose as a matter of necessity, and he paid, on behalf of sinners, a debt which he did not owe. In view of this, he was all the more setting an example, the purpose of this being that people would not, when there was a compelling reason, have doubts about giving to God something which each of them was some time before long to lose. He was in no way needy on his own account, or subject to compulsion from others, to whom he owed nothing, unless it was punishment that he owed them. Nevertheless, he gave his life, so precious; no, his very self; he gave his person—think of it—in all its greatness, in an act of his own, supremely great, volition.

B. You are approaching very close to my heart’s desire. But be so patient as to allow me to ask a question which you may perhaps think me foolish to ask but to which it is not immediately obvious how I would reply, if I were to be asked it. You say that, when Christ died, he gave something which he did not owe. But no one will deny that, when he set this example in the way he did, he acted in a better way, and one more pleasing to God, than if he had not done this. And no one will say that he ought not to do something which he understood to be the better option and more pleasing to God. How, therefore, are we to assert that he did not owe to God what he did—namely, what he knew to be better and more pleasing to God—especially since a creature owes to God all that it is, and all that it knows and is capable of ?

A. Although a creature possesses nothing of itself, none the less, when God gives it leave to do or not to do something with his permission, he is granting it the gift of having two options, under such terms that, although one option may be better, neither is definitely demanded. Instead, whether the creature does what is better, or the alternative, it is said that what it is doing is what it ought to do. Moreover, if it does what is better, it has a reward, because it is giving of its own accord what is its own. For instance, although virginity is better than marriage, neither is definitely demanded from a human being. Rather, it is said of a person who prefers to marry, and of one who prefers to preserve virginity, that this is what he ought to do. For no one says that a person ought not to choose virginity, or marriage. Rather, we say that what a person prefers, before choosing one of these options, he ought to do. And if he preserves his virginity, he looks forward to a reward for the voluntary gift which he is offering to God. When, therefore, you say that a creature owes to God what it knows is better and what it is capable of, this is not invariably true—not if you interpret the action as a matter of indebtedness, and do not read into your statement the unstated implication, ‘If God commands it’. For indeed, as I have said, a person does not owe virginity as a debt. Rather, he ought to marry, if this is his preference. But if the word ‘ought’ perturbs you and you cannot conceive of a meaning for it without any sense of ‘owing’, take note of the fact that, just as the words ‘can’ and ‘cannot’ and ‘necessity’ are sometimes uttered not because they apply to the subjects of the utterance in which they occur, but because they apply to something else, so it is with ‘ought’. For instance, when we say that the poor ‘ought’ to receive alms from the rich, this is no different from saying that the rich ‘ought’ to give alms to the poor. For the debt owed here is not something to be exacted from a poor person, but from a rich one. It is said of God too that he ‘ought’ to be pre-eminent over all things, not because he is in this respect in any sense a debtor, but because all things ‘ought’ to be subordinate to him. It is said of him that he ‘ought’ to do what is his will, since that which is his will ought to be. Thus, when some creature wishes to do something which it is its own prerogative to do or not to do, the reason why the expression ‘ought to do’ is used is that what it wishes ought to be. When, therefore, it was the will of the Lord Jesus, as we have said, to endure death, in view of the fact that it was his prerogative to suffer or not to suffer, the reason why he ‘ought’ then to do what he did was that what he wished ought to be. His action was not something that he owed, because it was not a matter of indebtedness. Indeed he is both God and man, so consequently, where his human nature was concerned, from the time when he became human, he received from his divine nature—which is different from human nature—the circumstance that whatever he had was his own. As a result, there was nothing which he ‘ought’ to give, except what he wished. But, where his person was concerned, he had what he had from himself, and thus was perfectly self-sufficient, and, as a result, neither owed recompense to anyone, nor needed to give recompense to himself.

B. I see plainly now that, contrary to what my reasoning seemed to indicate, there was no logical reason why it was as a result of an obligation owed that Christ gave himself up to death for the sake of God’s honour—and that, nevertheless, what he did was something which he ‘ought’ to do.

A. That honour, to be sure, belongs to the whole of the Trinity. It follows that because Christ himself is God, the Son of God, the offering he made of himself was to his own honour as well as to the Father and the Holy Spirit; that is, he offered up his humanity to his divinity, the one selfsame divinity which belongs to the three persons. However, so that we may express our meaning more clearly, while remaining steadfast in the same truth, let us say, as customary usage has it, that the Son voluntarily offered himself to the Father. For it is most appropriate to speak in this way, because, in referring to the one person, one understands the whole God to whom Christ offered himself as a human being. Moreover, through the naming of Father and Son, a feeling of immense pious devotion is aroused in the hearts of listeners, since the Son is said in this way to be making supplication to the Father on our behalf.

B. I accept this most gladly.


19. With what very great logicality the salvation of mankind follows from his death

A. Let us contemplate now, as far as we are able, with what very great logicality human salvation follows from his death.

B. This is the direction towards which my heart inclines. For, although it seems to me that I understand this, I none the less want the structure of the logic to be worked out by you.

A. There is no need, however, to expound what a great gift it is that the Son voluntarily gave.

B. That is sufficiently clear.

A. Moreover, it will not be your judgement that someone who gives such a great gift to God ought to go without recompense.

B. No. I see that it is necessary that the Father should compensate the Son. Otherwise, he would seem unjust if he lacked the will, and powerless if he lacked the ability, to do so; both of which qualities are foreign to God.

A. Someone who gives recompense to another either gives what that person does not have or excuses what cannot be exacted from him. But before the Son performed his supremely great action, all things which belonged to the Father belonged to him, and he had no debt which he could be excused. What compensation is to be given, therefore, to someone who lacks nothing and to whom nothing can be given or excused?

B. On the one hand, I see the necessity for compensation and, on the other, its impossibility. For it is both necessary for God to give what he owes, and there is nothing for him to give as recompense.

A. If a reward, supremely great and supremely well-merited, is not given to him or to anyone else, the Son will seem to have done his supremely great act to no purpose.

B. It is an abomination to countenance this idea.

A. It is inevitable, therefore, that, because it cannot be given to him, it must be given to someone else.

B. This follows inevitably.

A. Supposing the Son wished that what was owed to him should be given to someone else, could the Father have justly prevented him, or denied the gift to the intended recipient?

B. No. I appreciate that it is both just and necessary that it should be handed over as recompense by the Father to the recipient to whom the Son wished to give it. This is for two reasons: it is permissible for the Son to give what is his own, and it is only to someone else that the Father can give what he owes.

A. On whom is it more appropriate for him to bestow the reward and recompense for his death than on those for whose salvation, as the logic of truth teaches us, he made himself a man, and for whom, as we have said, he set an example, by his death, of dying for the sake of righteousness? For they will be imitators of him in vain, if they are not to be sharers in his reward. Again, whom is he with greater justice to make heirs of the recompense due to him, and of the overflowing of his bounty, than those who are parents and brothers to him, whom he sees, bound by so many and such enormous debts, wasting away with deprivation in the depths of misery? The debt that they owe for their sins would, as a result, be excused and they would be given what, because of their sins, they are deprived of.

B. There can be nothing more logical, nothing sweeter, nothing more desirable that the world can hear. I indeed derive such confidence from this that I cannot now express in words with what joy my heart is rejoicing. For it seems to me that God rejects no member of the human race who approaches him on this authority.

A. So it is, if he makes the approach in the way that he should. Moreover, how one should approach the state of sharing in this grace, and how one should live once subject to that state, is something which Holy Scripture teaches, based as it is on the solid truth into which, with God’s help, we have to some extent gained an insight, truth which is, as it were, a firm foundation.

B. Truly, whatever is built upon this foundation is founded on firm rock.

A. I think I have now gone some little way towards a satisfactory reply to your question, although someone better than I could do it more fully, and there are more, and greater, reasons for this thing than my intellect, or any mortal intellect, can comprehend. It is clear also that God in no way had a need which required him to perform the action of which we have been speaking: rather, it was unchangeable truth that demanded that this be so. For, granted that this was the action of the man of whom we have spoken and that it may be said that God did it, in view of the unity of his person, it is nevertheless not the case that God needed to come down from heaven to conquer the devil, or to take action against him in order to set mankind free. Rather, God demanded it of man that he should defeat the devil and should pay recompense by means of righteousness, having previously offended God through sin. Certainly God did not owe the devil anything but punishment, nor did man owe him anything but retribution—to defeat in return him by whom he had been defeated. But, whatever was demanded from man, his debt was to God, not to the devil.


20. How great and just the mercy of God is

Now, the mercy of God which, when we were considering the justice of God and the sin of mankind, seemed to you to be dead,39 we have found to be so great, and so consonant with justice, that a greater and juster mercy cannot be imagined. What, indeed, can be conceived of more merciful than that God the Father should say to a sinner condemned to eternal torments and lacking any means of redeeming himself, ‘Take my only-begotten Son and give him on your behalf ’, and that the Son himself should say, ‘Take me and redeem yourself ’. For it is something of this sort that they say when they call us and draw us towards the Christian faith. What also could be juster than that the one to whom is given a reward greater than any debt should absolve all debt, if it is presented with the feeling that is due?


21. That it is impossible for the devil to receive reconciliation

As for the reconciling of the devil about which you asked,40 you will understand this to be impossible if you carefully consider the reconciling of mankind. For just as man could not be reconciled except by a man-God who was capable of dying, through whose righteousness what God lost through the sin of mankind might be restored, likewise the condemned angels cannot be saved except by an angel-

39 Cf. 1.25 above.
40 Cf. 1.17.

God who would be capable of dying and who would restore by his righteousness what the sins of the others have stolen. Moreover, just as it was not right that man should be restored by another man who was not of the same race, even if he were of the same nature, similarly it is not right that an angel should be saved by another angel, even if he were of the same nature, since angels are not of one race as human beings are. For angels are not all descended from one angel in the same way that human beings are descended from one man. Another thing which rules out their restoration is that, just as they fell without having as the cause of their fall injury from anyone else, similarly they ought to rise once more without the assistance of anyone else—and this is impossible for them. For there is no other way in which they can be restored to the dignity which they were to have possessed, since, supposing they had not sinned, they would have been remaining steadfast in the truth without anyone else’s assistance, through power which they had received as their own. Consequently, if anyone advances the opinion that our Saviour’s redemption ought at some time to be extended to them, it is proved by logic that he is being deceived contrary to logic. I do not say this on the supposition that the value of the death of Christ does not outweigh in its magnitude all the sins of mankind and of the angels, but because unalterable logic opposes the granting of relief to the fallen angels.


22. That by the things which have been said, the truth of the Old Testament and the New has been proved

B. All the things which you say seem to me logical and incontrovertible. And my understanding is that, through the solution given to the single problem which we set ourselves, all that is contained in the New Testament and the Old has been proved. For you prove that it is a matter of necessity for God to become man, and you do so in such a way that, even if one were to remove the few things posited by you that come from books of ours, such as the material you have touched upon with regard to the three persons of God and with regard to Adam—you would be providing something which would satisfy not only Jews, but even pagans. The God-Man himself it is who establishes the New Testament and confirms the Old. Therefore, in the same way that it is a necessity to acknowledge that the God-Man is truthful, likewise no one can fail to acknowledge that all that is contained in those Testaments is true.

A. If we have said anything that ought to be corrected, I do not refuse correction. But if it is corroborated by the Testimony of Truth, as we think we have by means of logic discovered, we ought to attribute this not to ourselves but to God, who is blessed throughout all ages. Amen.

-작성중-

1. 일단 Brian Davies랑 G. R. Evans 번역부터.

1. That man was created righteous so that he might be blessedly happy
   인간이 지복을 누리도록 정의롭게 창조되었다는 것

A. It ought not to be doubted that the nature of rational beings^[각주:1] was created by God righteous^[각주:2] in order that, through rejoicing in him, it might be blessedly happy. For the reason why it is rational is in order that it may distinguish between right and wrong, and between the greater good and the lesser good. Otherwise it was created rational to no purpose. But God did not make it rational to no purpose. On the basis of similar logic there is proof that rational nature received the power of discrimination in order that it might hate and avoid what is bad, and love and choose the good, and, moreover, love and choose, for preference, the greater good. For otherwise it would have been to no purpose that God had given it that power of discrimination, if no love resulted from the discriminating, and no avoidance. But it is not fitting that God should have given such an important power to no purpose. It is a certainty, therefore, that rational nature was created to the end that it should love and choose, above all, the highest good, and that it should do this, not because of something else, but because of the highest good itself. For if the loving were for the sake of something else, it would have as its object not the highest good itself but the other thing. But loving the highest good is something which rational nature cannot do unless it is righteous. In order, therefore, that its rationality should not be purposeless, it was simultaneously created rational and righteous. Now, it was created with these characteristics—if it was created for the purpose of choosing and loving the highest good—either so that it should attain to what it was loving and choosing, or, alternatively, so that it would not. But if it is not the case that rational nature has been created righteous in order that some day it may attain to what it loves and chooses, it has been created with this characteristic to no purpose, as a result loving and choosing the highest good without there being any reason why it will ever be its due to attain to it. For so long, then, as it performs righteous acts, loving and choosing the highest good—the purpose for which it was created—it will be miserable, because it will be in need against its will, not having what it yearns for. This is an extreme absurdity. Hence rational nature was created righteous to the end that it might be made happy by rejoicing in the highest good, that is, in God. Man, being rational by nature, was created righteous to the end that, through rejoicing in God, he might be blessedly happy.
안 : 이성적 존재자들의 본성이 신에 의해서, 신 안에서 기뻐함을 통하여, 지복을 누리도록 창조되었다는 것은 의심하지 않아야 한다. 왜냐하면 그 본성이 이성적인 이유가 올바름과 그릇됨을, 그리고 더 큰 선과 더 적은 선을 구분하도록 하기 위함이기 때문이다. 그것은 달리 어떤 목적을 위해서도 창조된 것이 아니다. 하지만 신은 목적 없이 그 본성을 만들지 않았다. 비슷한 논리에 기초하여 이성적 본성은 악을 미워하고 피하도록, 그리고 선을 사랑하고 선택하도록 하기 위해, 그리고, 더 나아가, 선호에 대하여, 더 큰 선을 사랑하고 택하도록 하기 위해 분별의 능력을 받았다는 증명이 있다. 왜냐하면 다른 식으로는 신이 그 본성에 분별력을 주었다는 것이 아무 목적도 없는 일일 테니, 만일 그 분별로부터 아무런 사랑도, 아무런 기피도 귀결하지 않는다면. 하지만 신이 그런 중요한 능력을 아무 목적 없이 줘야 했으리란 것은 어울리지 않는다. 그러므로 이성적 본성이 무엇보다도 최상의 선을 사랑하고 택하도록 하는 목적으로 창조되었다는 것, 그리고 그 본성은 이 일을 다른 어떤 것 때문이 아니라 최상의 선 자체로 인해 행해야 한다는 것은 확실하다. 하지만 최상의 선을 사랑하는 일은 이성적 본성이 정의롭지 않는 한 행할 수 없는 어떤 것이다. 그러므로 그 본성의 이성이 맹목적이어서는 안 되겠기에, 그 본성은 이성적인 동시에 정의롭게 창조되었다. 이제, 그 본성은 이런 특성들과 더불어 창조되었다 - 만일 그 본성이 최상의 선을 사랑하고 택하는 것을 목적으로 창조되었다면 - 그리하여 그가 사랑하고 택하는 그것을 얻도록, 혹은, 대신에, 그러지 못하도록. 하지만 만일 이성적 본성이 언젠가 그 본성이 사랑하고 택하는 것을 얻도록 정의롭게 창조되었던 것이 아니라면, 그 본성은 아무 목적 없이 이러한 성격과 더불어 창조되었다, 그것을 얻어야 할 이유가 될 것도 없이 최상의 선을 사랑하고 택한다는 일의 결과로. 그래서 그 본성이 정의로운 행위들을 수행하는 한, 최상의 선을 사랑하고 택함으로써 - 그 본성이 창조된 목적 - 그 본성은 비참해지는데, 그 본성이 그 의지에 반하여 결핍에 처할 것이기 때문이다, 그것이 갈구하는 바를 지니지 못함으로써. 이것은 지극히 부조리하다. 따라서 이성적 본성은 최사의 선, 즉 신 안에서 기뻐함으로써 지복을 누리게 되도록 하기 위한 목적으로 정의롭게 창조되었다. 본성에 의해 이성적인 존재인 인간은 신 안에서의 기쁨을 통하여 지복을 누리도록 하기 위한 목적으로 정의롭게 창조되었다.


2. That he would not die if he had not sinned
 그는 죄를 짓지 않았더라면 죽지 않았을 것이다.

Furthermore, because man was created with this characteristic in order that he should not inevitably die, it is easily proved on this basis that, as we have already said, it is repugnant to the wisdom and justice of God that he should force him, if guiltless, to suffer death, having made him righteous for the purpose of eternal happiness. It follows, therefore, that if he had never sinned, he would never die.
더 나아가, 인간이 이런 성격과 더불어 불가피하게 죽어야 하는 것은 아니게끔 창조되었기 때문에, 이러한 배경에서, 우리가 이미 이야기했던 것처럼, 신의 지혜와 정의에 대해 그가 인간으로 하여금, 그가 죄가 없을 경우, 죽음을 겪도록 강제하리란 것, 영원한 지복의 목적으로 그를 정의롭게 만들면서도 그랬다는 것은 혐오스러운 일임이 쉽사리 증명된다. 그러므로 만일 그가 결코 죄 지은 일이 없었다면, 그는 결코 죽지 않았으리란 점이 귀결한다.

3. That he rises with the body in which he lives in this life
그는 이 삶에서 그가 살던 그 육신과 더불어 일어서리라는 것

Hence there is proof that there is to be at some time a resurrection of the dead. For if man is to be restored in perfection, he ought to be reconstituted as the sort of being he would have been if he had not sinned.
따라서 언젠가 죽은 자들의 부활이 있으리란 것의 증명이 있다. 만일 인간이 완전한 채로 복원될 것이라면, 그는 그가 죄를 짓지 않았더라면 그러하였을 그런 종류의 존재로서 재구성되어야 한다.

B. It cannot be otherwise.
달리 될 수는 없다.

A. In the same way, therefore, that if man had not sinned, he would have been bound to undergo change into incorruptibility, likewise it is right that, when in the future he is restored, he will be restored in the body in which he lives in this life.
그러므로 같은 방식으로, 만일 인간이 죄를 짓지 않았더라면, 그는 불후성으로의 전환을 겪도록 되어 있었을 것이고, 같은 방식으로, 미래에 그가 복원될 때, 그는 그가 이 삶을 살아가는 그 육체 안에서 복원될 것이라는 점은 옳다.

B. What are we to answer, if someone should say that it is right that this should happen in the case of those in whom the human race is to be restored, but that it is not necessary where the wicked are concerned?
만일 누군가 이런 일이 복원될 그런 인간종의 경우에는 일어나야 하는 게 맞다고, 하지만 악한들이 관련된 경우에는 필연적이지 않다고 말한다면, 우리가 답할 바는 무엇인가?

A. Nothing more just or appropriate can be conceived of than that, just as a human being, if he had persevered in righteousness, would have enjoyed eternal blessedness as an entirety, that is, with soul and body, similarly, if he perseveres in unrighteousness, he should, as an entirety, be eternally miserable.
바로 인간종으로서, 만일 그가 정의로움 안에서 존속하였다면, 전체로서, 즉 영혼과 육신을 가지고 영원한 지복을 향유하였을 것인 바와 마찬가지로, 만일 그가 부정의 안에서 존속하였다면, 전체로서 영원히 비참하였을 것이라는 것보다 더 정의롭거나 적절하다고 인정될 수 있는 아무것도 없다.

B. You have not taken long to satisfy me about these matters.
이 문제들에 대해 내게 만족할 만큼 길게 다루지 않았다.


4. That, with regard to the nature of mankind, God will bring to completion what he has begun
인류의 본성을 고려하여, 신은 그가 시작한 일을 완성하리란 것

A. On the basis of these considerations it is easy to recognize, that with regard to the nature of mankind, there are two alternatives: either God will complete what he has begun, or it was to no avail that he created this life-form^[각주:3]—so sublime a life-form, and with such great good as its purpose. But, if it is recognized that God has made nothing more precious than rational nature, whose intended purpose is that it should rejoice in him, it is totally foreign to him to allow any rational type of creature to perish utterly.
이런 고찰들을 기초로, 인류의 본성을 고려하여, 두 가지 대안들이 있다는 것은 알아차리기 쉬운 것이다: 신이 그가 시작한 일을 완결짓거나, 아니면 그가 이 삶의 형식 - 그렇게나 절묘한 삶의 형식, 그리고 그렇게나 커다란 선을 그 목적으로 가진 - 을 만들었던 것이 아무 쓸모도 없는 일이었다는 것이다. 하지만, 만일 신이, 그가 의도한 목적이 그 본성이 신 안에서 기뻐하게 되는 것인 그 신이, 이성적 본성보다 더 귀중한 다른 어떤 것도 만들지 않았다는 점을 인정한다면, 어떤 종류의 이성적 피조물이든 완전히 소멸하는 것을 허용함이 그에게 전적으로 이질적이다.

B. A heart that is rational cannot think otherwise.
합리적 심장은 달리 생각할 수 없다.

A. It is necessary, therefore, that, with regard to the nature of mankind, God should finish what he has begun. However, this cannot be done, as we have said, except through the paying of complete recompense for sin, something which no sinner can bring about.
그러므로 인류의 본성을 고려하면, 신이 그가 시작한 일을 끝마치리란 것은 필연적이다. 그렇지만, 우리가 말했듯, 이 일은 죄에 대한 완결된 보상을 지불함을 통해서가 아니라면 행해질 수 없다, 그 어떤 죄인도 야기할 수 없는 그런 어떤 것(선행사가 the paying이야 this야?)

B. I understand now that it is necessary that God should accomplish what he has begun, in order that he may not appear, unfittingly, to be failing in his undertaking.
난 이제 신이 그가 시작했던 일을 완성하리란 게 필연적임을 이해한다, 신이 어울리지 않게 그가 맡은 일에 실패하는 것으로 보이지 않도록 하기 위해서.


5. That, although it is a matter of necessity that this should happen, it will not be under compulsion of necessity that he will do this; that, moreover, there is a necessity which removes or diminishes graciousness and a necessity which increases it
이 일이 일어나리란 것이 필연적인 일이라 할지라도, 그가 이 일을 해내리란 것이 필연의 강제 아래 있지는 않으리란 것; 즉, 더 나아가, 영광을 제거하거나 약화시키는 필연성과 그것을 증대시키는 필연성이 있다는 것.

But if this is so, God seems, as it were, to be forced to bring about the salvation of mankind by the necessity for avoiding unfittingness. How can it be denied, therefore, that he is taking this action for his own sake rather than ours? Again, if this is the case, what gratitude^[각주:4] do we owe him for this thing which he is doing for his own sake? Furthermore, how is it that we are to attribute our salvation to his grace, if it is of necessity that he saves us?
하지만 만일 이 일이 그렇다면, 신은 마치 부적절함을 피하기 위한 필연에 의해 인류 구원을 일으키도록 강제받는 것처럼 보인다. 그러므로 그가 이 행위를 우리보다도 그 자신 때문에 취하고 있다는 걸 어떻게 부정할 수 있는가? 다시, 만일 이게 사실이라면, 그가 그 자신을 위해 하고 있는 이 일을 위해 우리가 그에게 줘야 할 감사가 무엇인가? 더 나아가, 어떻게 우리의 구원을 신의 은혜로 돌리게 되는가, 만일 그가 우릴 구원하는 것이 필연에 속한다면?

A. There is a necessity which removes graciousness from someone who is acting beneficently, or diminishes it, and there is a necessity whereby the debt of gratitude owed for a benefaction is increased. For when someone acts beneficently against his will due to the unavoidable force of circumstances to which he is subject, he is owed either no gratitude or less gratitude. When, on the other hand, he subjects himself freely to a force which inevitably requires him to do good, and is not reluctant to endure it, then he certainly deserves greater gratitude for his good deed. Now, this action is not to be called an act of necessity but an act of grace, because it is under no one’s compulsion that he undertakes it and carries it out, but freely. For, suppose you promise today that you will give a present tomorrow and tomorrow make the gift of your own free will: even though it is a matter of necessity for you to keep your promise, if you can—otherwise you will be a liar—the person to whom you are making the gift is no less indebted to you than if you had not made the promise, because you did not hesitate to make yourself his debtor before presenting the gift. A comparable case is when someone of his own free will makes a vow about holy living. It is true that he is of necessity under an obligation to keep the vow after he has made it, in order that he may not incur the condemnation due to an apostate; it is true, also, that he can be forced to keep it, supposing he does not wish to.
유익하게 행위하는 누군가로부터 영광을 제거하거나 혹은 그 영광을 약화시키는 필연성이 있고, 자선에 대해 갚아야 할 감사의 빚이 증대되는 그런 필연성이 있다. 누군가 그의 의지에 반하여 그가 지배받는 상황의 불가피한 강제 탓으로 유익하게 행위할 때, 그는 전혀 감사받지 않아야 하거나 덜 감사받아야 한다. 반면에 그가 불가피하게 선을 행하도록 요구하는 강제로부터 자유롭게 그 자신을 지배할 때, 그리고 그 일을 감내하기를 내키지 않아 하지 않을 때, 그러면 그가 확실히 그의 선행에 대해 더 큰 감사를 받을 만하다. 이제, 이런 행위는 필연에 속한 행위로 불려야 하는 것이 아니라, 은혜에 속한 행위로 불려야 하는데, 그 행위는 그가 그 행위를 떠맏고 또 수행하도록 하는 누구의 강제 하에도 있지 않고 자유롭기 때문이다. 당신이 내일 선물을 주겠노라고 오늘 약속하고 내일 당신 자신의 자유로운 의지로 선물을 만든다고 가정해 보자: 당신이 당신의 약속을 지키는 것이 필연의 문제라 할지라도, 만일 당신이 그럴 수 있다면 - 다른 식으로는 당신이 거짓말쟁이가 될 것이다 - 당신이 그에게 줄 선물을 만들고 있는 그 사람은 당신이 그 약속을 하지 않았다면 그러했을 것보다 당신에게 조금도 덜 고마워하지 않는다, 당신 자신을 그 선물을 하기 전까지 그 사람에 대한 채무자로 만들기를 주저하지 않았기 때문에. 비견할 만한 경우는 누군가 그의 자유로운 의지로 경건한 삶에 대한 맹세를 하게 될 경우이다. 그는 그가 맹세한 이후로 그 맹세를 지킬 의무 하에 필연에 속해 있다는 건 참이다, 변절자(배교자)라는 이유로 비난을 초래하지 않도록 하기 위해서; 또한 그가 바라지 않는다고 가정하면, 그 맹세를 지키도록 강제받을 수 있다는 것도 참이다.
But even so, if he keeps his vow willingly, he is not less, but more, pleasing to God than if he had not made the vow, since what he has renounced for the sake of God is not only life in ordinary society^[각주:5] but permission to participate in it. Moreover, it is not right to say of him that he is living a holy life as a matter of necessity, but in freedom, rather—the same freedom in which he made his vow. Consequently, despite the fact that it is not fitting for God to fail to bring to completion a good beginning, we ought all the more to attribute it entirely to his grace if he completes the act of beneficence towards mankind which he has begun, seeing that he has begun it for our sake, not for his own, being himself in need of nothing. For it was no secret to God what man was going to do, when he created him, and yet, by his own goodness in creating him, he put himself under an obligation to bring his good beginning to fulfilment. Ultimately, God does nothing under compulsion of necessity—because he is in no way forced to do, or prohibited from doing, anything. And when we say that God is performing some action as if out of a necessary obligation to avoid what is dishonourable—something of which he certainly has no fear—what we should understand, rather, is that he is acting thus out of a necessary obligation to uphold what is honourable. The necessity to which I am referring is plainly nothing other than the unchangeability of God’s honour, which he possesses of himself, and from no one apart from himself. For this reason, ‘necessity’ is a misnomer. Let us say, nevertheless, that it is a necessity that the goodness of God should bring to completion what it has begun with respect to mankind, because of his unchangeability, although the whole of what he does is grace.
허나 그렇긴 해도, 만일 그가 그의 맹세를 자진하여 지킨다면, 만일 그가 맹세를 하지 않았다면 그러했을 것보다 덜 신을 기쁘게 하는 게 아니라 오히려 더욱 기쁘게 한다, 그가 신을 위하여 단념하였던 것은 단지 세속에서의 삶만이 아니라, 그 삶에 참여함에 대한 허용까지이므로. 더욱이, 그에 대해 그가 필연의 문제로 경건한 삶을 살고 있다고 말하는 것은 옳지 않고, 자유 속에서, 오히려 - 그가 그 안에서 그의 맹세를 하였던 것과 동일한 자유 안에서 그렇다고 말하는 게 옳다. 결론적으로, 선한 시작을 완성시키지 못함이 신에 대해 적절하지 않다는 것이 사실임에도, 우리는 만일 신이 그가 시작한 인류에 대한 유익한 행위를 완수한다면 그 일을 전적으로 더욱 더 그의 은혜로 돌려야 하는데, 그가 우리를 위해 그 일을 시작하였고, 스스로 어떤 결핍도 없는 그 자신을 위해서가 아니었기 때문이다. 신이 인간을 창조했을 때 인간이 무엇을 하게 될 것인지는 신에게 비밀이 아니었는데, 그럼에도 불구하고, 인간을 창조함에 있어서 신 자신의 선에 의하여, 신은 자신을 그의 선한 시작이 충족되도록 할 책임 하에 두었기 때문이다. 궁극적으로, 신은 아무것도 필연의 강제 하에 행하지 않는다 - 그는 어떤 식으로도 그 어떤 것도 행하도록 강제받거나 행함으로부터 금지당하지 않기 때문이다. 그리고 우리가 신이 어떤 일을 마치 불명예일 수 있는 어떤 것을 피할 필연적 의무로부터인 것처럼 수행하고 있다고 말할 때 - 그 일에 대해 신이 확실히 아무런 두려움도 없는 - 우리가 이해해야 하는 바는, 오히려, 신이 명예로울 일을 유지하는 필연적 의무로부터 행위하고 있다는 것이다. 내가 언급하고 있는 필연성은 분명히 신의 영광의 불변성, 그가 그 자신의 것으로 지니는 불변성, 그리고 그 자신 외에 그 어떤 것으로부터도 나오지 않는 그 불변성 외에 다른 아무것도 아니다. 이런 이유로, '필연성'은 잘못된 이름이다. 그럼에도 불구하고, 신의 선이 그 선이 인류에 대한 기대를 가지고 시작했던 일의 완성을 이루어야 한다고, 그의 불변성 때문에, 그가 행하는 모든 일이 은혜로울지라도 그렇다고 말하기로 하자.

B. You have my leave to say so.
난 당신이 그리 말하도록 허락한다.


6. That no one is capable of bringing about the recompense by which mankind may be saved except someone who is God and man
신이면서 인간인 누군가를 제외하고 누구 하나 그로써 인류가 구원될 보상을 일으킬 능력이 없다는 것

A. But this cannot come about unless there should be someone who would make a payment to God greater than everything that exists apart from God.
그러나 이 일은 신 외에 존재하는 모든 것보다 더 큰 것을 신에게 보상할 누군가가 있지 않는 한 일어날 수 없다.

B. That is agreed.
그건 동의되었다.

A. It is also a necessity that someone who can give to God from his own property something which exceeds everything which is inferior to God, must himself be superior to everything that exists apart from God.
또한 신에게 미치지 못하는 모든 것을 넘어서는 뭔가를 그 자신의 소유로부터 신에게 줄 수 있는 누군가는, 그 자신이 신 외에 존재하는 모든 것에 대해 넘어서는 자여야만 한다는 것은 필연적이다.

B. I cannot deny it.
부정할 수 없다.

A. Now, there is nothing superior to all that exists which is not God—except God.
이제, 신을 제외하고는, 신 아닌 존재하는 모든 것을 넘어서는 아무것도 없다.

B. That follows.
귀결된다.

A. But the obligation rests with man, and no one else, to make the payment referred to. Otherwise mankind is not making recompense.
하지만 언급된 죗값을 치르는 의무는 다른 누구도 아닌 인간 책임이다. 다른 식으로 인류는 보상을 이룰 수 없다.

B. This seems pre-eminently just.
특히나 정의로워 보인다.

A. If, therefore, as is agreed, it is necessary that the heavenly city should have its full complement made up by members of the human race, and this cannot be the case if the recompense of which we have spoken is not paid, which no one can pay except God, and no one ought to pay except man: it is necessary that a God-Man should pay it.
그러므로 만일 동의된 바대로 천국이 인간 종의 수로 채워진 완전수를 지님이 필연적이라면, 그리고 만일 우리가 말했던, 신 외에 그 누구도 갚을 수 없는, 인간 외에 그 누구도 갚아야 하는 게 아닌 그 보상이 지불되지 않는다면 이 일이 불가능하다면: 신-인간이 그걸 갚아야 함이 필연적이다.

B. Blessed be God! Now we have made a great discovery relating to the object of our search. Continue, therefore, as you have begun. For I have hope that God will help us.
신 만세. 이제 우리는 우리 탐구의 목표에 관련된 대단한 발견을 해냈다. 그러니까 시작했던 것처럼 계속해라. 나는 신이 우릴 도울 거라는 희망을 가진다.


7. That it is necessary for one and the same person to be perfect God and perfect man
동일한 하나의 인격이 완전한 신이자 완전한 인간임이 필연적이라는 것

A. What we now have to investigate is how it is possible for a God-Man to exist. For it is not the case that divine nature and human nature are mutually interchangeable so that divine nature may become human or human, divine; nor can the two be mixed so that some third nature might arise from them, a nature which would not be divine—not at all—and not human either. To sum up, if it were possible for one nature to be changed into another, the result would be someone who would either be God and not man, or man and not God. Alternatively, if they were mixed so that a third nature was produced as the consequence of intercontamination of the two natures,^[각주:6] the result would be neither man nor God. We may compare how the issue of two individual animals, male and female, of different species, is a third type of animal, which preserves neither the nature of its father nor that of its mother in its entirety, but has a third nature which is a mixture of both. The God-Man who is the object of our quest cannot, therefore, come into existence out of divine and human nature, or out of the changing of one into the other, or a contaminating mixture of the two resulting in a third nature. For these things cannot happen, or, supposing they were possibilities, they would not have the power to effect the outcome at which our enquiries are directed.
지금 우리가 탐구하고 있는 것은 신-인간이 존재하는 게 어떻게 가능한지이다. 신성과 인성이 상호 전환가능하여 신성이 인성이 되거나 인성이 신성이 된다는 건 불가능하기 때문이다; 그 둘이 섞일 수 있어서 신성도 아닐-전혀 아닐- 그리고 인성도 아닐 제 3의 어떤 본성이 그것들로부터 생겨날 수도 없다. 요컨데, 만일 한 본성이 다른 것으로 변화되는 일이 가능하다면, 결론으로 신이면서 인간은 아니거나, 인간이면서 신은 아닌 누군가가 있을 것이다. 대안적으로, 만일 그것들이 섞여서 그 두 본성들의 상호-오염의 결과로 제 3의 본성이 산출된다면, 그 결과는 인간도 신도 아닐 것이다. 우리는 상이한 종들에 속하는 개별적 두 동물들 수컷과 암컷의 문제에 비교할 것이다, 어떻게 제 3 유형의 동물, 그 부계나 모계의 전체로서의 본성을 어느 쪽도 유지하지 않는 동물이, 허나 그 양자가 뒤섞인 제 3의 본성을 가지는지. 그러므로 우리의 목표인 신-인간은 신성과 인성으로부터 현존하게될 수 없거나, 하나에서 다른 하나로의 변화로부터, 아니면 제 3의 본성으로 귀결하는 그 둘의 오염시키는 뒤섞음으로부터 나온다. 이런 것들은 일어날 수 없거나, 가능하다고 가정하면, 우리의 조사가 향하는 결과를 산출할 능력을 가지지 않을 것이다.
If, furthermore, these two natures, as wholes, are said to be somehow conjoined to a limited extent whereby man and God are distinct from one another and not one and the same, it is impossible that both should bring about what it is necessary should happen. For God will not do it because it will not be his obligation to do it, and a man will not do it because he will not be able to. In order, therefore, that a God-Man should bring about what is necessary, it is essential that the same one person who will make the recompense should be perfect God and perfect man. For he cannot do this if he is not true God, and he has no obligation to do so if he is not a true man. Given, therefore, that it is necessary for a God-Man to be found in whom the wholeness of both natures is kept intact, it is no less necessary for these two natures to combine, as wholes, in one person, in the same way as the body and the rational soul coalesce into one human being. For otherwise it cannot come about that one and the same person may be perfect God and perfect man.
더욱이, 만일 이런 두 본성들이, 전체인 것들로서, 어떤 식으로 그로써 신과 인간이 하나가 다른 하나로부터 구별되고 하나이며 동일한 것이 아니게 되는 제한된 정도로 결합되는 것으로 이야기된다면, 그 양자가 필연적으로 일어나야 하는 것을 야기시키리란 것은 불가능하다. 왜냐하면 신은 그 일을 행함이 그의 의무가 아닐 것이기에 그 일을 행하지 않을 것이고, 인간은 그것이 불가능하기에 그 일을 행하지 않을 것이기 때문이다. 그러므로 신=인간이 필연적인 일을 야기하도록 하기 위해, 그 보상을 만들어낼 동일한 한 인격이 완전한 신이자 완전한 인간이어야 함이 본질적이다. 왜냐하면 그는 만일 그가 참으로 신이지 않다면 이 일을 할 수 없고, 그가 참으로 인간이 아니라면 그렇게 할 의무가 없기 때문이다. 그러므로 신-인간이 두 본성들의 전체성이 손상되지 않은 채로 그 안에서 발견될 것이 필연적이라는 것을 전제하면, 이 두 본성들이, 전체들로서, 하나의 인격 안에서, 육체와 이성적 영혼이 하나의 인간 존재로 결합하는 것과 동일한 방식으로 결합함이 조금도 덜 필연적이지 않다. 왜냐하면 그렇지 않다면 하나의 동일한 인격이 완전한 신이자 완전한 인간이 되는 일은 일어날 수 없기 때문이다.

B. I am happy with all that you are saying.
당신이 말하고 있는 모든 것에 기쁘다.


8. That it is right that God should assume human nature from the race of Adam and from a virgin woman
신이 아담의 종으로부터 그리고 동정녀로부터 인간 본성을 취했으리란 것이 옳다는 것.

A. It remains now to investigate from what source, and how, God will take human nature upon himself. For either he will take on this nature from Adam, or he will create a new man, just as he created Adam from no other human being. But if he creates a new man who is not from the race of Adam, this new man will not belong to the human race which is descended from Adam. Consequently, he will not have an obligation to give recompense on behalf of this race, because he will not be from it. For, just as it is right that it should be a human being who should pay recompense for the guilt of humanity, it is likewise necessary that the person paying recompense should be identical with the sinner, or a member of the same race. Otherwise, it will be neither Adam nor his race who will be making recompense on Adam’s behalf. Therefore, just as, starting from Adam and Eve, sin has been engendered in all human beings, similarly, no one except either these two themselves, or someone descended from them, has an obligation to pay recompense for the sin of mankind. As they themselves are not able to do so, it is necessary that the person who is to do this will be descended from them.
이제 어떤 원천으로부터 어떻게 신이 그 자신에 대한 인간 본성을 취할 것인지 탐구하는 일이 남았다. 왜냐하면 신은 이 본성을 아담으로부터 취할 것이거나, 아니면 새로운 인간을 창조할 것이기 때문이다, 다른 어떤 인간 존재로부터도 아담을 창조하지 않았던 것처럼. 하지만 만일 그가 아담 종으로부터 나오지 않은 새로운 인간을 창조한다면, 이 새로운 인간은 아담으로부터 유래한 인간 종에 속하지 않을 것이다. 결과적으로, 그는 이 종에 기인한 보상을 내놓을 의무를 지지 않을 것인데, 그가 그로부터 나오지 않았을 것이기 때문이다. 왜냐하면, 인간성에 속하는 죄에 보상을 지불해야 할 자가 인간존재여야 함이 맞는 것처럼, 마찬가지로 보상을 지불하는 인격은 죄인과 동일할 것이거나 동일 종의 구성원임이 필연적이기 때문이다. 그렇지 않다면, 아담의 탓으로 보상을 할 자가 아담도 그의 종도  아닐 것이다. 그러므로, 아담과 이브로부터 시작하여 죄가 모든 인간 존재들 안에 잉태되었던 것과 마찬가지로, 유사하게, 이 두 사람 자신들이나 그들로부터 유래한 누군가 외에 그 누구도 인류의 죄에 대한 보상을 지불할 의무를 지지 않는다. 그들 스스로 그리 할 수 없으므로, 이 일을 할 그 인격은 그들로부터 유래할 것임이 필연적이다.
I will enlarge on this. If Adam had not sinned, he and all his race would have maintained their standing without the support of another creature: correspondingly, if this same race rises again after its fall, it is right that it should rise again, and be raised up again, through its own doing. For, whoever it is through whose agency man is restored to the standing which belongs to him, man will certainly owe his standing in future to this person through whose agency he recovers his standing. Moreover, it was in Adam alone that God originally created human nature, and it was God’s will to create woman—in order that human beings of both sexes would be multiplied—from an origin which was none other than Adam. God therefore made it perfectly clear that it had not been his will that his future action regarding human nature would be without derivation from Adam. Consequently, supposing the race of Adam were to be raised up again by some man from a different race, it will not be restored to that dignity which it was to have had if Adam had not sinned. Hence it will not be completely restored; also God’s plan will appear to be failing. Both of these consequences are unfitting. Therefore, it is necessary that the man through whom the race of Adam is to be restored should be taken from Adam’s progeny.
난 이걸 더 상세히 살펴볼 것이다. 만일 아담이 죄를 짓지 않았다면, 그와 그의 모든 종은 그들의 위치를 다른 피조물의 도움 없이 유지하였을 것이다: 그에 따라서, 만일 이 동일한 종이 그 추락 이후 다시 부상한다면, 그 종 고유의 행위를 통해 다시 부상해야 하고 다시 부상될 것이라는 게 옳다. 왜냐하면 누구라도 그의 작용을 통해 인간이 그에게 속한 위치로 복원되든, 인간은 확실히 그의 미래 위치를 그가 그의 작용을 통해 그의 위치를 되찾은 이 인격에 빚질 것이기 때문이다. 더욱이, 신이 본래 인간 본성을 창조했다는 것은 오직 아담에게만 속했던 것이고, 여성을 창조하고자 하는 신의 의지는-양성의 인간 존재들이 번식되도록-다름 아닌 아담이었던 그 기원으로부터 나왔다. 그러므로 신은 아담으로부터 유래하지 않았을 인간 본성을 고려하여 그의 미래 행동이 그의 의지가 아니었다는 점을 절대적으로 분명하게 만들었다. 결론적으로, 아담의 종족이 다른 종족으로부터의 어떤 인간에 의해 다시 격상될 것으로 가정하면, 그 종족은 만일 아담이 죄를 짓지 않았더라면 지니고 있었을 것이었던 품격으로 회복되지 않을 것이다. 따라서 그 종족은 완전히 복원되지 않을 것이다; 또한 신의 계획은 실패한 것으로 보일 것이다. 이 결론들 모두 부적절하다. 그러므로, 아담의 종족이 그를 통해 복원될 바로 그 인간은 아담의 자손으로부터 취해져야 한다는 점이 필연적이다.
B. If we maintain a logical approach, as we have proposed to do, this must inevitably be the case.
만일 논리적 접근을 견지한다면, 그리 하자고 제안했던 것처럼 그런다면, 이건 불가피한 사실이어야만 한다.
A. Let us now investigate the question of how God is to take human nature upon himself: whether from father and mother, as is the case with other human beings, or from a man without a woman, or from a woman without a man. For, in whichever of the ways it is to be, the human nature so assumed will derive from Adam and Eve, from whom every human being, of either sex, is descended. Moreover, it is not the case that one of these three ways of operating is easier for God than the others, so that it is in this way that human nature ought to be assumed by him in preference to the others.
이제 어떻게 신이 인간 본성은 신 자신에게 취하는지 그 물음을 탐구하도록 하자: 아버지와 어머니로부터, 다른 인간 존재자들의 경우처럼 그런지, 아니면 여성 없이 남성으로부터, 혹은 남성 없이 여성으로부터인지. 왜냐하면, 그러할 어느 방식에서든, 인간 모든 본성은 모든 인간 존재들이 그로부터 유래한, 양쪽 성의, 아담과 이브로부터 유래할 것으로 추정되었으니까. 더 나아가, 이 작동의 세 방식들 중 하나가 다른 것들보다 신에게 더 쉽다는 것, 그래서 인간 본성은 신에 의해 다른 것들에 대해 더 선호함에 있어서 추정되어야 하는 그런 방식으로 이루어진다는 것은 사실이 아니다.
B. The way in which you are proceeding is good.
당신이 진행하는 방식은 훌륭하다.
A. But there is no need for great effort in order to demonstrate that the human being we have in mind will be more purely and honourably procreated from a man in isolation, or from a woman in isolation, than from an intermingling of the two like that whereby all other human children are procreated.
허나 우리가 염두에 두는 인간 존재가 고립된 한 인간으로부터 혹은 고립된 한 여성으로부터 산출되는 것이 다른 모든 인간 자손들이 산출되는 그 둘의 결합으로부터 산출되는 것보다 더 순수하고 명예롭게 산출되리라는 것을 증명하기 위해 크게 노력할 필요는 전혀 없다.
B. Enough said.
충분히 말했다.
A. Therefore he must be taken either from a man in isolation or from a woman in isolation.
그러므로 그는 고립된 남성이나 고립된 여성으로부터 취해져야만 한다.
B. He can come from nowhere else.
그는 다른 어느 곳으로부터도 나올 수 없다.
A. God can create a human being by four methods. To be specific: he can do this either from a man and a woman together, as the usual practice demonstrates, or from neither a man nor a woman, as in the case of Adam’s creation, or from a man without a woman, as in the creation of Eve, or from a woman without a man—which he has not yet done. In order, therefore, that he should prove that this method too is within his competence and that it has been kept in reserve for the very undertaking which we have in mind, it is pre-eminently fitting that he should take the man who is the object of our quest from a woman without a man.
신은 네 가지 방식으로 인간 존재를 창조할 수 있다. 구체적으로: 그는 남성과 여성 모두로부터 이 일을 할 수 있다, 일반적 관습이 증명하듯, 혹은 남녀 어느 쪽으로부터 하지 않을 수 있다, 아담의 창조의 경우처럼, 아니면 여성 없이 남성으로부터만, 이브의 창조에서처럼, 아니면 남성 없이 여성으로부터만 - 그가 아직 하지 않았던 일이다. 그러므로 이 방식 역시 그의 권한 내에 있음을 증명하도록 그리고 우리가 염두에 둔 바로 그 일에 대해 예비해 두기 위하여, 남성 없이 여성으로부터 우리 작업의 목표인 그 사람을 신이 취할 것임은 특히나 적절하다.
B. You are speaking in accordance with my heart’s desire.
내 마음의 열망에 부합하게 말하고 있다.
A. Is what we have been saying something solid, or is it—as you have told me unbelievers allege in their criticisms of us—insubstantial like a cloud?
우리가 말해오고 있는 것이 어떤 견고한 것인가, 아니면 - 비신자들이 우리에 대한 비판들에서 혐의를 제기한다고 당신이 말했던 것처럼 - 구름처럼 공허한 건가?
B. Nothing could be more solid.
아무것도 더 견고할 수 없다.
A. Paint your picture, then, not upon an empty sham but upon solid truth, and say that it is extremely appropriate that, just as the sin of mankind and the cause of our damnation originated from a woman, correspondingly the medicine of sin and the cause of salvation should be born of a woman. Moreover, women might lose hope that they have a part in the destiny of the blessed ones, in view of the fact that such great evil proceeded from a woman: in order to prevent this, it is right that an equivalent great good should proceed from a woman, so as to rebuild their hope. Include this, too, in your picture: on the supposition that it was a virgin woman who has been the cause of all the evil besetting the human race, it is all the more appropriate that the woman who is to be the cause of all good should be a virgin. Another thing to include in your picture is this. One may presume that the woman whom God created from a man without a woman was created from someone who was a virgin: on this supposition, it is extremely fitting that the man who is to be created from a woman without a man, should be brought forth by a virgin. For the moment, however, let these considerations suffice with regard to the pictures which may be painted on the subject of how the God-Man ought to be born of a virgin woman.
그럼 네 그림을 공허한 허풍이 아니라 견고한 진리 위에 그려 봐라, 그리고 여성으로부터 기원하였던 인류의 죄와 천벌의 원인과 마찬가지로, 그에 부합하게 죄의 치유와 구원의 원인이 여성으로부터 출생할 것임이 지극히 적절하다고 말하라. 더욱이, 여성들은 축복받은 자들의 운명에 몫을 가질 희망을 잃었을 테니, 그렇게나 대단한 악이 한 여성으로부터 나왔다는 사실의 관점에서: 이를 방지하기 위해, 등가의 대단한 선이 한 여성으로부터 나올 것이 옳다, 그들의 희망을 되세우도록. 네 그림에 이를 포함해라: 인간 종족에 붙어있는 모든 악의 원인이었던 여성이 처녀였다는 가정에서, 모든 선의 원인일 여성이 처녀일 것은 더할 나위 없이 적절하다. 니 그림에 포함시킬 또 다른 게 이거다. 신이 남성으로부터 여성 없이 창조했던 여성이 처녀였던 어떠 여성으로부터 창조되었다 추정할지 모른다: 이 가정에서, 남성 없이 여성으로부터 창조될 남성은, 처녀에 의해 출산되어야 할 것이 지극히 적절하다. 그렇지만 우선 이런 고찰들이 어떻게 신-인간이 처녀 여성으로부터 태어나야 하는지 하는 주제에 대해 그려질 그림들을 고려하여 충분하다고 하자.
B. These pictures of yours are extremely beautiful and in accordance with logic.
네 이 그림들 지극히 아름답고 논리에 맞는다.


9. That it is necessary for the Word alone and man to combine in a single person
로고스만이 인간과 단일한 인격 안에서 결합함이 필연적이라는 것(그래, 신은 고자다, 지랄)

A. Something else which we must investigate now is this: in what person is God, who is three persons, to take manhood upon himself? For several persons cannot take upon themselves one and the same manhood with resultant unity of person. But I have said sufficient, I believe, for the purposes of our present enquiry, in the letter On the Incarnation of the Word, addressed to the lord Pope Urban, about this uniting of the person of God with man and the question in which person of God this ought best to come about.
이제 우리가 탐구해야만 하는 다른 건 이거다: 세 인격들인 신이 그 자신에게 취할 인성으로서 어떤 인격 안에 있는지? 몇몇의 인격들은 그들 스스로 결과적 인격 통합과 함께 하나의 동일한 인성을 취할 수 없으니까. 하지만 내가 믿기로 지금 우리 탐구의 목적들을 위해 로고스의 육화에 대한 글에서, 교황 우르반에게 보냈던 것에서, 신의 인격과 인간의 이 통합에 대해서 그리고 이것이 그 안에서 최선이 되어야 하는 신의 인격이 무엇인지 하는 물음에 대해서 충분히 말했다.
B. Even so, do touch briefly, at this point, on the reasons why it is the person of the Son which ought to be made incarnate, rather than that of the Father or the Holy Spirit.
그렇더라도 육화로 이루어져야하는 것이 성부나 성령이 아닌 성자의 인격인 이유들에 대해서, 이 점에서 간략히 건드려 줘.
A. Supposing any other of the persons is to be made incarnate, there will be two sons in the Trinity, namely: the Son of God, who is Son even before the incarnation, and he who will be the Virgin’s son through the incarnation. Moreover there will be, among persons who ought always to be equals, an inequality resulting from the distinction of their respective births. For the one who is born of God will have more distinguished birth than the one who is born of the Virgin. Also, if it is to be the Father who is made incarnate, there will be two grandsons in the Trinity, because, through his assumption of manhood, the Father will be the grandson of the parents of the Virgin, and the Word, despite having no trace of human nature in him, will none the less be the grandson of the Virgin, because he will be the son of her son. All these eventualities are incongruous, and do not come about if it is the Word who is made incarnate.
다른 인격들이 육화로 이루어진다고 치면, 삼위 안에 두 아들들이 있을 것이다, 즉: 신의 아들, 육화 전에도 성자인 그가 있고, 육화를 통해 성모의 아들일 그. 더욱이 항상 동일해야 할 그 인격들 사이에서, 각자의 탄생들의 구분으로부터 귀결하는 불일치가 있을 것이다. 신의 태생인 쪽이 성모 태생인 놈보다 더 구별되었을 것이다. 또한, 만일 육화로 이루어졌던 성부가 있다면, 삼위 안에 두 손자들이 있을 것이다, 왜냐하면, 그의 인성 상정을 통해, 성부는 성모의 부모의 손자일 것이고, 로고스는, 그 안에 아무런 인간 본성의 자취도 가지지 않을지라도, 조금도 덜 성모 손자이지 않을 것인데, 왜냐하면 그녀의 아들의 아들일 테니까. 이 사건들은 다 이상하고, 육화로 이루어지는 게 로고스라면 일어나지 않는다.
And there is yet another reason why it is more appropriate for the Son to be made incarnate than the other persons: because it sounds more appropriate for the Son to make supplication to the Father than for any other of the persons to supplicate another. Also, both man, for whom the Son was to pray, and the devil, whom he was to defeat, had both wilfully taken upon themselves a false likeness of God. Hence they had sinned, as it were, most specifically against the person of the Son, who is believed to be the true likeness of the Father. The avenging or pardoning of a wrong, therefore, is most appropriately being assigned to the person on whom the injury is most specifically inflicted. Inescapable logic, then, has led us to the conclusion that it is necessary for divine and human nature to combine in one person, and that this cannot come about with respect to more than one person of God; moreover it is evident that it is more fitting for this to happen with respect to the person of the Word than to the other persons. It is, consequently, an inevitability that God the Word and a human being should combine in one person.
육화로 이루어질 것이 성자임이 더 적절한 또 다른 이유가 아직 있다: 성자가 성부에게 간청하는 게 다른 인격들 중 뭐든 또 다른 것에 간청하는 것보다 더 적절하게 들리기 때문이다. 또한, 성자가 그를 위해 기도할 인간이나 성부가 이겨낼 악마나 모두 고의로 신의 겉닮음을 그들 자신들에게 취했다. 따라서 그들은 죄를 지었고, 특히 성자의 인격에 맞서, 성부의 진짜 모상으로 믿어지는 자에 반대하여. 그러므로 잘못의 복수든 용서든 가장 확실하게 그에게 상처가 입혀지는 그 인격에 할당되는 것이 가장 적절하다. 불가피한 논리로 그래서 우리는 신성과 인성이 한 인격 안에서 결합함이 필연적이고, 이것은 특히 신의 한 인격 면에서보다 더 일어날 수는 없다: 더욱이 이 일은 로고스의 인격 면에서 일어나는 것이 다른 인격들 면에서보다 더 적절하다는 게 분명하다. 결론적으로 로고스 신과 인간 존재는 한 인격 안에서 결합될 것은 불가피하다.
B. The road, fortified on both sides by logic, along which you are leading me is such that I see I cannot depart from it either to the right or to the left.
니가 날 따라 이끈 논리에 의해 양쪽으로 강화된 그 길이 오른쪽으로도 왼쪽으로도 떠날 수 없음을 알 그런 거다.
A. But it is not I who am leading you but the one about whom I am speaking, without whom we can do nothing, and who is our guide wherever we keep to the way of truth.
허나 너 이끈 게 내가 아니라 내가 말하고 있는 자고, 그 없이 우린 못 했을 거고, 우리 인도자다 진리의 길을 지키는 언제든.
(...읽을 수록 정나미가 떨어져서, 씨바.)


10. That this same man does not die obligatorily; and in what sense he is, or is not, capable of sinning, and why he, or an angel, should be praised for his righteousness, even though they are incapable of sinning
이 동일한 인간이 의무적으로 죽은 게 아니라는 것; 어떤 의미에서 그가 죄를 짓거나 짓지 않을 능력이 있는지, 그리고 왜 그나 천사가 그의 정의로움에 대해 기원되어야 하는지, 설령 그들이 죄를 짓지 못할지라도.

We must now investigate whether that man is obligatorily to die, just as all other men die obligatorily. . .^[각주:7] But, if it is the case that Adam would not have been destined to die if he had not sinned, then this man, in whom it will be impossible for sin to exist because he is to be God, will have still less of an obligation to die.
이제 우리 저 인간이 의무적으로 죽을 건지, 다른 모든 인간들이 의무적으로 죽는 것처럼...?... 탐구해야만 해. 하지만, 만일 아담이 죄를 짓지 않았더라면 죽도록 운명지어지지 않았을 것이란 게 사실이라면, 이 인간은 그가 신일 것이라서 그 안에 죄가 있는 게 불가능할 자로서 죽을 의무를 훨씬 덜 지닐 거다.
B. I wish to detain you on this point for a little while. For whether it is said that he cannot sin, or that he can, in either case a question of considerable importance arises, as I see it. For if he is said to be incapable of sinning, it seems difficult to believe that he has this obligation. Let us speak, just for a moment, not as if with reference to a person who has never existed, which has been our procedure so far, but about the person whom we know, and whose deeds we are acquainted with. Who will deny that he could have done many things which we call sins? For instance—not to mention other examples—how are we to say that he could not have lied, something which is always a sin. For, given that he says to the Jews, with reference to the Father, ‘If I say that I do not know him, I shall be a liar, like you’ [ Joh. 8: 55], and he says in the course of this utterance, ‘I do not know him’; who will be able to assert that he could not have uttered these five words^[각주:8] in isolation from the remainder of the utterance, so as to say, ‘I do not know him’? If he were to do this, as he himself states, he would be a liar—and that is to be a sinner. Hence, since he could do this, he was capable of sin.
나는 이 지점에서 조금 더 당신을 붙들고 싶다. 왜냐하면 그가 죄를 지을 수 없다는 얘긴지, 아니면 그가 그럴 수 있다는 건지, 어느 경우이든 주목할 만한 중요한 질문이 야기된다, 내가 보기에. 만일 그가 죄 지을 능력이 없는 것으로 얘기된다면, 그가 이 의무를 진다는 것을 믿는 게 어려워 보인다. 잠깐이라도 지금까지 우리가 진행해 왔던 것으로, 마치 절대로 존재하지 않았던 사람에 관련한 것처럼이 아니라, 우리가 알고 있는 사람에 대해서, 그리고 그의 업적들을 우리가 익히 아는 사람에 대해서. 우리가 죄들이라 부르는 많은 것들을 그가 행할 수 있었으리란 것을 누가 부정하겠나? 예를 들어 - 다른 예들을 빼고 - 어떻게 우리가 그가 거짓말을 할 수 없었을 거라 말하겠나, 언제나 하나의 죄인 어떤 것으로서. 왜냐하면, 그가 유대인들에게 성부와 관련하여 '만일 내가 그를 모른다고 말한다면, 나는 거짓말쟁이가 될 것이다, 늬들처럼'이라 말했다고 가정하면, 그가 이 발언과정에서 '나는 그를 모른다'라고 말했기 때문이다; 누구라고 그가 이 다섯 단어들을 그 발언의 나머지 부분들로부터 독립적으로, 언급할 수 없었다고 단언할 수 있겠는가? 만일 그가 이리 했다면, 그 스스로 진술하듯, 그는 거짓말쟁이가 되었을 것이고 - 죄인이 되었을 것이다. 따라서, 이리 할 수 있었으니, 그는 죄를 지을 수 있었다.
A. It was possible for him to say this and, at the same time, not to be capable of sin.
이 말을 하는 게 그에게 가능했고, 동시에, 죄를 지을 수 없었다.
B. Demonstrate this.
이걸 증명해 줘.
A. All capability is consequent upon will. For when I say, ‘I am capable of speaking’ or ‘walking’, this contains an implicit subtext, ‘If it is my will’. If will, then, is not implicit, what is being referred to is not capability but inevitability. For if I say, ‘I am capable of being dragged away’ or ‘defeated’, against my will, the reference is not to my capability, but to inevitability, and the capability of another individual. To be precise, to say, ‘I am capable of being dragged away’ or ‘of being defeated’ is no different from saying, ‘Another person is capable of dragging me away’ or ‘defeating me’. We can therefore say of Christ that he could tell a lie, if this statement is recognized to contain the implication, ‘If it were his will’. And since he could not lie unwillingly and it could not be his will to tell a lie, it can equally be stated that he was incapable of lying. It follows that thus he both could, and could not, tell a lie.
모든 능력은 의지의 결과다. 왜냐하면 내가 '나는 말할 수 없다'거나 '나는 걸을 수 없다'라고 말할 때, 이건 내포된 숨은 이유를 포함한다, '만일 그것이 내 의지라면'이라는 걸. 그래서 만일 의지가 내포되지 않는다면, 언급되는 것은 능력이 아니라 불가피성이다. 왜냐하면 만일 내가 내 의지에 반하여 '나는 끌려갈 능력이 없다'거나 '나는 패배될 능력이 없다'고 한다면, 그 언급은 내 능력에 대해서가 아니라, 내 불가피성에 대해서이고, 또 다른 별개의 능력이다. 정확히, '나는 끌려갈 능력이 없다'거나 '패배당할 능력이 없다'는 '또 다른 자가 날 끌어내릴 능력이 없다'거나 '나를 패배시킬 능력이 없다'라는 말과 차이가 없다. 우리는 그러므로 그리스도에 대해 그가 거짓말할 수 있었다고 말할 수 있다, 만일 이 진술이 다음 함축을 포함하는 것으로 인정된다면, '만일 그것이 그의 의지라면'. 그리고 그가 비자발적으로 거짓말할 수 없었고 거짓말을 하는 것이 그의 의지일 수 없었으므로, 그가 거짓말할 능력이 없었다고 똑같이 진술될 수 있다. 그래서 그는 거짓말을 할 수 있었기도 없었기도 하다는 결론이다.
B. Let us now revert to making investigations about Christ in the manner we adopted at the outset: as if there were as yet no such person. What I say is this: if he is not going to be capable of sinning, because, as you say, he will not be capable of wishing to sin, he will be upholding righteousness as a matter of inevitable necessity. For this reason, he is not going to be righteous as a result of free will. What gratitude, then, will be due to him for his righteousness? For it is customary among us to say that God’s purpose in making angels and human beings such as to be capable of sinning, was that, in the event that they maintained righteousness while being capable of abandoning it, they should deserve gratitude and praise which they would not deserve if they were righteous as a matter of inevitability.
이제 그리스도에 대해 우리가 처음에 적용했던 방식으로 탐구들을 하는 일로 되돌아가자: 마치 아직 그런 사람이 있던 적 없던 것처럼. 내가 할 말은 이거다: 만일 그가 죄 지을 능력이 없게될 것이라면, 당신 말대로 그가 죄 짓길바랄 능력이 없을 것이기 때문에 그렇다면, 그는 불가피한 필연의 문제로 격상된 정의로움일 것이다. 이런 이유로, 그는 자유 의지의 결과로 정의롭게 되진 않을 것이다. 그럼 그의 정의로움에 대해 그에게 돌릴 감사가 무엇이겠나? 왜냐하면 신이 천사들과 인간 존재들을 죄 지을 능력이 있도록 그렇게 만듦의 목적은, 그들이 정의를 폐기시킬 능력이 있음에도 정의를 유지했던 그 경우에서, 그들이 만일 불가피하게 정의로웠더라면 받을 만하지 않았을 감사와 찬사를 받을 만하도록 하는 것이었다고 우리 사이에서 습관적으로 말하니까.
A. Are the angels, who are now incapable of sinning, not worthy of praise?
지금 죄 지을 능력이 없는 천사들은 찬사받을 만한 가치가 없나?
B. They certainly are, because the fact that they cannot now sin was their reward for not wishing to sin, when capable of doing so.
그들은 확실히 그럴 만한데, 왜냐하면 그들이 지금 죄 지을 수 없다는 사실은 그렇게 할 능력이 있던 때 죄 짓길 바라지 않았음에 대한 상이었기 때문이다.
A. What about God, who cannot sin, and whose inability to sin has not been earned as a reward for not having sinned while being capable of sinning—what do you say about him? Is he not to be praised for his righteousness?
죄를 지을 수 없고 그 죄 지을 능력 없음이 죄 지을 능력이 있음에도 죄 짓지 않았음에 대한 상으로 얻어진 것이 아니었던 신에 대해서는 - 그에 대해서는 뭐라 할 건가? 그는 그의 정의로움에 대해 찬사받지 않게 되겠나?
B. On this point my wish is that you should answer on my behalf. For if I say that he is not worthy of praise, I know that I am lying. But if I say that he is worthy of praise, I am afraid of invalidating the argument which I mentioned about the angels.
이 지점에서 나는 당신이 나를 위해 답하길 기대한다. 왜냐하면 만일 내가 그는 찬사받을 만하지 않다고 하면, 내가 거짓말하고 있다는 걸 내가 아니까. 하지만 만일 그가 찬사 받을만 하다고 말하면, 내가 천사들에 대해 언급했던 논증을 무효화할까 두렵다.
A. The reason why the angels are to be praised for their righteousness is not that they were in the past capable of sinning, but because in some way they possess—independently^[각주:9]—an inability to sin; in this respect they somewhat resemble God, who possesses whatever he possesses independently. Now, someone who does not take something away, when he is capable of doing so, is said to be ‘making a gift of it’, and a person who is capable of making something not be, but refrains from doing so, is said to be ‘making do with it’. In this sense, then, it is correct to assert that an angel ‘gave himself ’ righteousness and ‘made himself ’ righteous, given that, while capable of depriving himself of righteousness, he did not do so and, while capable of making himself unrighteous, he did not make himself so. He therefore possesses righteousness ‘independently’ in this way, because it is impossible for a created being to possess anything ‘independently’ in any other way. As a consequence of this, he deserves to be praised for his righteousness. Furthermore he is not righteous as a matter of necessity but in freedom, because it is not correct to speak of necessity where there is neither any compulsion nor any prohibition. It follows that, since God possesses to a perfect degree what he possesses independently, he most of all is worthy to be praised for the good things which he possesses and keeps in his possession, doing this not out of any inevitable necessity, but as I have said earlier, out of an unchangeability which is his peculiar property and lasts for ever. Thus the man we have in mind, who is also to be God, will be righteous independently and therefore worthy of praise, since he will possess independently every good thing which he will possess, not out of necessity but in freedom. Even though his human nature will possess what he is to possess thanks to his divine nature, he will be possessing it ‘independently’, since his two natures will be one person.
천사들이 그들의 의로움에 대해 찬사받게 될 이유는 그들이 과거에 죄를 지을 능력이 있었기 때문이 아니라, 어떤 식으로 그들이 죄를 지을 능력이 없었음을 -독립적으로- 지녔기 때문이다; 이런 면에서 그들은 어떤 신의 모사이다, 그가 지닌 무엇이든 독립적으로 지니는 그의. 이제, 뭔가를 취할 능력이 있을 때 취하지 않는 누군가는 그것을 '증여함을 이루는 것'이라 얘기되고, 뭔가 있지 않게 만들 능력이 있는 자가, 그러나 그리 하길 관두는 사람은 '그것을 가지고 행했다'고 이야기된다. 이런 의미에서, 그래서, 천사가 의로움에 '그 자신을 주었'고 의롭게 '그 자신을 만들었다'고 주장하는 것은 옳다, 그 자신을 의로움으로부터 저지할 능력이 있음에도, 그리 하지 않았고, 그 자신을 부정의하게 만들 능력이 있음에도, 그 자신을 그렇게 만들지 않았음을 가정하면. 그러므로 그는 이런 식으로 '독립적으로' 의로움을 지닌다, 피조물이 다른 식으로 '독립적으로' 어떤 것을 지니기는 불가능하니까. 이것의 귀결로, 그는 의로움에 대해 찬사받을 만하다. 더욱이 그는 필연의 문제로 의로운 게 아니라 자유롭게 의로운데, 왜냐하면 어떤 강제도 어떤 금지도 없는 곳에서 필연을 말하는 것 부정확하기 때문이다. 결론으로, 신이 완전한 정도로 그가 지닌 것을 독립적으로 지니므로, 그는 무엇보다도 그가 지니고 그의 소유로 견지한 좋은 것들에 대해 찬사받을 만하다, 이 일을 어떤 불가피한 필연으로부터도 아니라, 내가 앞서 말했듯, 그의 특유하고 영원한 불변성으로부터 함으로써. 그래서 우리가 염두에 두는 사람은, 또한 신이기도 한 그는, 독립적으로 의로울 것이고 그래서 찬사받을 만한데, 그가 독립적으로 그가 지닐 모든 좋은 것들을 지닐 것이기 때문이고, 필연으로부터가 아니라 자유롭게 그럴 것이기 때문이다. 그의 인간 본성이 그가 그의 신성에 그 소유를 감사할 것을 지닐 것이라 하더라도, 그는 그것을 '독립적으로' 지니고 있게 될 것인데, 그의 두 본성들이 한 인격일 것이기 때문이다.
B. You have satisfied me by means of this argument, and I see plainly both that it will not be possible for him to sin and that, even so, he will be worthy of praise for his righteousness. But now I think the question has to be asked: given that God is capable of creating such a man, why did he not make the angels and the first two human beings such that they would likewise be both incapable of sinning and worthy of praise for their righteousness?
이 논증으로 넌 날 채워줬어(앙), 그리고 나는 그가 죄 짓는 게 불가능하리란 것도, 그렇지만 그는 그의 의로움에 대해 찬사받을 만하다는 것도 충분히 알았어. 하지만 이제 나는 이런 물음을 던져야 한다고 생각해: 신이 그런 인간을 만들 능력이 있었다고 가정하면, 왜 마찬가지로 죄 지을 능력도 없고 의로움으로 찬사도 받을 만한 천사들과 처음 두 인간 존재들을 만들지 않았지?
A. Do you understand what you are saying?
니가 말하고 있는 게 뭔 소린지 알아?
B. It seems to me that I understand it, and that is why I am asking why he did not make them like this.
난 이해하는 것 같아, 그리고 내가 묻고 있는 이유는 그가 그들을 이와 같이 만들지 않았던 이유야.
A. This was because it was neither right nor possible for it to be brought about that any one of them should be identical with God, as is the case, so we are saying, with this man. And if you ask why he does not bring this about for as many such human beings as there are persons of God, or why he did not at least do it for one of them, I answer that reason did not at all demand that this should be done: rather, since God does nothing irrationally, it prohibited this.
그게 옳지도 않았고 그들 중 누구 하나, 우리가 말하고 있는 이 사람의 경우처럼, 신과 동일시될 것이 일어난다는 게 가능하지도 않았기 때문에 그래. 그리고 만일 니가 왜 신이 신의 인격들이 있는 만큼 그런 인간 존재들을 그렇게 하지 않는지 이유를 묻는다면, 혹은 그가 최소한 그들 중 한 사람에 대해서 그걸 하지 않았는지 묻는다면, 나는 이성이 이것이 그리 되어야 할 것을 전혀 요구하지 않았다고 답해: 차라리, 신이 아무것도 비이성적으로 하지 않으므로, 이성이 이 일을 금지했어.
B. I am ashamed at having asked this question.
이 물음 물은 게 부끄럽네.
A. Let us say, therefore, that the God-Man will be under no obligation to die, since he will not be a sinner.
그러니까 신-인간은 죽을 아무런 의무도 없을 것인데, 그가 죄인이 안 될 거라 그렇다고 말하자.
B. I must admit this to be the case.
난 이걸 사실이라 인정해야만 해.

-蟲-

XXI. Quanti ponderis sit peccatum.
XXII. Quam contumeliam fecit homo deo, cum se permisit vinci a diabolo, pro qua satisfacere non potest.
XXIII. Quid abstulit deo cum peccavit, quod reddere nequit.
XXIV. Quod quamdiu non reddit deo quod debet, non possit esse beatus nec excusetur impotentia.
XXV. Quod ex necessitate per Christum salvetur homo.
(Schmitt, 88.11-96.20)

21. How heavy the weight of sin is
22. What an insult a human being inflicts on God when he allows himself to be conquered by the devil—one for which he is incapable of paying recompense
23. What it was that man stole from God when he sinned—something which he cannot give back
24. That, so long as a human being does not give back to God what he owes, he may not be blessedly happy, and his incapacity may not be excused
25. That it follows as a necessary consequence that mankind is saved by Christ

21. How heavy the weight of sin is

A. Let us hypothesize that those things which you proposed you could offer in repayment for sin are not a debt which you owe, and let us see whether they can suffice as recompense for a single sin, even so small a sin as one glance contrary to the will of God.
우리 다음과 같이 가정하기로 하세. 자네가 죄의 대가로 내놓을 수 있으리라 제안했던 그런 것들이 당신이 갚아야 할 빚이 아니라고 말일세. 그리고 그것들이 단 하나의 죄에 대한 대가로라도 충분할 수 있을지 보기로 하세. 신의 뜻에 반하여 한 번 곁눈질을 한 만큼 그렇게 작은 죄일지라도.
B. Were it not that I hear you calling this matter into question, I would think that I cancel this sin by a single moment of repentance.
이 일이 문제거리라고 하신 말씀을 제가 들은 것이 만일 그렇지 않았다면, 저는 이 죄를 회개의 단 한 순간으로 해소한다고 여겼을 테지요.
A. You have not yet considered how heavy the weight of sin is.
자네는 아직 죄의 무게가 얼마나 무거운지 고찰하지 않았네.
B. Explain this to me now.
이제 이 점을 제게 설명해 주시지요.
A. If you were to see yourself in the sight of God, and someone were to say to you, ‘Look over there’, and God were to interject, ‘It is totally against my will that you should look’, consider for yourself in your own heart what contingency there is, in the totality of things which exist, on account of which you are obliged to take that look contrary to the will of God.
만일 자네가 신의 관점에서 자네 자신을 보게 된다면, 그리고 누군가 자네에게 이리 말한다면, '저길 보시오', 그리고 신께서는 그와 반대로, '네가 보려 함을 나는 결코 원치 않는다', 이리 말씀하신다면, 자네 자신의 마음 속에서 자네 자신을 고려해 보게, 존재하는 모든 것 속에, 신의 뜻에 반하여 보는 일을 취해야 하는 이유가 되는 무언가가 있을지.
B. I can think of no contingency requiring me to do this, unless, maybe, I should be placed in an unavoidable situation where it would be absolutely necessary for me either to do this or commit a greater sin.
저는 제가 이 일을 해야 하도록 만드는 아무것도 생각할 수 없습니다, 아마도 제가 이 일을 하거나 그렇지 않으면 더 큰 죄를 저지르거나 하는 일이 절대적으로 필연적일 그런 불가피한 상황에 처하지 않는 한 말입니다.
A. Set aside that case of absolute necessity, and consider, with exclusive reference to the particular sin in question, whether you can commit it in order to secure your own redemption.
절대적으로 필연적인 경우는 제쳐두고, 고찰해 보게, 문제가 되는 그 특정한 죄에 대한 배타적인 언급을 가지고, 자네가 그 일을 자네 자신의 죄갚음을 바라며 행할 수 있을지 말일세.
B. I see clearly that I cannot.
저는 제가 하지 못하리란 걸 분명히 압니다.
A. To come to the point and not detain you further, what if it were necessary either for the whole universe and whatever is not God to perish and be brought to nothing, or for you to do this thing, such a little thing, against the will of God?
(ne te diutius protraham)나는 자네를 더 멀리까지 이끌진 않을 걸세. 그런데 만일 세계 전체와 신 아닌 무엇이든 파멸하고 무로 돌려지는 것이나, 아니면 자네가 이것, 그런 사소한 것을, 신의 뜻에 반하여 행하는 것이 필연적이라면 어떤가?
B. When I consider the action itself, I see that it is an extremely lightweight matter—but if I consider that17) it is contrary to the will of God, I realize that it is something extremely grave, and incomparably greater than any loss. But we are in the habit of doing something occasionally against someone’s will in a way which is not reprehensible, with the aim that his interests may be protected; and this deed afterwards pleases the person against whose will we are acting.
그 행위 자체를 생각해 볼 때, 저는 그것이 지극히 가벼운 문제라는 것을 압니다 - 하지만 만일 제가 그 일이 신의 뜻에 반하는 것임을 고려한다면, 저는 그 일이 극도로 중대한 것임을, 그리고 어떤 손실보다도 비교할 수 없이 대단한 어떤 것임을 깨닫습니다. 허나 우리는 종종 비난받지 않을 만한 방식으로 누군가의 뜻에 반하여 어떤 일을 해 버릇합니다, 그의 이해관계가 보호될 목적을 가지고 말이죠: 그리고 이 행위는 이후에 우리가 그의 뜻에 반하여 행위하고 있는 그 사람을 기쁘게 합니다.
17) The translation here presupposes a conjectural reading, quod sit contra voluntatem dei . . . in place of quid sit contra voluntatem dei (Schmitt, 89.5).
A. This happens in the case of the person who sometimes does not understand what is in his own interest, or is incapable of replacing what he loses. But God lacks for nothing and, if all things were to perish, he would be capable of restoring them in the same way that he created them.
이런 일은 때로 무엇이 자신의 고유한 이익인지 이해하지 못하는 그런 사람의 경우에 일어나거나, 그가 상실한 것을 대체할 능력이 없는 사람의 경우에 일어나지. 하지만 신께서는 어떤 것도 부족함이 없으시고, 만일 만물이 소멸한다면, 그 분께서는 그것들을 창조하셨던 방식과 동일한 방식으로 되돌리실 능력을 갖고 계실 것이네.
B. I have no alternative but to admit that, for the sake even of preserving the whole of creation, there is nothing which I ought to do contrary to the will of God.
저로서는 받아들일 수밖에 달리 아무런 대안도 없군요, 설령 창조의 전체를 보존하기 위해서라도 할지라도, 제가 신의 뜻에 반하여 행해야 할 아무것도 없다는 걸 말입니다.
A. What if there were several universes, full of created beings, just like this one?
그런데 만일 여러 세계들이 있다면 어떤가, 바로 이 세계와 마찬가지로 피조물들로 가득 찬 세계들 말이네?
B. If there were an infinite multiplicity of universes, and they were similarly laid out before me, this is the answer which I would give.
만일 무한히 다양한 세계들이 있다면, 그리고 그 세계들이 제 앞에 유사하게 펼쳐져 있다면, 이것이 제가 내놓을 대답입니다.
A. You could not be more absolutely right. But consider, too, if it came about that you took that glance contrary to the will of God: what recompense could you make for this sin?
자네는 더할 나위 없이 옳군. 허나 생각해 보게, 마찬가지로, 만일 자네가 신의 뜻에 반하여 눈길을 주는 일을 행하게 된다고 말일세: 자네가 이 죄에 대해 행할 수 있을 보상이 무엇인가?
B. There is nothing I possess greater than what I have spoken of earlier.
제가 앞서 말씀드린 것보다 더 큰 것을 제가 지닌 바 아무것도 없습니다.
A. This is how seriously we sin, whenever we knowingly do anything, however small, contrary to the will of God. For we are always in his sight, and it is always the teaching he gives us that we should not sin.
(Sic graviter peccamus)그런 식으로 우리가 심각하게 죄를 저지른다네, 언제든 얼마나 작은 일이든 간에 뭔가 신의 뜻에 반하여 알고도 행할 때에는 말일세. 왜냐하면 우리는 언제나 그 분의 시야 안에 있고, 우리가 죄를 짓지 않아야 한다는 것은 그 분께서 언제나 우리에게 주시는 가르침이니까.
B. To judge from what I am hearing, we live very dangerously.
제가 들은 바로부터 판단컨데, 우리는 실로 위험천만하게 살고 있습니다.
A. It is obvious that God demands recompense in proportion to the magnitude of the sin.
신께서 죄의 크기에 비례하여 보상을 요구하심은 분명하지.
B. Undeniably.
부정할 수 없도록 말입니다.
A. You do not therefore give recompense if you do not give something greater than the entity on account of which you ought not to have committed the sin.
그러니 자네는 만일 자네가 그로 말미암아 죄를 짓지 않아야 했던 그것보다 더욱 큰 뭔가를 내놓지 않는다면 보상을 바치지 않는 걸세.
B. I see that logic demands this: I also see that it is utterly impossible.
저는 논리가 이런 것을 요구한다는 점을 알겠습니다: 저는 또한 그것이 전적으로 불가능하다는 것도 알겠습니다.
A. And God cannot raise up to a state of blessedness anyone who is to any extent bound by indebtedness arising from sin.
그리고 신께서는 죄로부터 일어나는 부채로 인한 어떤 정도의 한계에든 속하는 그 누구든 지복한 상태로 격상시키실 수 없다네.
B. This verdict is an extremely grave one.
이 결론은 지극히 중요한 것이로군요.

22. What an insult a human being inflicts on God when he allows himself to be conquered by the devil—one for which he is incapable of paying recompense

A. Listen to another reason why it is equally difficult for a human being to be reconciled with God.
인간에게 신과 조화를 이룬다는 것이 마찬가지로 어려운 또 다른 이유를 들어 보게.
B. If it were not that faith were consoling me, just the one reason would force me to despair.
만일 신앙이 저를 위로하고 있다는 점만 아니라면, 바로 그 한 가지 이유가 저를 절망하도록 강제하였을 겁니다.
A. Listen, even so.
그럴지라도 들어 보게.
B. Speak.
말씀하시죠.
A. In the Garden, man was created without sin, as if he were placed there as God’s deputy, in a position between God and the devil, the intention being that he might overcome the devil by not consenting when the devil recommended sin by means of persuasion. In the event that man were not to sin despite the devil’s persuasion, this would vindicate and honour God and confound the devil, who, despite his greater strength, committed sin in heaven as a consequence of no one’s persuasion. And although man was easily capable of doing this, he allowed himself to be conquered by persuasion alone, not under forcible compulsion. He did this in accordance with the will of the devil and contrary to the will and honour of God.
낙원에서, 마치 신의 보좌로서 그 자리에 있는 듯이, 인간은 죄 없이 창조되었지, 신과 악마의 사이 자리에, 악마가 설득을 사용하여 죄를 짓도록 권할 적에, 동의하지 않음으로써 악마를 극복할 수 있을 의사를 지닌 채로 말일세. 인간이 악마의 설득에도 불구하고 죄를 짓지 않았을 경우, 신을 증거하고 또한 그 분께 영광을 바치며 악마를 반박하는 일이 될 걸세, 그의 대단한 힘에도 불구하고, 그 누구의 설득도 없던 결과로 천국에서 죄를 지었던 그를 말일세. 그리고 설령 인간이 이 일을 쉽사리 행할 능력이 있었다 하더라도, 그는 그 자신이 단지 설득만으로 정복되도록 허용하였고, 물리적 강제 하에 그리하진 않았네. 그는 이 일을 악마의 뜻에 따라 신의 뜻과 영광에 반하여 행했지.
B. Where do you intend this argument to lead?
이 논증의 어디로 인도하실 요량이신지요?
A. Judge for yourself whether it is not contrary to the honour of God that man should be reconciled with him so long as he is subject to the charge18) of having inflicted this insult upon God—unless he has previously honoured God by conquering the devil just as he has dishonoured him by having been conquered by the devil. Now, the character of this victory ought to be as follows. In the same way that man, when he was strong and potentially immortal, easily complied with the devil’s suggestion that he should commit a sin, and hence justly incurred the penalty of becoming mortal, correspondingly, now that he is weak and mortal, being himself responsible for having made himself like this, man needs to conquer the devil through the difficulty of death, and in so doing to sin in no way. He cannot do this, so long as he is conceived by the wound of primal sin, and so long as he is born in sin.
자네 스스로, 인간이, 그가 신께 이러한 모욕을 가했다는 죄의 적용을 받는 한에서 그 분께 조화되어야 한다는 것이 신의 영광에 반하지 않는가 여부를 판단해 보게 - 그가 이전에 악마에 의해 정복당했던 일로써 신께 불명예를 입혔던 바로 그런 방식으로 악마를 정복함으로써 먼저 신을 영광되게 했던 것이 아닌 한 말일세. 이제, 이 승리의 성격은 다음과 같아야 하네. 인간이, 그가 강력했고 잠재적으로 불멸이었던 때, 그가 죄를 범해야 한다는 악마의 그 제안을 쉽사리 따랐고, 그리하여 정당하게 필멸이 됨의 처벌을 받았던 것과 동일한 방식에서, 이에 부응하여, 이제 그가 나약하고 죽을 운명인 바, 그가 그 자신을 이와 같이 만들었던 데에 스스로 책임이 있는 자로서, 인간은 죽음의 고난을 통하여 악마를 정복해야 할 필요가 있고, 어떤 식으로도 죄 짓지 않는 방식으로 그리 해야 하네.(per mortis difficultatem vincat diabolum ut nullo modo peccet).
18) Calumnia: in classical Latin always a ‘false charge’; in the Latin of Anselm’s period it is sometimes used simply to mean any ‘charge’.
B. Once more I say that what you are saying is both logically proven and an impossibility.
다시 한 번 저는 당신께서 말씀하고 계신 것이 논리적으로도 증명된 것이고 또한 불가능한 것이라고 말합니다.

23. What it was that man stole from God when he sinned—something which he cannot give back

A. Here is something else again—no less impossible—without which there is no way for mankind to be justly reconciled.
여기 다시 또 다른 어떤 것이 있다네 - 조금도 덜 불가능한 것이 아닌데 - 그것 없이는 인류가 정당하게 보상을 드릴 아무런 방법도 없는 것이지.
B. You have already put before us so many things which we are under an obligation to do, that nothing that you add could make me more terrified.
당신께서는 이미, 당신께서 덧붙이실 그 어떤 것도 이 이상 저를 참담하게 만들지 못할, 우리에게 해야 할 의무가 있는 그다지도 많은 것들을 우리 앞에 내놓으셨습니다.
A. Listen, nevertheless.
그렇지만, 들어보게.
B. I am listening.
듣고 있습니다.
A. What did man steal from God when he allowed himself to be conquered by the devil?
인간이 그 자신을 악마로 하여금 정복되도록 허하였을 때 신으로부터 인간이 훔친 것은 무엇인가?
B. You do the talking, seeing that you have begun—for I do not know what he could have done additional to those evils which you have been disclosing.
당신께서 말씀해 주시지요, 당신께서 시작하셨으니 말입니다 - 왜냐하면 저는 당신께서 폭로하신 그러한 악들에 추가할 만한 뭔가를 알지 못하니까요.
A. Did he not steal from God whatever he planned to do with regard to the human species?19)
그는 신께서 인간 종(인간 본성)에 관하여 행하도록 계획하셨던 무엇이든지 간에 그것을 신으로부터 갈취하지 않았는가?
19) ‘With regard to the human species’: Lat. de humana natura.
B. This is undeniable.
이 점은 부정할 수 없습니다.
A. Subject the matter to strict justice, and judge accordingly whether man may give recompense for his sin to a level commensurate with his sin, if he does not give back, by conquering the devil, what he has stolen from God by allowing himself to be conquered by the devil. Just as, through the fact of man’s defeat, the devil took what belonged to God, and God lost it, so, correspondingly, in the event of man’s victory, the devil would be the loser and God would regain what he had lost.
엄격한 정의에 대한 문제를 주제로 삼고, 그에 따라 인간이 그의 죄에 상응하는 차원에서 그의 죄에 대한 보상을 제공하겠는지 판단해 보게, 만일 그가 악마를 정복함으로써 그가 자신을 악마에 의해 지배되도록 허함으로써 신으로부터 훔쳐냈던 것을 되돌려주지 않는다고 한다면 말일세. 바로 그렇게, 인간의 패배라는 그 사실을 통하여, 악마는 신께 속하는 것을 취하였고, 신께서는 그것을 잃으셨으며, 그리하여, 그에 따라서, 인간의 승리의 경우, 악마는 상실한 자가 될 것이고 신께서는 당신께서 잃으신 것을 되찾으실 것이네.
B. One can imagine nothing stricter or more just.
그보다 더 엄격하거나 더욱 정의로운 아무것도 상상할 수 없습니다.
A. Do you think the supreme justice capable of violating this justice?
자네는 지고의 정의가 이러한 정의를 침해할 수 있다 생각하는가?
B. I dare not think so.
감히 그리 생각하진 않습니다.
A. Man, therefore, neither ought nor can receive from God what God planned to give him, unless man returns to God all that he has taken away from him. In this way, just as God incurred loss through man, similarly, through man’s agency, God would recover what he had lost. The only way in which this can be put into effect is as follows. Because of the man who was conquered, the whole of humanity20) is rotten and, as it were, in a ferment with sin—and God raises up no one with sin to fill up the complement of the renowned heavenly city. Correspondingly, supposing a man were victorious, because of him as many humans would be brought out of sin into a state of righteousness21) as would make up that full number to which I have referred, for the completion of which mankind was created. But a man who is a sinner is in no way capable of doing this, for one sinner cannot make another sinner righteous.
그러므로 인간은 그가 신으로부터 앗아갔던 모든 것을 신께 되돌려 드리지 않는 한, 신께서 인간에게 주기로 계획하셨던 것을 신으로부터 받아야 하는 것도 아니고 받을 수 있는 것도 아닐세. 이런 방식으로, 신께서 인간으로 인하여 상실을 당하셨던 바로 그와 같이, 유사하게, 인간의 행위를 통하여, 신께서는 그 분께서 잃으신 것을 되돌리실 것이네. 이 일이 수행될 수 있는 유일한 방식은 다음과 같네. 정복당하였던 그 인간으로 인하여, 인간 본성 전체가 부패하였네, 이를 테면, 죄와 더불은 들끓음 안에서 말일세 - 그리고 신께서는 알려진 천상의 나라의 보완자로 죄 지은 그 누구도 채워 올리지 않으신다네. 따라서, 한 사람의 승자를 가정하면, 그 자로 인하여, 죄로부터 벗어나 정의롭게 될 인간들의 수 만큼 내가 언급하였던 완전수를 구성할 터인데, 인류가 그것을 위해 창조된 그 보완 때문이지. 하지만 죄인인 자는 어떤 식으로도 이 일을 행할 능력이 없으니, 죄인은 다른 죄인을 의롭게 할 수 없기 때문이네.
20) ‘Humanity’, Lat. humana natura, so Migne edition.
21) ‘Brought . . . into a state of righteousness’; Lat. iustificentur.

B. Nothing could be more just and, equally, nothing could be more impossible. Rather, what appears to be the case from all these considerations is that the mercy of God and the hope of man are dead, so far as the state of blessedness is concerned for which mankind was created.
더할 나위 없이 정의롭고, 마찬가지로, 더할 나위 없이 불가능합니다. 차라리, 이런 고찰들로부터 사실인 것으로 드러나는 바는 신의 자비와 인간의 희망은 죽었다는 것입니다, 인류가 그와 같은 관심으로 창조되었던 그 지복의 상태와 관련하여서는 말입니다.

24. That, so long as a human being does not give back to God what he owes, he may not be blessedly happy, and his incapacity may not be excused

A. Wait a little longer.
조금 더 기다리게.
B. What further do you have in store?
뭔가 더 하실 말씀이라도 있습니까?
A. If a man who returns what he owes to another man is said to be a wrongdoer, he is much more a wrongdoer if he does not return what he owes to God.
만일 다른 사람에게 빚진 것을 되돌려 주지 않는 사람 잘못한 자라 이야기된다면, 신께 빚진 것을 되갚지 않는다면 그는 훨씬 더 잘못한 자이지.
B. If he is capable of returning it and does not do so, he is certainly a wrongdoer. But if he does not have the capacity, in what sense is he a wrongdoer?
되갚을 능력이 있으면서 그리 하지 않는다면, 그는 확실히 잘못한 자입니다. 하지만 그가 능력이 없다면, 어떤 의미에서 그가 잘못한 자인지요?
A. Perhaps, if the responsibility for his incapacity does not rest with him, he can be excused to some extent. But if there is blame inherent in the incapacity itself, the incapacity does not mitigate the sin itself, any more than it excuses the person who does not repay the debt. For suppose someone assigns his bondslave a task, and tells him not to leap into a pit from which he cannot by any means climb out, and that bondslave, despising the command and advice of his master, leaps into the pit which has been pointed out to him, so that he is completely unable to carry out the task assigned to him. Do you think that his incapacity serves in the slightest as a valid excuse for him not to perform the task assigned to him?
아마도, 만일 그의 무능력에 대해서 그가 책임이 없다면, 그는 어느 정도까지 양해받을 수 있네. 허나 만일 그 무능력 자체 내에 내재하는 책임이라면, 그 무능력이 죄 자체를 경감시키지 않지, 빚을 갚지 않은 자를 양해해 주는 그 무능력보다 조금도 더 그리하지 않는다네. 어떤 이가 자신의 노예에게 일을 맡긴다고, 그리고 그 노예에게 그 노예가 어떤 수를 쓰더라도 기어 오를 수 없는 구덩이로 뛰어들지 말라고 말한다고 가정해 보게. 그리고 그 주인의 명령과 조언을 가벼이 여기는 저 노예는 그에게 주인이 가리켜 주었던 그 구덩이로 뛰어들어서, 그에게 맡겨진 그 일을 전혀 수행할 수 없게 되었다고 가정해 보게. 자네는 그의 무능이 그에게 맡겨진 일을 수행하지 않은 데 대한 조금이라도 타당한 양해해 줄 여지가 있다고 생각하는가?
B. Not at all. It serves, rather, to increase his guilt, since he has brought the incapacity upon himself. For indeed he has sinned in two ways: in having not done what he was told to do, and in having done what he has been told not to do.
전혀 아닙니다. 그 무능은 오히려 그의 죄를 가중시킵니다. 그가 그 자신에게 그 무능을 초래하였으니 말입니다. 게다가 그는 두 가지 방식들로 죄를 저질렀으니까요: 그가 행하도록 이야기된 일을 행하지 않았다는 점에서, 그리고 그가 행하지 말라고 이야기된 일을 행했다는 점에서 말입니다.
A. Thus, a person who has of his own accord bound himself by a debt which he cannot repay, has thrown himself into this state of incapacity by his guilt. As a result, he is unable to repay what he owed before his sin, that is, an obligation not to sin, and the fact that he is in debt as a consequence of his sin is inexcusable. For the very fact of his incapacity is blameworthy: because it is something he ought not to have, no indeed, he is under an obligation not to have it. Therefore, just as it is blameworthy for someone not to have that capacity which he received in order that he should be able to guard against sin, similarly it is blameworthy for him to have an incapacity as a result of which he cannot uphold righteousness and guard against sin and cannot, moreover, repay the debt which he owes on account of his sin. For he has acted of his own volition, and it is as a consequence that he has lost his former capability, and has arrived at his present state of incapacity. Now, it is the same thing for him not to have a capability which he ought to have, as it is for him to have an incapacity which he ought not to have. Consequently, a person’s incapacity to repay to God what he owes—an incapacity which brings it about that he does not make repayment—does not excuse him, in the event that he does not make repayment. For the result22) of a sin does not excuse a sin which it brings about.
그래서, 자진하여 그가 갚을 수 없는 빚으로 그 자신을 묶은 바 있는 인간은, 그 자신의 죄로써 이와 같은 불능의 상태로 자신을 내친 것일세. 결과적으로, 그는 그가 죄에 앞서 빚진 것을 갚지 못하게 되는데, 그건 즉, 죄 짓지 않을 의무이고, 그가 자기 죄의 귀결로서 빚진 처지에 있다는 사실은 양해될 수 없다네. 그의 무능이란 바로 그 사실이 탓할 만한 것이니까: 그것은 그가 하지 않아야 했던 어떤 일이고, 그 일을 하지 않을 의무 아래 있기 때문이지. 그러므로, 어떤 이가 그가 죄에 맞서 지킬 수 있게끔 하도록 받은 저 능력을 지니지 못한다는 것이 비난받을 만한 것인 바와 마찬가지로, 유사하게 그가 죄에 맞서 정의로움을 견지하고 수호하지 못한 결과로서, 더 나아가, 그의 죄로 말미암아 그가 빚진 것을 갚지 못한 결과로서 무능력을 지닌다는 것도 비난 받아 마땅하네. 그는 자기 자신의 의지로써 행동하였고, 그 결과로 이전의 능력을 상실했던 것이며, 작금의 무능한 상태에 이르렀기 때문이지. 이제, 그가 지녀야 할 능력을 지니고 있지 못함은, 그가 지니지 말아야 할 무능력을 지니는 것과 동일한 일일세. 그 귀결로, 신께 빚진 것을 되갚지 못하는 인간의 무능은 - 그가 보상을 이루지 않도록 만든 그 무능은 - 그에게 양해되지 않는다네, 그가 보상을 이루지 않는 경우에 말일세. 왜냐하면 죄의 결과는 그 결과를 일으킨 죄를 양해해 주지 않으니까.
22) Interpreting effectum as a neuter nominative.
B. This is an exceedingly grave consideration, and equally it is an unavoidable fact.
이건 지극히 중대한 고찰이고, 그만큼이나 불가피한 사실입니다.
A. A human being who does not give back to God what he owes is, therefore, a wrongdoer.
신께 빚진 것을 되돌려 드리지 않는 인간 존재는 그러므로 잘못한 자일세.
B. That is all too true. For he is a wrongdoer because he does not give it back, and he is a wrongdoer because he is unable to give it back.
그 역시 전적으로 옳습니다. 그는 그것을 되돌려 주지 않는 탓으로 잘못하는 자이고, 그것을 되돌려 줄 수 없는 자이기에 잘못한 자입니다.
A. No wrongdoer, moreover, will be admitted to a state of blessed happiness, since blessed happiness is sufficiency in which there is no want and, correspondingly, this state is appropriate for nobody except a person in whom there is such pure righteousness that there is no wrongdoing in him.
더 나아가, 잘못한 자 그 누구라도 지복의 상태가 허락되지 않을 것인데, 지복은 아무런 결핍 없는 만족이고, 따라서, 이 상태는 내적으로 순수한, 아무 잘못이 없는 정의를 지닌 인간을 제외하고는 그 누구에게도 적당하지 않기에 그러하네.
B. I do not have the audacity to believe otherwise.
저는 달리 생각할 만큼 몰염치하지 않습니다.
A. A human being, therefore, who does not repay to God what he owes, will be incapable of being blessedly happy.
그러므로 신께 빚진 것을 갚지 않는 인간 존재는 지복한 자일 능력이 없게 될 것이네.
B. I am unable to deny that this too follows.
이리 귀결됨을 부정할 수 없습니다.
A. But if you want to say, ‘A merciful God remits the debt of anyone who begs forgiveness on the ground that he is incapable of making repayment’, God cannot be said to be remitting anything except either: that which the person ought to repay and cannot, that is, recompense which he might hypothetically be able to give for his sin—sin which ought not to be committed even for the sake of preserving everything that exists which is not God—or alternatively: that which, by way of punishment, he was about to take away from a person against that person’s will, that is, the state of blessed happiness. But if God remits what a person cannot give back of his own volition, for the reason that he is incapable of giving it back—how is this different from saying: ‘God remits what he is not able to have’. But it is mockery for mercy of this kind to be attributed to God. If, however, God remits what he was about to take away from a person against his will, because of that person’s incapacity to make payment—in that case he is making his punishment lax and making a person happy on account of his sin, in that the person has what he ought not to have. For his very incapacity is something he ought not to have, and therefore, so long as he has it without paying recompense, it is sin on his part. But mercy of this kind is absolutely contrary to God’s justice, which does not allow anything to be given in repayment for sin except punishment. Hence, given that it is impossible for God to be self-contradictory, it is impossible for him to be merciful in this way.
그러나 만일 자네가, '자비로우신 하느님께서 그가 보상할 능력이 없다는 점에서 용서를 구하는 누구의 빚이든 사하여 주신다'라고 말하고자 한다면, 신께서는 다음의 것들 외에는 어떤 것도 사하여 주시는 것으로 이야기될 수 없네. 하나는 인간이 보상해야 하지만 할 수 없는 것, 즉 그의 죄에 대하여 가정적으로 내놓을 수 있었을 보상이네 - 그 죄는 신 아닌 존재하는 만물의 보존을 위해서라도 저지르지 않아야 했던 죄일세. 혹은 대안으로, 처벌의 방식에 의해, 그 분께서 인간의 의지에 반하여 인간으로부터 앗아 가실 것으로, 즉, 복락의 상태이네. 허나 만일 신께서 인간이 그의 고유한 의지... 무능으로 보상을 신의 자기모순은 불가능하다. 따라서 이런 식의 자비는 불가능하다.
B. I see that one has to look for some other ‘mercy of God’ than the ‘mercy’ to which you are referring.
더할 나위 없이 신의 자비에 어울린다.
A. Let it be true that God forgives a person who does not repay what he owes, for the reason that he is incapable of repaying.
못 갚아서 봐주는 게 참이라 치자.
B. I would wish this were the case.
그러길 바란다.
A. So long, however, as he does not repay, he will either be wishing to repay, or not wishing to do so. But in the event that he has a desire to do what he is incapable of doing, he will be a person in want: in the event that he does not have this desire, he will be a wrongdoer.
허나 그가 못 갚는 한, 그는 갚길 바라거나 바라지 않을 거다. 하지만 그가 할 수 없는 걸 욕구하는 경우, 그는 결핍된 인간일 거다. 바라지 않으면 잘못하는 거다.
B. Nothing could be clearer.
분명합니다.
A. Now, whether he is in want or whether he is a wrongdoer—in neither case will he be blessedly happy.
이제, 그가 결핍된 자인지 아닌지 혹은 그가 잘못한 자인지 아닌지, 어느 경우든 복락을 누리지 못할 거다.
B. If the God of justice acts according to logic, there is no route whereby wretched little man may escape, and it seems that the mercy of God is dead.
정의로우신 신께서 논리에 따라 행하신다면, 비참한 인간이 달아날 구멍이 없고, 신의 자비는 죽은 걸로 보인다.
A. You asked for logic: here is logic. I do not deny that God is merciful, he who saves ‘men and beasts in accordance with how’ he has ‘multiplied his mercy’.23) Moreover, we are talking about that final mercy, whereby, after this life, he makes a human being blessedly happy. That this state of bliss ought not to be given to anyone whose sins have not been utterly forgiven, and that this forgiveness ought not to happen except on repayment of the debt which is owed because of his sin and which is proportional to the magnitude of his sin, I think I have demonstrated by the logical reasonings set out earlier. If it seems to you that any objection can be made to these logical reasonings, you ought to say so.
논리를 찾는데 여기 있네. 신이 자비로운 걸 부정하지 않네, 다양한 자비의 방식에 따라 인간들과 짐승들을 구원하는 자를. 더욱이 사후 인간을 복락 누리게 하시는 궁극적 자비에 대해 말하고 있네. 이 지복의 상태는 전혀 용서받은 일 없는 죄 지은 누구에게도 주어지지 않아야 하고, 이 용서는 죄로 말미암고 그 죄의 크기에 부합하는 그 빚의 보상 외에 달리 일어나선 안 된다. 나는 앞서 제시한 논리적 추론들로 이를 증명했다 본다. 만일 이 논리적 추론들에 반박이 있어 보인다면, 말해라.
23) Cf. Vulgate, Psalmi iuxta LXX, 35 (36), 7–8: homines et iumenta salvabis, Domine, quemadmodum multiplicasti misericordiam tuam, Deus.

B. I see that I certainly cannot prove any of your logical reasonings in the slightest invalid.
조금의 부당함도 찾을 수 없다.
A. Nor do I think them so, if they are properly considered. Nevertheless, if just one piece of reasoning, out of all those which I have set forth, has the corroboration of unassailable truth, that ought to suffice. For, whether the truth is unassailably demonstrated by one argument or by several, it is equally safeguarded from all doubt.
나도 그렇게 생각한다, 만일 적절히 고려되었다면. 그럼에도 불구하고 만일 내가 내놓은 추론의 한 조각이라도 불가치한 진리의 확증을 가진다면 만족해야 한다. 그 진리가 불가침하게 증명되는 게 논증 하나로든 여럿으로든, 의심 막는데 마찬가지이다.
B. Self-evidently, this is the case.
자명하다.

25. That it follows as a necessary consequence that mankind is saved by Christ

B. How, then, will man be saved, if he does not himself pay what he owes, and is bound not to be saved if he does not pay? What effrontery it is on our part to assert that God, who is ‘rich in mercy’ [cf. Eph. 2: 4] beyond human understanding, cannot do this merciful thing!
그럼 어떻게 인간이 구원될까, 만일 그가 스스로 빌린 걸 못 갚으면, 그리고 그가 갚지 못하면 구원 못 받게 묶여 있으면? 인간의 지성을 넘어서서 자비로 넘치는 신이 이 자비로운 일을 할 수 없다 주장하는 건 얼마나 뻔뻔한가?
A. You ought to demand an answer now from those people, on whose behalf you are speaking, who do not believe that Christ is necessary for the salvation of mankind. They should state by what kind of means mankind can be saved without Christ. If they are in no way able to do so, let them cease mocking us, and come and join those of us who have no doubt that mankind can be saved through Christ, or alternatively let them despair of the notion that salvation can ever happen by any means whatsoever. If they are horrified at the thought, let them believe, with us, in Christ, so that they be capable of being saved.
자네가 대신 말하고 있는 그들에게 이제 답을 요구해야 한다, 예수가 인류 구원을 위해 필연적이라고 믿지 않는 자한테. 그들은 예수 없이 어떤 수단으로 인류 구원 되는지 말해야 한다. 만일 그들이 그럴 방법이 없다면, 그들이 조롱하게 내버려 두고, 인류가 예수 통해 구원될 수 있음을 의심하지 않는 우리와 함께 가거나, 그들로 하여금 어떤 수단으로든 어떻게든 구원이 있으리란 기대를 체념하게 둬라. 그들이 두려워 한다면, 우리와 함께 그리스도 안에서 믿게 하고, 그래서 그들이 구원받을 수 있도록 하라.
B. I shall make the same request as I did at the beginning: that you should explain for what reason it is that mankind is saved through Christ.
처음 요구한 거 다시: 인류가 예수 통해 구원받는 것 이유 설명해줘.
A. Surely it is sufficient proof that it is through Christ that mankind can be saved when even unbelievers affirm that there is some way in which man can become happy, and it has been adequately demonstrated that, if we posit the non-existence of Christ, the salvation of mankind cannot be effected by any means? For these are the alternatives: it will be possible for mankind to be saved through Christ, or by some other means, or by no means. Therefore, if it is untrue that this can happen by no means, or by some other means, it is necessary that it should come about through Christ.
충분한 증명이지? 그리스도 통해서 인류 구원될 수 있다고, 비신자들조차 인간 행복해질 방법 있다고 긍정할 때, 우리가 그리스도 없다 치며 인류 구원 어떤 식으로도 안 된다고 충분히 증명했지? 이건 대안들이지: 인류가 예수 통해 구원받을 수 있거나 아무 방법이 없거나. 그래서 만일 어떤 식으로 일어날 수 없다거나 다른 법이 있다는 게 거짓이면 예수 통한 게 필연적이다.
B. Suppose someone were to see the validity of the reasoning that salvation cannot happen by any other means, while not understanding why it could happen through Christ. He would wish to assert that salvation could not happen through Christ or in any way at all. What shall we say in answer to him?
불가피한 건 알아도 그리스도 통해서 왜 가능한지 모르면. 그는 어떤 식으로도 구원 없다고 할 거야. 걔한테 뭐라 할까?
A. What answer is one to give to someone who, out of an inability to understand why it is, concludes that an inevitable fact is an impossibility?
불가피한 사실이 왜 그런지 모르고 불가능한 것이라 결론내리는 바보한테 뭐라 그래?
B. The answer that he is a fool.
바보라 그러지.
A. And so, what he says deserves contempt.
엿이나 먹으라 그래.
B. True. But one needs to make clear to him the reason why the thing that he reckons impossible is actually the case.
맞아. 근데 그가 불가능하다 여기는 게 실제로 사실이란 거 이유 설명해줘야 해.
A. Do you not understand, on the basis of what we have already said, that it is a necessity that some human beings should attain to happiness? For let us assume that God created mankind without stain with this state of bliss in view and thus that it is unfitting for him to bring to this state a human being who is in any way stained—otherwise he might seem to be having regrets about his good undertaking and to be incapable of bringing his plan to fulfilment. If this is a correct assumption, the incongruity referred to makes it even more impossible that no human being can be brought forward to the state for which he was created. Consequently, one either has to look outside the Christian faith—and this is something for which no logic can offer demonstrative support—for the satisfaction for sin which, as we have demonstrated earlier, needs to come about, or, alternatively, one should have an undoubting belief in that faith. For something which is truthfully deduced to be the case by unavoidable logic ought not to be subjected to doubt, even if the reason why it should be the case is not perceived.
너 몰라? 말했던 전제에서 몇 놈은 복락 누려야 하는 게 필연적인거? 신이 인류를 오점 없이 복된 채로 관조 속에 만들고 얼룩진 놈 거기 놓는 게 안 어울린다고 가정하자. - 다른 식으로는 그의 좋은 일을 후회하고 계획 수행 못하는 걸로 보이니까. 만일 이게 정확한 가정이면, 언급된 부조화가 아무도 그를 위해 창조된 그 복에 못 가는 것을 훨씬 불가능하게 만들어. 결론적으로 그리스도교 신앙 밖에서 보거나 - 증명지지 줄 아무런 논리도 없는 것 - 죄의 보상에 대해서, 앞서 밝혔던 것처럼, 그게 일어나야 한다고, 아니면, 대신에, 그 신념에 의심 없는 신념을 가져야 해. 불가피한 논리도 사실로 추론되는 거는 의심받지 않아야 해, 그 사실이 그래야 하는 이유가 인지되지 않더라도.
B. What you are saying is true.
맞어.
A. So, what more are you asking for?
그럼, 뭐가 더 필요해?
B. I have not come to this point with the aim that you should remove from me doubt about the faith, but so that you should reveal to me the logical basis for my certainty. You have brought me by logical reasoning to this point, so that I might see that man owes to God for his sin something which he is incapable of paying back, and cannot be saved unless he repays it. I wish you likewise to bring me to a position where I may understand that, in terms of logical necessity, all the things which the Catholic faith teaches us to believe have to be the case, if we wish to be saved; where I may understand, too, how it is that they are effective for the salvation of mankind, and how God in his mercy saves mankind, when he does not forgive a person for his sin, if the person in question does not give back what he owes on account of that sin. And, so that your arguments may be all the more certain, make your beginning a long way from your eventual point,24) in such a way that you may build them on a firm foundation.
내 의심 거둬달라고 온 게 아니라 논리적 근거 달라고 온 거야. 논리적으로 이끌어 줘서 내가 인간은 죄에 대해 신에게 빚졌다고 그가 갚을 수 없는 걸 그랬다고, 못 갚으면 구원 못 받는다고 알았어. 논리적 필연으로 가톨릭 교사들이 우리한테 사실이어야 한다고 믿으라 가르치는 거 이해시켜줘. 만일 우리가 구원받길 바란다면; 어떻게 그 믿음들이 인류 구원에 효과적인지 알게 해줘. 그리고 어떻게 신이 자비 속에서 구원하는지도. 만일 인간이 죄로 빌린 거 안 갚으면 용서 못 받는 상황에서 말이야. 그리고 니 논증 확실해지게 목적지에서부터 긴 길을 시작해 줘. 확실한 기초 위에 그것들을 세울 방식으로.
24) There is archaelogical evidence that it was common 12th-cent. bad building practice to erect buildings directly over the (rubbish-filled) quarry pits from which the stone for them had been excavated.

A. May God help me now, because, in setting me such a great task, you are not sparing me in the slightest and are not taking into account the weakness of my knowledge. Nevertheless, seeing that I have made a beginning, I shall make the attempt, not putting trust in myself but in God, and I shall do what I can with his help. But, to avoid causing the would-be reader tedium by too long a continuous argument, let us separate the things which remain to be said from those already said, by making another beginning.
신이 돕는다면, 그런 큰 일 하는 데, 넌 날 조금도 아끼지 않고 내 무식도 고려 안해. 그렇지만 내가 시작했으니 그걸 해 봐야 하겠고, 내가 아니라 신을 신뢰하면서, 그리고 난 내가 그의 도움으로 할 수 있는 걸 할래. 하지만 읽을 놈들 너무 길어 지루하지 않게, 얘기할 남은 거랑 얘기된 거 나누자, 다른 시작을 해서.

-蟲-